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1 – FOREWORD
Foreword
 C
limate change-related migration and displace-
ment are already a reality for many people 
around the world. A growing body of research 
suggests that the number of people affected 
will rise over the coming decades, which will create 
additional risks for the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. This trend and the related issues are 
an increasing topic of discussion at international policy 
fora. The Task Force on Displacement under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Platform on Disaster Displacement 
(PDD) are addressing these policy challenges. The Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) 
is calling for the development of “coherent approaches 
to address the challenges of migration movements in 
the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural 
disasters”. 
This report reflects what is currently known about the 
impacts of climate change on people living in island 
nations and highlights the necessity to develop policies 
that address human mobility dynamics resulting from 
adaptation to these changes. By looking at island and 
archipelagic states as diverse as Kiribati, Saint Lucia and 
the Philippines, the various political frameworks within 
which they operate and the different response mecha-
nisms they have adopted can be examined. First-hand 
interviews with experts from across the regions show 
the multiplicity of challenges governments are facing: 
from difficulties in distribution of relief goods to land 
scarcity, aid dependency, insufficient data and personnel 
capacities. Yet the key interviewees underline ways in 
which governments can capitalise on the strengths 
inherent to island and coastal communities to further 
build resilience using existing and innovative practices. 
For policymakers and non-governmental organisa-
tions, the authors summarise the different national 
approaches taken to the topic and provide recommen-
dations on how to support a sustainable management 
of human mobility. They show that doing so can help 
to avoid some of the worst climate impacts: extreme 
human suffering, particularly of the poorest, when 
people are unable to move out of hazardous areas, but 
also chaotic displacement situations. Providing skills 
training to migrants and creating legal pathways for 
migration can ultimately enable people to move in 
dignity before climate impacts become life threatening. 
For researchers, the findings serve as an entry point into 
the complex network of different government institu-
tions and their responsibilities. Beyond that, they flag 
up research gaps and emphasise the need for more 
home-grown scientific insights that can be used to 
inform policy making. Strengthening the science-policy 
dialogue is key to effectively allocating limited budgets 
for disaster risk reduction, adaptation and relief. 
The German government takes the challenges of 
climate-related migration seriously, as increasingly 
do other countries as well. The Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 
supports its partner countries in protecting the climate 
but also invests in adaptation to climate change and 
assists people whose livelihoods and homes are threat-
ened by devastating climate impacts around the 
world. This study has been conducted as part of the 
programme “Human mobility in the context of climate 
change”, implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). It represents a 
collaborative effort between BMZ, the Potsdam Institute 
for Climate Impact Research (PIK), GIZ, several local 
researchers, and the policymaking and stakeholder 
community in each of the nations in focus. The strategic 
funding provided by BMZ serves to harness the syner-
gies between PIK’s outstanding research capacity and 
GIZ’s long-standing experience in working with govern-
ment partners.
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Prof. Dr. Johan Rockström  |  Director, 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research (PIK)
The present study can help operationalise recommen-
dations of international agreements, fostering human 
rights-based and participatory approaches. The 
growing attention of Caribbean states towards disaster 
response and cross-border displacements in the wake 
of the hurricanes in 2017 or the development of sound 
procedures on voluntary and planned relocations in 
Fiji, both portrayed on the following pages, exemplify 
how countries can take the lead. Not in the future, but 
today – before ever more serious climate impacts hinder 
 proactive and sustainable reactions. 
Thus, we hope that this study will be a valuable resource 
for all stakeholders as they continue their work on 
human rights-based relocations, migration as an adapta-
tion strategy and reducing the hardships associated with 
disaster displacements – putting the principle of “leave 
no one behind” into practice. 
12
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2Executive Summary
 Island and coastal regions belong to the most climate change-exposed habitats. Today, people living in island states experience the devastating effects of extreme tropical cyclones, rising sea levels, droughts 
and ocean acidification. In some cases, entire cultures are 
at risk of extinction because traditional livelihoods can 
no longer provide sufficient resources for survival while 
landmasses are submerged and salinised by high tides. 
Although there have been notable advances over the last 
decades, many island countries still struggle with issues like 
poverty, universal access to basic education, and health-
care. Recent development gains are at risk of reversal by 
the economic and human costs of climate change, which 
increases dependencies on external actors.
While economically and culturally different, archipelagic 
and island countries face common problems of scarcity 
of arable land, remoteness, and the challenges to relief 
distribution in times of disaster. Some of their popula-
tions are vulnerable and have limited resources to adapt in 
situ to adversity. These compounding circumstances are 
push factors for migration and may become so strong that 
people feel they have no other option but to move out of 
harm’s way in order to have the chance of a decent future. 
Island agriculturalists – like subsistence farmers, livestock 
herders, and fishermen – are at particular risk of invol-
untary displacement to places in which their skills give 
them no opportunities to earn a living. These nations and 
particularly vulnerable inhabitants have contributed little 
to nothing to global greenhouse gas emissions. Faced with 
this grave injustice, policymakers in archipelagic and island 
states are trying to understand potential future changes 
and their implications for their nations. Consequently, 
many have voiced demands for halting global mean 
temperature increase at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. 
On the achievement of this climate protection goal, they 
Barbuda – Antigua and Barbuda  (© Kira Vinke / PIK)
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have little to no influence, but rely – some with their terri-
torial existence – on the mitigation plans of the high emit-
ters and the pressure of the international community.
Increasing climatic risks already prompted relocation of 
villages, and recent changes in the natural environment 
contributed to migration decisions and forced displace-
ment. Non-governmental organisations are demanding 
more governmental support for affected communities. 
This reality has led policymakers in some countries to 
consider new mechanisms to influence mobility patterns 
and to guide displacement responses and planned reloca-
tion. Others have just started the dialogue on this topic. 
Their ability to act and come up with policy solutions to 
address human mobility in the context of climate change, 
though, is limited by strained financial resources, which 
are under additional pressures to adapt and reconstruct 
infrastructure after disasters. Moreover, it can be politi-
cally difficult to introduce this topic to the public discourse 
proactively, as many citizens rightly demand to stay in 
their home areas. By developing different strategies to 
address human mobility in the context of climate change 
(HMCCC), governments can both enable people to stay and 
ensure they are able to move in good conditions, in order 
to minimise human suffering. 
This report provides an overview of where human mobility 
in the context of climate change fits in the policy landscape 
of nine island and archipelagic countries: Anguilla, Antigua 
& Barbuda, Dominica, and Saint Lucia in the Eastern 
Caribbean; Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu in the Pacific; 
and the Philippines in the Western Pacific. All of these 
nations are heavily affected by climate impacts like sea 
level rise, ocean acidification, tropical cyclones and hydro-
logical extremes. Different forms of human mobility are 
among the ways people adapt or respond to these changes, 
in complex ways. Moreover, the policy landscape is hetero-
geneous. Some of the countries have specifically addressed 
HMCCC in guidelines, adaptation plans or policies, like 
Dominica, Fiji, and, Vanuatu. Others have just recently 
recognised the topic as an emerging policy action field. This 
report demonstrates that HMCCC is a cross-cutting issue 
that can potentially be addressed by several ministries and 
governmental agencies, for example internal affairs, devel-
opment, immigration, disaster relief, labour, social protec-
tion or health. However, without clear responsibilities for 
East Coast Dominica  (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)
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addressing the topic together with a strong coordination 
between different departments, it may not be adequately 
considered in planning processes. Moreover, the inclusion 
of civil society actors and non-governmental organisations 
in consultations is crucial for ensuring people-centred and 
rights-based policy development. 
This report provides insights gained from 94 expert inter-
views. Prior to the interviews, regional literature reviews 
were conducted to understand the challenges and oppor-
tunities to address HMCCC in specific local contexts. 
This report shows the strength of regional approaches 
for improving migrants’ rights and for increasing climate 
resilience. The findings are relevant to other island nations 
that face similar challenges and need to build capacity for 
future climate-related mobility dynamics. Moreover, they 
highlight the necessity of building a coherent multi lateral 
framework on HMCCC to accommodate and support 
people who may have to move in the future.
Insights from the Eastern Caribbean:  
Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Commonwealth 
of  Dominica, and Saint Lucia
The Caribbean has a long history of human mobility dating 
back from pre-Colombian times to the period of enslave-
ment, indentureship and to the post-colonial period. Today, 
the impacts of climate change are becoming a push factor 
for migration and displacement. These changes materialise 
in different cultural, socio-economic, and demographic 
settings and therefore can have different outcomes for 
human mobility. The combined effects of sea level rise and 
high wind-speed tropical cyclones have led to the (tempo-
rary) displacement of people, mainly across the region. 
The relationship between slow-onset climate impacts and 
migration in the Caribbean are less observed, researched 
and understood.
In the Eastern Caribbean, inter-island mobility is facilitated 
through the framework of the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States Commission (OECS), which grants its 
Member States’ citizens freedom of movement and the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which provides 
freedom of movement for certain types of skilled labour 
under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). 
Soufriere & Scotts Head – Dominica  (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)
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Dominica has developed a strategy to move people away 
from hazard-exposed areas. Besides this strategy, no 
explicit policies or guidelines exist that address HMCCC on 
a national or regional level. 
The extreme cyclone season of 2017 led to unprecedented 
numbers of displacements in the region. In general, intra-
regional collaboration served to accommodate displaced 
populations and the solidarity between the countries was 
highlighted as positive by policymakers. However, inter-
views with regional and national level actors indicated that 
capacities of involved agencies were hard-pressed, resulting 
frequently in insufficient care for displaced persons, high 
stress for agency employees, who themselves were some-
times affected, and missed opportunities for data collec-
tion. Displacements after disasters have led to negative 
psychological health effects and these are insufficiently 
addressed in response frameworks.
Insights from the Pacific:  
Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu
The adverse effects of climate change are already having 
an impact on livelihoods in the Pacific and projections for 
impacts like sea level rise, droughts and ocean acidification 
show mounting risks. Rising sea levels might threaten the 
very existence of low-lying Pacific islands like Kiribati or 
Tuvalu. With limited land available for relocation within 
national boundaries, cross-border migration – within the 
region or even to far-off destinations – may become a 
necessity.
Although migration has been part of cultures across the 
Pacific Ocean throughout centuries, climate change may 
lead to abrupt and involuntary displacement of commu-
nities deeply connected to their land. Climate change is 
therefore increasingly acknowledged as a driver of human 
mobility among policymakers in the Pacific. This has 
prompted civil society movements, like the Pacific Climate 
Warriors to demand more ambitious climate protection 
internationally, in order for communities to be able to 
remain in their homeland. At the same time, policymakers 
carry the responsibility to take precautionary action and 
help people move out of hazardous areas. 
In 2018, Fiji launched Planned Relocation Guidelines, 
though the standard operating procedures are yet to be 
developed. In addition, Vanuatu launched its National 
Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced 
Displacement in 2018. Despite this growing awareness, 
experts have indicated that HMCCC is not sufficiently 
addressed in policy documents across the region. Increased 
awareness among policymakers is a precondition for 
Vunidogola – Fiji  (© GIZ )
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achieving this. Regional actors like the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) or 
the Pacific Community (SPC) play an important role in 
giving a voice to Pacific island states in international policy 
negotiations on climate change. Regional actors like the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) are also active 
in managing or responding to displacement and relocation 
in the region. The Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS), 
another important regional actor, has elevated results 
from the Technical Working Group on HMCCC to regional 
policy work in the Pacific. Several respondents referred 
to good cooperation practices, for instance after tropical 
cyclones. Referring to national levels, experts expressed 
doubt in capacities to address HMCCC. Several experts also 
mentioned the need to improve communication and/or 
coordination mechanisms between stakeholders in this 
cross-cutting topic.
Insights from the Philippines
A significant number of Filipino lives are uprooted every 
year by extreme weather and climate events, a highly 
visible and well-recorded phenomenon in the Philippines. 
There is also growing evidence of links between gradual 
environmental degradation, climate change, and internal 
human mobility patterns. Growing understanding and 
policy actor interest in HMCCC is timely, as climate projec-
tions portend an increase in risks to Filipino livelihoods, 
in particular, from heat, rainfall variability and extremes, 
water scarcity, increased intensity and frequency of storms, 
sea warming, and rising sea levels.
These changes impact the mobility of both rural and urban 
populations. In the case of the latter, people in poverty 
and/or informal housing are particularly at risk of further 
hazards. Rural populations are apparently migrating to 
nearby urban areas, nearby farms, and agricultural areas, 
a trend particularly reported in the larger islands of the 
archipelago. Internal migration from resource stressed 
areas towards larger cities is most likely to involve 
working-age males with middle-to-high socio-economic 
status. Availability of social networks is particularly 
important for rural-urban movements, and education is a 
limiting factor for cities to become springboards for desti-
nations overseas. 
While no legislation exists specifically referencing 
HMCCC, two national agencies were created to coordinate, 
centralise and scale-up work on climate change adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction, two issues typically addressed 
separately: the Climate Change Commission (CCC) and 
the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
Council (NDRRMC). Both of these coordinating bodies 
have the strength of a legal basis, through Republican Act 
9729 and Republican Act 10121, respectively. The currently 
fragmented approaches and multiplicity of actors can be 
improved by converging the strategies of the two agen-
cies. A good step towards more effective integration of 
population movements in CCC and NDRRMC activities 
would be better inclusion of the Philippine Commission 
on Population (POPCOM), the central body mandated 
to manage population programmes including internal 
migration.
Efforts to improve data and research on internal migration 
will add to the groundwork for efforts to address HMCCC, 
particularly in the context of environmental degradation 
and slow-onset hazards. Significantly, the 2018 Philippine 
National Migration Survey (NMS) builds knowledge on 
internal migration and provides a baseline for deeper 
research.
Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)
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1. Set a Strategic Direction
Setting a clear, strategic, and objective-driven direction for 
policy development and implementation of climate migra-
tion policy is an important component to effective public 
policy and governance both on the regional and national 
levels. For example, mapping and integrating existing 
policies for migration, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and to 
climate change adaptation (CCA) can strengthen the effec-
tiveness of both policy areas, as these currently often trans-
late to separate institutional structures and operational 
frameworks. Forming a specific direction of action involves 
ensuring sustained commitment at key levels of leader-
ship; engaging in regional and/or international dialogues 
and thereby in cross-country coordination; establishing 
targeted legal and policy instruments; building institu-
tional structures and capacities for effective implementa-
tion of policies and programmes; ensuring the full partici-
pation of affected communities, with particular attention 
to vulnerable or marginalised groups; and executing moni-
toring and evaluation mechanisms. 
2. Execute Abating Actions for Climate Risks
Policies and programmes to undercut the root causes 
of displacement, and distress migration, and specifi-
cally targeting people already affected by climate change 
impacts, are key. One instrument that increases the 
capability of addressing climate change is the diversi-
fication of income. Especially farmers, fishers, or the 
tourism industry could thereby decrease their exposure to 
hazards. Moreover, safety net mechanisms for losses and 
damage in the context of extreme weather, such as cash 
for work programmes and insurance schemes, are needed. 
Community consultation mechanisms will be necessary 
for many government activities to succeed, for example: 
to relocate at-risks people, distribute relief equitably, or to 
establish thresholds at which areas are designated as unsafe 
or unfit for human habitation.
3. Improve Data and Strengthen Research
The collection of migration and displacement data is 
important for the implementation, follow-up and review 
of any migration or displacement management policy, as 
well as for identifying and assisting groups with specific 
vulnerabilities. In all regions studied, limitations in data 
availability, data access, and data management on HMCCC 
exist. More funding and personnel should be allocated 
for data collection, knowledge management, and data 
analysis. Longitudinal or panel data, as well as qualitative 
case studies, are needed. Gender and human rights should 
be mainstreamed into these efforts. Disaggregation of data 
by sex, age, and migration status is necessary and in line 
with agreed indicators for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. In addition, most countries would benefit 
from systems to better integrate, share, and harmonise 
existing data on both international and internal migration; 
targeted analysis on HMCCC; integration of relevant indi-
cators or questions in existing national tools; and trainings 
on migration and displacement data in general.
Partially due to the lack of data, research on HMCCC is 
very limited for some regions, like the Caribbean. In other 
areas, some substantial research exists but is often carried 
out by external institutions and researchers. Local research 
capacities and education need strengthening in order to 
assess HMCCC nationally. Greater consideration is needed 
for migration and displacement in the context of slow-
onset impacts of climate change, in order to maximise the 
potential for migration to contribute to human develop-
ment and to minimise possible challenges. Further, more 
in-depth and qualitative research is needed to understand 
how climate change affects people’s physical and mental 
health. Several experts approached for this study explicitly 
mentioned the need to investigate long-term effects of 
post-disaster trauma and stress.
5 Steps Forward: Key Recommendations
Establishing effective policies to manage migration, planned relocation and displacement is essential to minimise 
 potential challenges of human mobility and to deliver on the positive potential of migration for development. To support 
effective policymaking, several steps can be taken by national and regional actors. 
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4. Foster Effective Policy Implementation and 
Decision Making
Some existing policies, which could be applied to HMCCC, 
are not effectively implemented. Policy implementation 
can be strengthened through participatory, community-
based approaches as well as by paying special attention 
to groups with specific needs. In the case of the latter, the 
dearth of disaggregated data is a challenge to evidence-
based policy development. Mechanisms to include the 
meaningful participation of affected communities should 
be strengthened. Key barriers to the inclusion of displaced 
persons in disaster recovery include the dearth of registra-
tion and tracking mechanisms post-displacement, for both 
cross-border and internal displacement; the invisibility of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in urban areas, in 
informal settlements, and with temporary hosts; and the 
reality that many people who migrate following disas-
ters do not self-identify as an IDP. Moreover, monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms and increased institutional 
capacities can help to ensure sustainable implementation. 
Regional entities like the OECS Commission or CARICOM 
in the Caribbean and Council of Regional Organisations 
of the Pacific (CROP) agencies in the Pacific could support 
coordination of knowledge or capacities. The objective of 
regional coordination must be the integration of strategies, 
policies and actions between ministries or departments, 
across different governance levels, and always integrating 
local communities, who will themselves be the source of 
solutions. On a national level inter-ministerial working 
groups could be established for coordination and to ensure 
greater mainstreaming of human mobility into overall 
development planning.
5. Widen and Deepen the Stakeholder 
Network
Effective policy formulation and implementation need a 
strong actor network. The first step to this is an improved 
awareness of climate change and human mobility link-
ages – and scientific literacy of both issues – among policy 
actors and practitioners. This requires good science-policy 
communication, accessible to local governments and their 
constituents. To achieve this, governments should consider 
fostering partnerships with universities as independent 
knowledge brokers.
Moreover, national governments could invite constituted 
bodies under the UNFCCC regime [e.g. the Executive 
Committee of Warsaw International Mechanism, the 
Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the Paris 
Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)] to develop guid-
ance related to risk retention and related capacity building 
and technology needs – for example through a ‘toolkit’ 
such as those that exist for planned relocations. Likewise, 
donor governments should support the development of 
such guidance/toolkits and the implementation of recom-
mendations therein, with a view to improving consist-
ency and coherence across countries and regions as well as 
within them, to enhance coordination and complementa-
rity of different actions at various levels of government.
Municipality of Lake Sebu, South Cotabato Province  (© Jorge S. Ebay)
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3
 Recently observed climate impacts and related human mobility responses have called attention to the existing policy frameworks that could guide population movements under future climate 
change. Especially island and archipelagic nations are at 
the forefront of bearing the effects of climate change and 
have already seen migratory movements in response to, or 
anticipation of those impacts. This report examines how 
in the Eastern Caribbean, the Pacific, and the Philippines 
human mobility in the context of climate change (HMCCC) 
is addressed across different levels of governance. 
Following the recommendations of recent international 
agreements such as the Global Compact on Migration, 
it is clear that knowledge on the existing provisions and 
instruments is needed in order to identify protection gaps 
and facilitate an exchange on best practices. Moreover, as 
climate impacts intensify, the urgency to formulate policies 
to manage possibly even greater pressures in the future is 
evident. In the past decade, severe tropical cyclones, like 
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, Hurricane Irma in the 
Caribbean and Cyclone Pam in the Pacific caused massive 
destruction and displacements across the regions. In the 
aftermath of these events, disaster management agencies 
were often overwhelmed with the urgent need for assis-
tance. As projections indicate that storm surges of high-
wind tropical cyclones could inundate larger areas, disaster 
management agencies at national and regional levels need 
to be better equipped to handle such extreme events. This 
not only means to improve financial resources and tech-
nical capacities. Policies are needed to guide temporary 
resettlement or response mechanisms to displacement. 
Already, in all three of these regions there are examples 
of state-led planned relocations, in which at risk commu-
nities were resettled to less exposed areas. Currently, the 
most common form of human mobility in these regions 
is labour migration, which can be a successful adaptation 
strategy to climate change, as migrants can send remit-
tances to their home communities and thereby diversify 
risk and increase resilience. 
In the Eastern Caribbean, the Pacific and the Philippines, 
HMCCC has been addressed to varying degrees by some 
regional and national institutions. Whereas in the Pacific 
policies exist in Fiji and Vanuatu, there are no specific 
policies pertaining to HMCCC in the Caribbean and the 
Philippines yet, except for a planned relocation strategy 
in the Commonwealth of Dominica which was developed 
in response to displacements after Cyclone Erica in 2015. 
However, other policy frameworks may be applied to 
HMCCC.1 Even in the countries where policies have been 
drafted, their application is yet to be tested and effective 
implementation may require more capacities on both 
national and sub-national levels than is currently available. 
This report summarises the existing state of knowledge 
on the regional dynamics of human mobility related to 
climate change impacts and builds upon 94 qualitative 
interviews with regional and national experts, outlining 
1  As a cross-cutting issue, references to HMCCC may be found in a number of 
policies or programmes from different ministries or agencies. Furthermore, 
these documents may or may not be primarily drafted the context of climate 
change legislation. Documents which may be relevant include: national 
development plans or frameworks, legislation on migration in general, 
disaster management or disaster risk reduction policies or strategies, 
national adaptation plans, and, last but not least, documents prepared for the 
international governance of climate change such as Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs).
Introduction
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their perceptions of the existing policies and instruments 
pertaining to HMCCC. It analyses gaps and shortcomings, 
but also possible entry points and good practices in the 
different island and archipelagic states. 
While the countries covered in this report differ, among 
other factors, with regard to their economic situation, 
geography, demographics, migration dynamics and culture, 
there are similarities in terms of the climate change-
related challenges which these nations are now facing. 
These include the exposure to tropical cyclones, sea level 
rise, coral bleaching, and hydrological extremes. Moreover, 
there are similarities in vulnerability of certain liveli-
hoods and economic sectors that are particularly reliant 
on functioning ecosystems such as agriculture, fisheries, or 
tourism. Therefore, bringing together the perspectives and 
knowledge of very different island and archipelagic nations 
can prove valuable for future adaptation planning and 
policymaking. Furthermore, the synthesis of this report 
will underline the necessity to proactively prepare for 
future movements in response to climate impacts. 
3.2. 
Human Mobility in the Context of 
Climate Change – Policy Challenges 
and Livelihood Opportunities for 
Island and Archipelagic Nations at 
Risk
Several international frameworks have highlighted the 
need for the establishment of new instruments in order to 
address human mobility in the context of climate change. 
These frameworks include the Task Force on Displacement 
within the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss 
and Damage, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees. 
The latter establishes that climate interacts with other 
drivers of refugee movements. The necessity to further 
investigate the relationship between climate change 
impacts and human migration especially on island states 
has also been highlighted as an important research field 
3 – INTRODUCTION
Figure 1 – The figure shows that entry points for policies to manage HMCCC exist at different phases of human mobility processes. 
Policies may directly address climatic drivers of HMCCC (e.g. through insurance schemes) or they aim to influence other drivers  
(e.g. socio-economic drivers). Human mobility processes are complex and multi-causal, climatic and non-climatic drivers interact.
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by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).2 Moreover, several organisations, among them 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM)3, the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD)4 and Oxfam5, 
have pointed to the devastating coincidence of high expo-
sure and high vulnerability to climate change in archipel-
agos and small islands. In general, it is acknowledged that 
migration can lead to both negative and positive livelihood 
outcomes for individuals and households. It can function 
as a risk diversification strategy, or it can lead to further 
impoverishment. Without understanding the different 
vulnerabilities of particular groups, policy responses may 
not be as effective as they could be or, even worse, increase 
vulnerability. In this regard, Mearns and Norton speak of 
the “structural and situational drivers of vulnerability” in 
a World Bank report on the social dimensions of climate 
change.6 These drivers include geographical location, 
assets and livelihood sources or social positioning.7 To sum 
this up, risks related to climate change are determined 
by complex interactions between physical exposures to 
climate hazards and the socio-economic vulnerability of 
an individual or a group of people. Therefore, the integra-
tion of gender and human rights aspects into policies is 
important.
In island nations with limited resources halting climate 
change at 1.5° to 2°C above pre-industrial levels will be 
decisive for the continuation of traditional livelihoods and 
2  Leonard A. Nurse et al., “Small Islands,” in Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability: Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, ed. Vicente R. Barros et al. (Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1613–54, https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9781107415386.
3  International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and 
Migration in Vulnerable Countries: A Snapshot of Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States” 
(Geneva, Switzerland, 2019), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/
climate_change_and_migration_in_vulnerable_countries.pdf.
4  PDD, “Platform on Disaster Displacement,” 2019,  
https://disasterdisplacement.org.
5  Oxfam, “Forced from Home: Climate-Fuelled Displacement,” 
December 2, 2019, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/
handle/10546/620914/mb-climate-displacement-cop25-021219-en.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
6  Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton, “Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming 
World: Introduction and Overview,” in Social Dimensions of Climate 
Change Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World, ed. Robin Mearns and 
Andrew Norton, New Frontiers of Social Policy (Washington DC, USA: The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 
2010), 5.
7  Mearns and Norton, “Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World: 
Introduction and Overview.”
in some cases for habitation, too.8 While currently migra-
tion can still function as an adaptation, a regime shift in 
the climate system9 would inevitably lead to a shift in the 
human mobility patterns as well, leading to more survival 
migration, displacement and human suffering. The difficult 
situation and the social tensions that have occurred in 
the Caribbean during the extreme cyclone season of 2017 
provide a glimpse of the multi-layered damages that can be 
incurred.
Despite the temperature limits that have been outlined 
in the Paris Agreement, global greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to rise, in spite of the risk of unmanageable 
climate impacts. Many policymakers and experts inter-
viewed for this report have pointed out struggles to adapt 
to the current warming level of 1°C and the changes in the 
environment that came with it. To confront future climate 
impacts and to enable migration in dignity, more capacities 
will be needed.
8  Curt D. Storlazzi et al., “Most Atolls Will Be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st 
Century Because of Sea-Level Rise Exacerbating Wave-Driven Flooding,” 
Science Advances 4, no. 4 (April 1, 2018): eaap974, https://doi.org/10.1126/
sciadv.aap9741.
9  Will Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 115, no. 33 (August 14, 2018): 8252 – 8259, https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1810141115.
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3.3. 
Concepts and Definitions  
of Human Mobility 
(DISPLACEMENT, PLANNED RELOCATION, MIGRATION, 
TRAPPED POPULATIONS)
In accordance with decisions taken at the Conference of 
Parties 16 in Cancun (COP16), this report distinguishes 
three different types of climate-related human mobility: 
migration, displacement and planned relocation.10 “Human 
mobility” functions as an umbrella term to catego-
rise movements of people. Some experts conceptualise 
different forms of mobility on a spectrum of varying 
10  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 
29 November to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at Its Sixteenth Session,” paragraph 14f, accessed 
August 15, 2019, https://unfccc.int/documents/6527.
degrees of freedom, ranging from entirely voluntary to 
entirely forced mobility. It is important to note that in 
practice many movements cannot be clearly catego-
rised, there is significant fluidity between categories, and 
human mobility ranges considerably across temporal and 
spatial scales. Whereas other categories could be drawn to 
differentiate between types of movement, in this report 
we use the categories suggested in the COP16, to reduce 
complexity when analysing large amounts of individual 
movements. An overview of these three broad types of 
human mobility in the context of climate change is given 
in the following figure:  11 12 13 14 15 .16 
11  The Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced 
Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: Volume 1,” 2015, 
https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-
AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf.
12 The Nansen Initiative.
13 The Nansen Initiative.
14 The Nansen Initiative.
15  The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of 
International Migration, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), “Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and 
Environmental Change through Planned Relocation,” 2015, https://www.
brookings.edu/research/guidance-on-protecting-people-from-disasters-and-
environmental-change-through-planned-relocation.
16  The Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced 
Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change.”
Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change
MIGRATION
is the voluntary movement of 
people because reasonable 
alternatives are available.11 In 
the context of climate change 
migration can be incentivised 
through hazards and exposure. 
It can occur within and across 
borders and if it is of preventa-
tive nature, migration can be an 
adaptation strategy.
DISPLACEMENT
is the forced movement of 
people possibly induced by the 
exposure to hazards and limited 
resilience.12 Displacement can 
increase already existing vulner-
abilities to climate change.13 
Displacement happens mostly 
within borders, although exam-
ples of cross-border displace-
ment exist.14 
PLANNED RELOCATION
is the top-down resettlement of 
people. A planned relocation is 
guided by a governmental entity, 
therefore within national bor-
ders, and can be implemented 
on individual, household or com-
munity level.15 Because of the 
complexity of this process and 
other factors, planned relocation 
is generally a measure of last 
resort.16 
3 – INTRODUCTION
Figure 2
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3.4. 
Objective and Methodology 
This report summarises a stocktaking of information on 
human mobility policies in the context of climate change 
that was conducted in the three areas of island and coastal 
environments: the Caribbean (four Member States of 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS): 
Saint Lucia, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla), 
the Pacific Islands (four states in the Pacific: Fiji, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu), and the Philippines. These states are 
partner countries of the global programme “Sustainable 
management of human mobility in the context of climate 
change”, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and 
implemented by GIZ. The countries were chosen due 
to their particular exposure to climate impacts and the 
different mobility patterns that have been observed in 
relation to climate change, as well as high interest by the 
governments in HMCCC. Together the countries exhibit 
large variance in terms of the national and regional institu-
tions which can address HMCCC. Therefore, this report also 
provides an entry point to develop more joint research and 
capacity building activities across the regions.
Literature review and analysis of primary data, utilising 
qualitative approaches, were employed to fulfil the objec-
tives of the research. Thorough reviews were conducted for 
all three research areas of available scientific publications 
on climate change and migration as well as of relevant 
regional and national policy-documents related to these 
topics. Based on an analytical framework adapted to this 
study to measure as well as to analyse the efficiency and 
effectiveness of both policy frameworks and the stake-
holder community required for policy implementation,17 
a set of questions was developed together with an inter-
view guide. Prior to the interviews, the questionnaires 
were reviewed, adapted to the local context, and tested by 
regional consultants.
Primary data was collected through a series of in-depth 
interviews with key stakeholders in each target country, 
as well as a limited number of focus group discussions, 
between January and June 2019. Interviews were held in 
person and in some cases via electronic media. They were 
17  See, for example: Adriaan Perrels, “Efficiency and Effectiveness of Policy 
Instruments: Concepts and Practice” (Workshop on Good Practices in Policies 
and Measures, Copenhagen, 2001), 14.
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Objective and Research Process
primarily conducted in English, although a limited number 
in the Philippines and in the Pacific were conducted in 
local languages for the comfort of the interview partner. 
Interviews comprised regional and national level actors, 
who may have been involved in the management of migra-
tion, displacement or planned relocation, or in the field 
of climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduc-
tion. The first list of people was identified by regional GIZ 
programme staff. This group was broadened to include 
others recommended by the first set of interviewees 
through snowball sampling and, later in the research, 
critical case sampling. In line with European Union data 
privacy regulations,18 prior to all interviews, participants 
were requested to sign forms indicating their informed 
18  For more information see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/
data-protection_en.
consent, understanding of data processing and manage-
ment employed for this research, and consent to be 
recorded.
All recordings were transcribed verbatim, and the few 
recordings in other languages were translated into English. 
All transcripts were then coded manually by the research 
team to identify core concepts, themes, and recurring 
perceptions or opinions of the key informants. Coding, data 
reduction techniques, and the subsequent text analysis 
were conducted in an iterative process facilitated by the 
use of qualitative analysis software called QDA Miner. For 
the ease of the reader, quotations from the key informant 
interviews in the text that follows are in italics. Quotations 
are given verbatim.
METHODOLOGY
REGIONS AND 
COUNTRY
Eastern Caribbean Pacific Philippines
OUTPUT
OBJECTIVE
“Improve applied knowledge relating to the sustainable management  
of human mobility in the context of climate change”.
Policy Recommendations  
(Country-specific and Overarching)
In-depth Interviews 
with Stakeholders
Literature Review
Analysis of Policy 
Frameworks
Figure 3 provides and overview of the steps involved in conducting this study. In order to achieve the objective, the authors used 
a combination of different methods. An overarching perspective on strengths and weaknesses of existing national and regional 
frameworks for HMCCC in all countries of interest is an integral part of this research.
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Limitations
The main limitations of this study are selection bias, the 
time and resources available, and limited comparability 
of diverse contexts. The selection of interviewees does not 
represent the views on HMCCC of the respective govern-
ments or the overall populations. However, as experts 
with knowledge relating either to climate change, disaster 
management or migration were interviewed, the sensitivity 
to human mobility in a changing climate can be assumed 
to be much higher than in other national ministries, NGOs 
or the general population. This report aims to reflect the 
local experts’ opinion on the existing national and regional 
frameworks pertaining to HMCCC and their assessment 
on how this topic needs addressing in the future. Thereby, 
we seek to outline both challenges and improvements of 
current frameworks governing the movement of people 
under climate change as viewed by experts in the field. 
While an exhaustive number of interview partners was 
not possible in the timeframe of this study, an appropriate 
balance of viewpoints and experiences was sought to cover 
numerous subjects. Bias may have been inadvertently 
introduced by the researchers through wording that can 
lead the participant and confirmation bias. Interview ques-
tions were purposefully kept as simple as possible and in a 
suitable order, with general questions preceding specific or 
potentially sensitive ones.
Vunidogola – Fiji  (© GIZ)
28
HOME LANDS – ISLAND AND ARCHIPELAGIC STATES’ POLICYMAKING FOR HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 29
4
4.1. 
Introduction: Unprecedented Storms 
and Community Displacement in the 
Eastern Caribbean 
After the extreme cyclone season of 2017 which completely 
destroyed the infrastructure on the Caribbean island of 
Barbuda and severely affected other nations, climate-
related displacement became an issue of concern among 
policymakers across the Caribbean. However, the links to 
climate change and the implications of climate projections 
have not yet been fully captured and addressed. Likewise, 
other topics such as poverty reduction or improvements of 
public infrastructure frequently require more government 
attention than existing institutional capacities can deliver. 
The challenges which will arise even under a low emissions 
scenario in line with the Paris Agreement are substantial 
and could put Caribbean livelihoods at risk. States need to 
develop policies for highly affected groups, namely those 
who work in agriculture, fisheries and the tourism sector. 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR), adaptation and migration 
policies have to make special provision for those who are 
already particularly vulnerable, such as the elderly and 
people living with disabilities. While the Eastern Caribbean 
countries under investigation already have improved 
disaster response mechanisms and regional cooperation on 
DRR over the past decade, the dimension of the challenges 
ahead demands urgent action plans to minimise future 
displacement and facilitate migration in dignity.
Information Base of the Caribbean Chapter
The Caribbean chapter builds upon the existing literature, 
interviews with 33 experts in the partner countries, and the 
study by Clarke and Johnson (2018).19 The semi-structured 
qualitative interviews were held with stakeholders from 
various national ministries, regional organisations, inter-
governmental organisations and individual researchers 
who work on areas related to the topic of this study. Of 
the 33 participants, 15 were men and 18 were women. 
The interviews followed the procedures outlined in the 
methods section.
19  J. Clarke and A. Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape 
Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the 
Caribbean,” GIZ Internal Report (GIZ, 2018).
The Eastern Caribbean 
Human Mobility Policies in the Context of Climate Change 
in Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of 
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OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS IN THE CARIBBEAN
Type Nation(s) Interviewee No. Sum
Local Politician Antigua & Barbuda C03, C11 2
National Politician Antigua & Barbuda C16 1
Provincial or Municipal Body C06 1
Ministry or Other Central National Body Antigua & Barbuda C01, C14, C17 3
Anguilla C04, C05, C07, C10, C13, C15 6
Dominica C21, C22, C30, C31 4
Saint Lucia C28, C29, C32, C33 4
Non-Governmental Organisation Dominica C18 1 20
Intergovernmental Organisation - C02, C09, C12, C20, C23, C24, C25, C26, C27, 9
Academia - C08, C19 2
Total 33
Background: Migration in the Caribbean20
The Caribbean is a region with a strong migration tradition. 
Migration has contributed to social progress and economic 
wealth through income diversification, educational oppor-
tunities and remittances, but also people have been forcibly 
moved from and to the region.21 Countries in the Caribbean 
are simultaneously areas of origin, destination, transit and 
return. Human mobility is, thus, not a new phenomenon in 
the Caribbean. 
The earliest inhabitants of the Caribbean, the indigenous 
Tainos, moved without restrictions between different 
islands.22 Following European colonisation in the late 
fifteenth century, the slave trade emerged in the Caribbean. 
Until the nineteenth century millions of people from 
Africa were forced to the Caribbean for enslaved labour. 
Moreover, during the period of indentureship between 
1838 and 1917 thousands of people from India were 
brought to the Caribbean as indentured labourers.23 
20  At the time of the interviews not many NGOs had specific expertise on 
HMCCC in the Caribbean and some were not available for interviews.
21  Clarke and Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape 
Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the 
Caribbean.”
22  Tony Martin, Caribbean History: From Pre-Colonial Origins to the Present 
(Pearson, 2012).
23  David Dabydeen and Brinsley Samaroo, India in the Caribbean (Hansib/
University of Warwick, Centre for Caribbean Studies Publication in cooperation 
with the London Strategic Policy Unit, 2006).
Over the last century, labour migration has become the 
dominant form of human mobility in the region. Already 
before most of the territories in the Caribbean gained 
independence, many people emigrated from the region.24 
Towards the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of 
the twentieth century, thousands of workers from British 
colonies left their homes in order to work on the construc-
tion site of the Panama Canal, often under high-risk 
conditions and plagued by tropical diseases.25 Similarly, the 
banana plantations of the United Fruit Company in Central 
America attracted many English-speaking workers from 
the Caribbean, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
thousands migrated to Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama.26 
In the course of the twentieth century, migrants from the 
Caribbean primarily moved to Europe and North America, 
with an estimated number of about 6 million in total.27 
Whereas in the1950s and 1960s many left the Caribbean, 
24  James Ferguson, “Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican  
Republic and Beyond” (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2003),  
https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MRG_
Rep_Caribbean.pdf; Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, “Trends and Patterns 
of Migration to and from Caribbean Countries,” in Caribbean 
Migration, 2001, https://www.scribd.com/document/360977487/
Elizabeth-Thomas-Hope-Caribbean-Migration-2002.
25  Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and Beyond” (Minority Rights Group International), 
accessed December 2, 2019, https://minorityrights.org/publications/
migration-in-the-caribbean-haiti-the-dominican-republic-and-beyond.
26 Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean.”
27 Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean.”
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particularly to settle down in the United States of America 
and the United Kingdom, migration increasingly slowed 
down as receiving countries started to lower immigration 
quota, with the result that migration became more and 
more irregular.28 Nowadays, households engage in different 
forms of migration, whether it be long-term, short-term 
or return migration.29 However, in many cases even long-
term migrations can not be associated with a total discon-
nection of the migrants from their roots, but rather create 
new and diverse forms of transnational connectedness.30 
With migration processes becoming increasingly diverse 
or even irregular and undocumented, a significant number 
of movements is not recorded in any systematic way. This 
also is often the case for displacements due to disasters. 
The different types of human mobility following the 2017 
hurricane season, for example, have not been systemati-
cally documented. 
28 Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean.”
29  Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, “Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from 
Caribbean Countries.”
30 Elizabeth Thomas-Hope.
4.2. 
Climate Change-Related Drivers  
of Human Mobility in the Eastern 
Caribbean
In the Caribbean, the impacts of climate change have 
the potential to influence mobility in multiple ways: by 
altering existing migration trends, by increasing the likeli-
hood of displacement due to more frequent and intense 
disasters, and potentially by creating the need for planned 
relocations of communities, but also by limiting the 
mobility of certain groups. Knowledge on HMCCC in Latin 
America in general, and the Caribbean in particular, is very 
limited. Existing empirical studies have focused mostly 
on Brazil, Mexico, and the United States.31 As compared to 
31  Frank Laczko and Etienne Piguet, “Regional Perspectives on Migration, the 
Environment and Climate Change,” in People on the Move in a Changing 
Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration, ed. 
Etienne Piguet and Frank Laczko, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 
2014), 13, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6985-4_1;  
Raoul Kaenzig and Etienne Piguet, “Migration and Climate Change in Latin 
America and the Caribbean,” in People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The 
Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration, ed. Etienne Piguet 
and Frank Laczko, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 155–76, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6985-4_7. 
Ferguson, James, “Migration in the Caribbean”; Faure, Aymeric, “Migratory 
patterns in the Caribbean: impacts and perspectives for Caribbean countries,” 
Open Diplomacy, accessed December 2, 2019, http://www.open-diplomacy.
eu/blog/migratory-patterns-in-the-caribbean-impacts-and-perspectives- 
for-caribbean.
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more populous regions, research on climate change and 
human mobility in the Caribbean has been limited and 
mostly confined to the aggregated regional level. Research 
has focused mainly on the factors contributing to displace-
ment, the humanitarian needs post-disaster, regional 
integration and the role of social networks in labour 
migration32. Insufficient research exists on the indirect or 
longer-term impact of climate change on human mobility 
patterns in the Caribbean, for example, through the effects 
of declining water availability and agricultural yields on 
livelihoods. The need to investigate slow-onset events has 
also been highlighted in the Paris Agreement (Article 8).
In the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the 
Caribbean, climate change has caused more frequent 
and devastating weather events such as flooding, tropical 
storms, and droughts.33 For example, new methods in 
attribution science show that climate change can change 
the likelihood of hurricanes reaching Caribbean islands 
at their peak force.34 For instance, “the annual probability 
of encountering Irma’s peak wind of 160 knots within 
300 km of Barbuda increased from 0.13 % in the period 
1981 – 2000 to 0.43 % by 2017 and will further increase to 
1.3 % by 2081 – 2100 assuming RCP8.5. […] The annual prob-
ability of encountering Maria’s peak wind of 150 knots 
within 150 km of 17 N, 64 W increased from 0.5 % during 
1981 – 2000 to 1.7 % in 2017 and will increase to 5 % by 
2081 – 2100 assuming RCP8.5.”35 
In a Paris Consensus Scenario there could be more severe 
tropical cyclones and also the average strength of these 
storms could increase.36 As warmer air holds more water, 
“average tropical cyclone precipitation rates (for a given 
32  Elizabeth Thomas-Hope, “Trends and Patterns of Migration to and from 
Caribbean Countries”; Cédric Audebert, “Régionalisme et migrations dans 
la Caraïbe,” in La Caraïbe dans la mondialisation: Quelles dynamiques 
régionalistes?, ed. Eric Dubesset and Rafael Lucas (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2011), 23–37, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00805771/file/
AUDEBERT_2011_Regionalisme_et_migrations_dans_la_Caraibe.pdf;  
ILO, “Labour Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean: Diagnosis, 
Strategy, and ILO’s Work in the Region,” ILO Americas Technical Reports, 
2016/2 (Lima: Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2017), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---americas/---ro-lima/
documents/publication/wcms_548185.pdf.
33  World Bank, “Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal” 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/20595. 
34  Kerry Emanuel, “Assessing the Present and Future Probability of Hurricane 
Harvey’s Rainfall,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 48 
(November 28, 2017): 12681–84, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1716222114.
35  H.-O. Pörtner et al., eds., IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in 
a Changing Climate (IPCC, 2019), https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_
FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf.
36 Pörtner et al.
storm) will increase by at least 7 % per degree Celsius sea 
surface temperature warming”.37 
These climate impacts threaten livelihoods in agricul-
ture, fisheries and tourism, as well as public and private 
infrastructure and the functioning of ecosystems38. One 
of the most dangerous hazards for the Caribbean is sea 
level rise. Global projections range between 0.65 m in a 
Paris-consensus scenario and up to 1.4 m in a business-
as-usual scenario by the end of the century.39 Without 
further infrastructural adaptation low-lying areas would be 
flooded, affecting human settlements and infrastructure in 
coastal zones. For example, a 1 m sea-level rise would put 
60 % of all tourist resort properties at risk as many of them 
are located in direct proximity to the beach.40 Moreover, 
rising sea levels can lead to the salinisation of vital fresh-
water aquifers and, thus, threaten the supply of water for 
agriculture, the tourism sector, or human consumption in 
general. Even if tropical cyclone intensity would remain 
unchanged, their effects could be more devastating because 
of higher storm surges.41 
Another substantial threat for Caribbean livelihoods is 
coral bleaching due to increasing temperatures and acidi-
fication which can contribute to fish stock decline. Besides 
other anthropogenic stressors including overfishing 
and pollution, fish will also move towards colder waters 
leading to stock depletion around the Caribbean islands. 
Projections show severe impacts for this in Saint Lucia.42 
Already today, climate change has profound negative 
impacts on Caribbean economies. In a recent statement, 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretary-General 
Irwin LaRocque described the severe economic impacts of 
superstorms: 
37 Pörtner et al.
38  Vergara, Walter, “Latin America and Caribbean Region, Annual Review,” 
Environment Matters (The World Bank, 2008).
39  Matthias Mengel et al., “Future Sea Level Rise Constrained by Observations 
and Long-Term Commitment,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 113, no. 10 (March 2016): 2597 – 602, 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1500515113.
40  Nurse et al., “Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.”
41  Pörtner et al., IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing 
Climate.
42 Adams et al., “Turn down the Heat.”
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 –“There can be no question that for us in the Caribbean, 
climate change is an existential threat. It has been 
recorded that between 2000 and 2017, Member States of 
our Community suffered at least seven major disasters in 
which damage ranged from 33 % to 226 % of the affected 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The estimated 
cost of reconstruction after the 2017 devastation by 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria has been put at US$ 5 billion 
region-wide”.43 
Climate change contributes to the degradation of coastal 
ecosystems such as coral reefs or wetlands and, thus, 
impacts ecosystems services that are crucial for livelihoods 
and human well-being. Another problem is the extreme 
growth of Sargassum seaweed, which affects both fish-
eries and the tourism industry.44 The seaweed which had 
previously not bloomed in excess in the Caribbean can trap 
43  Community (CARICOM), “CARICOM Secretary-General Highlights Region’s 
Climate Change and EU Blacklisting Concerns at International Conference in 
Romania,” CARICOM Today, March 12, 2019, https://today.caricom.org/ 
2019/03/12/caricom-secretary-general-highlights-regions-climate-change-
and-eu-blacklisting-concerns-at-international-conference-in-romania. 
44  Clifford Louime, Jodany Fortune, and Gary Gervais, “Sargassum Invasion 
of Coastal Environments: A Growing Concern,” American Journal of 
Environmental Sciences 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 58–64, https://doi.org/ 
10.3844/ajessp.2017.58.64.
larger sea animals such as turtles and dolphins, or damage 
coral reefs. Once it washes up on shore, it produces a strong 
sulphurous smell, deterring tourism. While climate change 
may be a contributing factor, it is not yet clear what causes 
the excessive algae bloom.45 Other anthropogenic factors 
may be the influx of nutrients via the Amazon River into 
the ocean, or iron fertilisation through dust particles.46 
The multiple effects of climate change are increasingly 
putting a burden on governments, Caribbean states that 
are already highly indebted.47 External economic shocks, 
including the devastating effects of tropical storms and 
other extreme events, can deepen economic dependencies 
and counteract efforts to reduce debt. 
45  Louime, Fortune, and Gervais; Katie Langin, “Seaweed Masses Assault 
Caribbean Islands,” Science 360, no. 6394 (June 15, 2018): 1157–58,  
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.360.6394.1157.
46  Langin, “Seaweed Masses Assault Caribbean Islands.”
47  Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Statistics External Public Debt of 
CARICOM Member States,” 2018, http://statistics.caricom.org/ExtDebt.html.
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Health Effects of Extreme Events 
Besides some of the direct physical impacts, Caribbean 
respondents emphasised the effects of climate change on 
health as a driver of migration. At the same time it was 
mentioned that the displacement experiences can affect 
physical and mental health. One respondent explained the 
multitude of effects of climate change on the health of the 
population:
 –“We have seen significant disruption to sewage systems 
resulting in contamination of water supplies and 
disruptions of the waste management. […] With respect 
to mental health, this is really a recent significant area 
for attention particularly since tropical storm Erica in 
Dominica and with respect to the 2017 season with Irma 
and Maria. There is now a growing appreciation of the 
importance of treating the psychosocial component as an 
important part of the recovery efforts for the population” 
(C12).
The same interviewee also referred to vector borne diseases 
such as Malaria. These effects on health can in turn also 
be push factors for outmigration. If people’s health is 
negatively affected through disease burden and the decay 
of healthcare provision, it could also hinder them from 
migrating. Following the 2017 extreme events, public 
health officials had to address 
 –“Injuries, vector borne diseases, mental health, respiratory 
conditions and impact on food and water security and 
the destruction of health facilities […]. So, in Dominica 
they lost electricity, they lost facilities to give oxygen, 
lab facilities […] They had neonatal babies that had to 
be moved […]. Having clear protocols around patient’s 
transfer and mobility is a critical issue in time of disaster” 
(C25). 
This excerpt highlights the need for providing guidelines 
for the evacuation and displacement management for ill 
and injured persons. In the aftermath of tropical cyclones, 
there was extensive need for mental health care. The effects 
of climate change impacts and extreme events especially 
on mental health are not sufficiently addressed overall. In 
the case of Barbuda, traumas of the devastating Hurricane 
Irma have gone largely untreated (see chapter 2.4.).
4.3. 
Regional Policies and Actors 
 Addressing HMCCC
Caribbean policymakers who work on issues of migra-
tion, displacement and planned relocation have not yet 
fully taken into consideration climate change as a poten-
tial driver of human mobility. However, after the extreme 
devastation of Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria in 
2017, the resulting displacement has emerged as an impor-
tant issue for policy actors and practitioners.
The significance of building frameworks to manage human 
mobility in the context of climate change has only been 
recognised over the past decade. Awareness of this topic is 
now increasing (C13, C21, C22, C21). Some broader frame-
works or strategies exist already on the general phenom-
enon of human mobility and disasters. For example, the 
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA) 
prepared a Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) 
Strategy with strategies for DRR and climate change adap-
tation at the regional and national level.48 Although this 
framework did not specifically address HMCCC, it estab-
lished national and regional mechanisms for DRR, which 
also apply in the case of climate change impacts. CDEMA 
established international and regional arrangements for 
cooperation in disaster management.49 Furthermore, 
the organisation undertakes data collection after disas-
ters and works with the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM). The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) Commission has a special unit working on 
climate change and DRR which could become an impor-
tant actor to develop management strategies for HMCCC. 
There are national-level actors also. The Commonwealth 
of Dominica, for example, has developed provisions for 
the relocation of populations. Many expert interviewees 
indicated positive policy developments, good cooperation 
and communication as well as existing standard proce-
dures in cases of disasters. One respondent said: “There has 
been a lot of traction from the OECS level on climate change 
in general, from the public awareness standpoint, mitigation 
standpoint and more so the adaptation standpoint” (C04). 
An intergovernmental expert said: “Caribbean countries 
have strong and tested systems to respond to disasters” (C09). 
48  Clarke and Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape 
Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the 
Caribbean.”
49  Clarke and Johnson.
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All those statements indicate that the existing policies 
address the general risk and impacts of disasters but more 
specific policies on climate change and human mobility 
may be necessary. 
Regional Actor Landscape
Several regional institutions were identified as important 
for the policy development of the intersection of human 
mobility and climate change: the OECS Commission, 
the CARICOM Secretariat (C08, C17), CDEMA and the 
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) 
(C09, C20). Among the bodies operating at the regional 
level, states in the Caribbean have two main pre-existing 
structures that are appropriate to develop and advocate 
for a strategic direction encompassing the complexity of 
human mobility outcomes of climate change: CDEMA and 
OECS Commission. 
The OECS Commission is a major regional actor in 
strengthening regional cooperation on climate resil-
ience, and environmental policy more broadly, as well 
as on human mobility. These areas of competence have 
traditionally been seen by OECS Member States as sepa-
rate areas of consideration, as alluded above. The OECS 
Commission provides a promising avenue for governance 
of HMCCC, to develop evidence-based policy advice as 
well as a convenor of other actors in the relevant commu-
nities. It offers an appropriate space for coordination and 
exchange of best practices. Such activities can ultimately 
provide fertile ground for the development and follow-
up on proactive domestic policies that specifically address 
climate-related human mobility. 
CDEMA is an inter-governmental disaster manage-
ment agency that, with additional and targeted support 
by participating states, would be more apt to deal with 
the operational and programmatic gaps that persist in 
addressing all phases of disaster displacement. Through 
CDEMA, vehicles exist for strategic coordination on disas-
ters that could explore additional needs climate change 
created in addressing the protection and assistance needs 
of people displaced by disasters. A comprehensive regional 
approach to disasters is urgently needed, including effec-
tive evacuation plans for each country. The experience of 
Antigua, Barbuda, and the Commonwealth of Dominica in 
2017 demonstrated that current plans are either inad-
Saint Lucia  (© Ragna John)
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equate altogether or insufficient to deal with special 
situations, such as with high-category storms or with 
scenarios where numerous parts of the region are affected 
by disaster. CDEMA has put forward a model evacuation 
policy and plan, which the Council of Ministers endorsed. 
This policy and plan should be conducted in cooperation 
with the Council, the CDEMA Commission, and ministries 
tasked with climate change action in each member state in 
order to integrate re-active disaster management with pro-
active resilience building.
Furthermore, international organisations like the intergov-
ernmental IOM, the Platform on Disaster Displacement or 
the UNHCR were identified as relevant actors for HMCCC 
in the Caribbean (C09). In terms of scientific background 
and implementation support, universities and other 
scientific institutes as well as NGOs can provide signifi-
cant knowledge. Interviewees pointed out that relevant 
institutions would be meteorological services (C29), the 
WAITT foundation, the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO) and the Caribbean Agricultural and Development 
Institute (C01). With respect to gender sensitive research, 
the Institute for Gender and Development Studies of the 
University of the West Indies has worked with national 
ministries with responsibility for women’s equality and 
gender affairs. Also the Red Cross is an active organisa-
tion in the Caribbean that could provide insights for policy 
formation.
Relevant Regional Policies for HMCCC 
In this section, we outline the current policy frameworks 
championed by the regional institutions in the Caribbean 
and explore how they support the mobility of persons in 
the context of climate change. As noted above, the study 
did not identify any specific regional laws or policies on 
climate mobility, except for the Dominican strategy on 
resettlement.50 The two main regimes for movement of 
people in the Caribbean, CARICOM and OECS, can to 
some degree provide legal grounds for HMCCC. Overall, 
regional agreements on freedom of movement can support 
mobility as a form of adaptation to climate impacts.51 
MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AMONG CARICOM MEMBER 
STATES
The CARICOM treaty and its protocols regulate the 
movement of people among Member States. Antigua and 
Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint 
Lucia are Member States of CARICOM, while Anguilla 
has the status of an Associate Member.52 The CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME) allows people with 
certain skillsets to move freely to other CARICOM states. 
The approved categories focus on graduates from univer-
sities, media personnel, and artists.53 They are entitled to 
the same benefits and enjoy the same workers’ rights as 
those provided and guaranteed to local workers.54 The 
Protocol on Contingent Rights, adopted in 2018, grants 
several rights such as access to social services to spouses 
and immediate dependent family members of a worker 
moving under the CSME free movement scheme for skilled 
workers.55 In the future the CARICOM arrangements for 
freedom of movement could also help in the context of 
50  Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, “Dominica Resettlement 
Strategy” (UNDP), accessed December 2, 2019, https://info.undp.org/
docs/pdc/Documents/BRB/Draft%20-%20Dominica%20resettlement%20
strategy%20v.100915.pdf.
51  Francis, Ama, “Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration: 
A Caribbean Case Study” (Columbia Law School, Sabin Center for Climate 
Change Law, September 2019), https://disasterdisplacement.org/
portfolio-item/fma-caribbean.
52  Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Member States and Associate Members,”  
accessed April 27, 2020, https://caricom.org/member-states-and-associate- 
members. 
53  CARICOM Single Market & Economy, “Development and Status of the Right 
to Free Movement of People – CARICOM Single Market & Economy,” accessed 
April 27, 2020, http://csme.caricom.org/regimes/movement-of-people.
54 CARICOM Single Market & Economy. 
55  Christopher Lawrence, “CARICOM Integration Advances: All CSME 
Participating Member States Now Signatories to Contingent Rights Protocol – 
CARICOM Single Market & Economy,” CARICOM Single Market & Economy, 
March 1, 2019, http://csme.caricom.org/component/k2/caricom-integration-
advances-all-csme-participating-member-states-now-signatories-to-
contingent-rights-protocol. 
Barbuda (© Kira Vinke)
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disaster displacement, as several interviewees contacted 
for this study indicated. For example, a widening of the 
justification for immigration to allow for disaster-displaced 
person to relocate could serve this purpose. The effects of 
climate change on human mobility were notably raised by 
heads of government, in the wake of the devastating 2017 
hurricane season, at the February 2018 CARICOM interses-
sional meeting.56 Building on this, the 2019 intersessional 
communiqué57 paid notable attention to resilience building 
and to the need to continue progress already achieved 
under the CSME, including visa waivers for certain non-
nationals.58 These official documents and the interviews 
conducted for this study indicate that the focus remains 
on economic integration and the free movement of the ten 
categories of skilled persons already agreed to in Article 45 
of the Treaty of Chaguaramas59 for all people moving in 
the context of climate change. Indefinite stay of CARICOM 
nationals for labour employment does not extend to low- 
or un-skilled non-wage earners, although migration of 
unskilled workers in the region was found to exceed skilled 
migration.60 This mismatch can push people into irregular 
migration within the region.61 A regional expert noted that 
currently there are clear limitations for the provision of 
freedom of movement in the context of climate change:
 –“We already have the capacity to address HMCCC 
because we have the free movement of persons, but 
remember it is for skilled labour. So in particular areas, 
we may need to look at modifications in instance of an 
event” (C2).
56  Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion 
of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government 
of the Caribbean Community” (Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), 2018), http://today.caricom.org/wp-content/uploads/
COMMUNIQUE.doc.
57  Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “COMMUNIQUÉ Issued at the Conclusion 
of the Thirtieth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of 
Government of the Caribbean Community Frigate Bay, St Kitts and Nevis, 
26 – 27 February 2019,” CARICOM Today, February 28, 2019, https://today.
caricom.org/2019/02/27/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-
thirtieth-intersessional-meeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government-
of-the-caribbean-community-frigate-bay-st-kitts-and-nevis-26-27-
february-2019.
58  Specifically, Haitian nationals who are holders of diplomatic and official 
passports or businesspersons who are holders of US, Canadian or Schengen 
visas.
59  Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Skill- Free Movement in the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME).”
60  International Organization for Migration, “Migration in the Caribbean:  
Current Trends, Opportunities And Challenges” (San José, Costa Rica.: 
International Organization for Migration – Regional Office for Central America, 
North America and the Caribbean, 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/
migration-caribbean-current-trends-opportunities-and-challenges.
61 International Organization for Migration.
With increasing risks, deepening regional integration could 
serve to improve resilience, by allowing people to move in 
response or anticipation of disasters. Therefore, fostering 
a regional policy between Caribbean island states guar-
anteeing to uphold rights of migrants in receiving states 
would serve the management of HMCCC. 
MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AMONG OECS MEMBER 
STATES
Among other activities, the OECS ensures free move-
ment of people among all protocol Member States.62 This 
freedom of movement requires no special documentation 
or resources, and the duration of stay in a foreign country 
is neither restricted nor subject to special interests.63 Free 
movement is accompanied by a policy of non-discrimina-
tion, meaning that citizens of these countries have a right 
to equal treatment in all member countries.64 
Primarily for economic reasons, “people move seeking 
better living opportunities, better overall livelihood” (C23) 
across the region of the OECS. Nevertheless, disasters, also 
driven by climate change, may increase the use of this 
channel. A regional official stated that the OECS has started 
to consider this new policy field (C23). Facing the move-
ment of people without identification cards in case of 
disasters and the vulnerability of people (C27), a coherent 
policy needs to include “hands-on tools and platforms” 
(C24) to give insights into “operational issues, because 
legally […] people can move” (C24). The current framework 
on the freedom of movement functions well, but addi-
tional policies and instrument may be needed to adapt to 
greater and more irregular influxes and outflow of people 
related to climate change. OECS Member States agree in 
section 14.2 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre to accord 
the organisation with “legislative competence”65 in relation 
to regional integration policies, environmental policy and 
immigration policy, although legislative authority remains 
with the states.
62  Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), “About the OECS,” OECS, 
accessed April 27, 2020, https://www.oecs.org/en/who-we-are/about-us. 
63  Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), “Frequently Asked 
Questions,” OECS, accessed April 27, 2020, https://www.oecs.org/en/
who-we-are/faq. 
64  OECS Member States citizens have equal access to social service systems in 
every OECS member state when they reside there.
65  Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), “Revised Treaty of 
Basseterre Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
Economic Union,” 2010, https://oecs.org/en/work-with-us/procurements/
procurement-procedures/revised-treaty-of-basseterre/download. 
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4.4. 
Country-Specific Insights
Antigua and Barbuda, Anguilla, the Commonwealth of 
Dominica and Saint Lucia differ in their capacities and in 
their approach to address HMCCC. This chapter presents 
country-specific insights from the interviews. It summa-
rises core themes of key informant interviews including 
communication and cooperation on HMCCC particularly 
in the aftermath of the extreme tropical cyclones season 
2017, and summarises key policies related to HMCCC.
Antigua and Barbuda 
The twin island state of Antigua and Barbuda is a transit 
hub of the Caribbean. The country is located between the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. The population of 
Antigua and Barbuda is 96,000 people, of which approxi-
mately 97 % live on the island of Antigua.66 Hurricane Irma 
made landfall on Barbuda on the night of 6 September 
2017 as a category 5 storm, generating winds of more than 
290 km/h. For three hours, the small island of Barbuda was 
affected by the extreme winds. The storm surge of 1.5 to 
3.5 m caused further destruction. In the end, basically all 
infrastructure in Barbuda was destroyed by the hurricane. 
Reconstruction is still a major task.
66  CIA World Factbook, “Antigua and Barbuda,” accessed October 8, 2019, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ac.html.
Until today, the colonial history of Antigua and Barbuda 
affects the nation’s development.67 In the middle of 
the seventeenth century the British established control. 
Antigua mainly produced sugar for the benefit of the 
British Empire. The sugar industry was established on 
the basis of enslaved labour forcibly moved from Africa. 
From 1681 to 1870 the British Empire leased the island of 
Barbuda to the Codrington family.68 People were enslaved 
on Barbuda for food production to supply the commercial 
plantations in Antigua.69 Antigua and Barbuda gained inde-
pendence in 1981. 
THE ANTIGUA EXPERIENCE 
Antigua has been described as the “gateway to the 
Eastern Caribbean”.70 In 2017, as a result of Hurricane 
Irma, Antigua received not only internally displaced 
persons from Barbuda but also displaced persons from 
the Commonwealth of Dominica. It was a transit country 
for workers from other parts of the region that had been 
affected by Hurricanes Irma and Maria. The high levels 
of displacement stressed the capacities to manage immi-
gration and in some cases exceeded the ability to provide 
adequate services to migrants. 
Several respondents highlighted the importance of 
well-functioning cooperation structures in the region. 
Particularly, arrangements on freedom of movement 
within intergovernmental organisations like CARICOM or 
the OECS (see chapter 2.3) have helped to resolve extremely 
difficult situations in the aftermath of Irma. This was 
supported by a DRR specialist who noted that “I think we 
saw the spirit of regionalism” (C17).
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the event brought to 
light gaps in social protection in times of disaster. It was 
mentioned that children were sent across the region 
unaccompanied, a process which is sometimes referred to 
as “child shifting” and which can expose children to the 
67  Cory Look, Erin Friedman, and Geneviève Godbout, “The Resilience of Land 
Tenure Regimes During Hurricane Irma: How Colonial Legacies Impact 
Disaster Response and Recovery in Antigua and Barbuda,” Journal of Extreme 
Events 06, no. 01 (March 1, 2019): 1940004, https://doi.org/10.1142/
S2345737619400049.
68  Allison Bain et al., “Landscape Transformation During Ceramic Age and Colonial 
Occupations of Barbuda, West Indies,” Environmental Archaeology 23, no. 1 
(January 2, 2018): 36–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/14614103.2017.1345115.
69  Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During 
Hurricane Irma.”
70  Caribbean Community (CARICOM), “Antigua Opens Region’s Most Modern  
Airport Terminal,” August 23, 2015, https://caricom.org/antigua-opens- 
regions-most-modern-airport-terminal.
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risks of human trafficking (C17). Also because of the high 
number of displaced persons in Antigua, the situation was 
at times chaotic: “Some kids couldn’t find their parents” 
(C01). The capacity to provide relief goods was insufficient: 
“I would like to mention when the Barbudans arrived [in 
Antigua] there was not a proper set up for them, there were 
no blankets, the people came shivering” (C01).
Besides being a receiving country for disaster displaced 
persons, climate change impacts also affect Antigua 
directly. A DRR expert described climate-related vulner-
abilities in Antigua this way:
 –“Antigua too has its own vulnerabilities […]. We have seen 
because of climate change beaches that used to go out 
several metres are now right on the actual coast. […] There 
are fishermen that are complaining that there are areas 
where they used to catch a lot of fish, they no longer [can]. 
They have to go further out to sea. […] We have always 
been dry but we are now seeing the drought periods, the 
gap between dry spells getting shorter and shorter. There 
was a time when we used to have a dry spell every five to 
seven years. Now it is every three to five and we have been 
in a drought for the last four years” (C17). 
Besides the effects of climate change, other anthropogenic 
factors such as increasing urbanisation and the expan-
sion of cruise-ship tourism are also causing degradation 
of coastal ecosystems.71 Moreover, Antigua may also be 
affected by tropical cyclones in the future. 
DATA AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY IN ANTIGUA 
Cross-institutional data collection and management 
during the displacement period in 2017 was a significant 
challenge (C14). Tracking migrants was seen as diffi-
cult because of the frequency of in- and outmigration. 
Moreover, the lack of coordination led to duplications 
of data. Again, this was due to limited capacities in the 
respective institutions which were overwhelmed by rising 
numbers of displaced persons. Another official said:
71  Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During 
Hurricane Irma.”
 –“Because in 2017 we knew that people were coming, […] 
there was a special meeting with immigration and other 
stakeholders […] to discuss how to collect information, 
how to share, etc. But once the numbers starting esca-
lating, that system went out through the window. Going 
forward we need a formal arrangement to deal with these 
situations. There is some sharing of information between 
stakeholders, however that is only at the board of control 
level and it needs to go beyond that. The information 
needs to be shared with social services” (C17). 
In light of the challenges faced with data management, 
authorities are seeking to learn from their experiences. 
Plans for a better information management system are 
already being considered. One informant explained: 
 –“The immigration department from this year will be 
streamlining data collection, it will be capturing, nation-
ality, age, gender (sex) and during the hurricane season 
a displacement space where people can explain their 
reasons for moving. All this information will fit into our 
statistics and we will be able to extract data from it” 
(C14).
With regard to research, there is a large need for knowl-
edge and capacity building, as a senior government official 
noted: 
 –“We need to get to a point where […] the impact of climate 
change on the human being is properly researched. 
People need to be trained in how to capture that infor-
mation and the knowledge-gained needs to be fed back 
into the national mechanisms, so the knowledge can be 
applied” (C17). 
 –Still today, much of the related research is produced 
outside of the region and may not be entirely applicable 
to the case of Antigua and Barbuda. There is also a risk 
of stranded assets for development projects which do not 
take into account future climate impacts such as sea level 
rise (C17).
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THE BARBUDA EXPERIENCE
Barbuda’s history from slavery to emancipation in 1834 
and post-colonial independence has shaped land-use prac-
tices and land tenure regimes on the island.72 The enslaved 
people on Barbuda developed their own methods of agri-
culture and livestock farming. They practiced traditions of 
communal land ownership and land management from 
Africa to produce food. This communal land ownership 
is still the governing principle of tenure practices today 
under the Land Act of 2007.73 The act provides that no 
land on Barbuda shall be owned, but should be governed 
and administered communally by the Barbudan people. 
The Barbuda Council has to approve the use of land for 
development projects.74 This practice supports basic food 
security post-disaster, as residents are able to hunt and fish 
72  Margaret T. Tweedy, “A History of Barbuda under the Codringtons, 1738-1833” 
(Birmingham, UK, University of Birmingham, 1981), https://etheses.bham.
ac.uk/id/eprint/5356.
73  Kenneth A. Gould and Tammy L. Lewis, “Green Gentrification and Disaster 
Capitalism in Barbuda,” NACLA Report on the Americas 50, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 
148–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2018.1479466.
74  Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During 
Hurricane Irma.”
on the land. The communal land ownership practice has 
been challenged by the Antigua-based national govern-
ment, which has argued in favour of a privatisation of 
land-ownership on Barbuda.75 There are fears that such an 
approach, in turn, could lead to a selling-out of the island, 
as foreign investors are positioned to pay much higher 
prices than the local population. Most recently, a lease 
of Hollywood actor Robert De Niro and the Australian 
billionaire James Packer has been contested in court.76 
A law called the “Paradise Found Bill” was passed by the 
Antigua-based national government, giving celebrity 
investors a 25-year tax break in return for their expanded 
development on the islands and overriding the right of 
approval of the Barbudan Council. The prime minister of 
Antigua and Barbuda, Gaston Browne, has since declared 
De Niro to be a “special economic envoy” of the country.77 
The contested project is also relevant with regards to the 
displacement that occurred after Hurricane Irma in 2017, 
as many Barbudans expressed the view that in the after-
math of the disaster attempts were being made to keep 
Barbudans off their land.
The destruction of Hurricane Irma was extensive, 
destroying critical infrastructure services. Codrington 
airport, for instance, experienced severe damage and had 
to be shut down for commercial traffic. Electricity genera-
tion, transmission and distribution were heavily affected 
and not fully operational when this study was prepared. 
All generators on the island required replacement. The 
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) reported that 
Irma damaged or destroyed 95 % of the houses on the 
island.78 Above, the limited public infrastructure was 
largely destroyed as the island’s hospital, schools, bank and 
government buildings were either destroyed or severely 
damaged. As of 2019, there is insufficient medical service 
available on the island and no functioning ATM or bank 
system. People need to bear transportation costs to Antigua 
to attain these services. 
75  Gould and Lewis, “Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda.”
76  Martina Johnson and Richard Luscombe, “Robert De Niro’s Plan for Caribbean 
Mega-Resort Opposed by Island Residents,” The Guardian, November 27, 
2015, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/27/
robert-de-niro-barbuda-island-resort-controversy.
77  Associated Press in St John’s, “The Mission: Robert De Niro to Be Economic  
Envoy for Antigua & Barbuda,” The Guardian, November 29, 2014, sec. Film,  
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/nov/29/robert-de-niro-economic- 
envoy-antigua-barbuda.
78  Government of Antigua and Barbuda, “Hurricane Irma Recovery Needs 
Assessment: A Report by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda” (St. Johns, 
Antigua, 2018), https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Antigua 
%20and%20Barbuda%20executive%20summary_print_text%282%29.pdf.
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Two days after Hurricane Irma made landfall, a mandatory 
evacuation was ordered on September 8th for the entire 
island because of another tropical cyclone, Hurricane 
Jose. Although Hurricane Jose did not make landfall on 
Barbuda, the evacuated inhabitants were not allowed to 
return to their homes for several weeks,79 and the island 
was proclaimed “uninhabitable”.80 This evacuation was 
characterised as traumatic by several informants. Some 
respondents considered the attempt to build an interna-
tional airport on Barbuda in the immediate aftermath of 
the hurricane and the later Paradise Found Bill as efforts 
to challenge communal land ownership. The extended 
prohibition to return to their homes after the evacuation 
resulted in heavy criticism.81 
79  Gould and Lewis, “Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda.”
80  Joe Sterling and Cassandra Santiago, “For First Time in 300 Years, 
Barbuda Is Empty,” CNN, accessed September 26, 2019, https://www.cnn.
com/2017/09/15/americas/irma-barbuda-population-trnd/index.html; 
MarketWatch, “Tiny Island of Barbuda ‘Practically Uninhabitable’ in Irma’s 
Devastating Wake,” accessed September 26, 2019, https://www.marketwatch.
com/story/tiny-island-of-barbuda-practically-uninhabitable-in-irmas-
devastating-wake-2017-09-06.
81  Gould and Lewis, “Green Gentrification and Disaster Capitalism in Barbuda.”
Two years after Hurricane Irma, a number of people were still living in tents on Barbuda  (© K. Vinke)
One expert elaborated on the evacuation experience:
 –“The Barbudan people have been affected psychologically since the passage of Hurricane Irma 
and even so more traumatised since we were made to evacuate from our homes, from our lands, 
into what is considered by some people who had never travelled out of Barbuda before. […] Now 
that we returned to Barbuda, people are finding it difficult to re-establish themselves. […] It is 
unfortunate that the Council does not have the finances to assist in the form of bringing specialist 
technical people in, technocrats to assist in the education, […] the reconnection and redevelopment 
of individuals back into society. Because a lot of our people are still living in tents” (C06).
Many houses and roofs in particular were still destroyed 
at the time of this study, which meant that a return to a 
normal daily routine was not possible. A social protection 
specialist described the situation:
 –“Their livelihoods have been affected greatly… their 
liberty was affected. […] I’ve met some elderly persons that 
up to this day are disoriented, if they hear heavy wind or 
a bang, they get stressed. So they have not been able to 
overcome their trauma” (C01). 
These excerpts portray how both physical climate impacts 
and displacement can have long lasting effects on the 
population. One aspect is that in the aftermath of a disaster, 
social problems such as domestic violence or harassment 
can be amplified. An interviewee framed the violation of 
rights as follows: “I’ve seen things, many things, with young 
girls, people asking for sexual favours in the face of disaster 
and men passing remarks… to be honest I think that a lot of 
their rights were infringed upon” (C01). However, a lack of 
knowledge about rights and the responsible institutions 
prevented people from making claims. 
42
The interview analysis brought to light that the effects of 
the hurricane were not limited to the months following 
the disaster. In fact, even two years afterwards, the physical 
damage of the hurricane and the psycho-social impact of 
the displacement are still present in the communities. One 
interviewee explained the long-term effects on people’s 
livelihoods: 
 –“Clearly, the hurricane has changed the island totally, 
it has wiped out the economy of Barbuda at least for 
the first year after the storm. The hurricane had a very 
negative impact in agriculture, all farms were destroyed, 
animals, small stocks were damaged. In the recovery 
process things have to be done in a different way and this 
is where we talk about resilience. So that at least, if this 
occurs again the impact will not be the same – it would 
be mitigated by things we put in place” (C16).
Return migrants may thus be more vulnerable to coming 
climate impacts, making effective adaptation to future 
climate change less likely. The issue of finding employment 
is a central concern, as a senior DRR specialist noted: “Some 
of them are still not back to work. They are still not back to 
where they were before and it will be some time before they 
get back. The challenge of finding other sources of employ-
ment continues” (C17). 
Many people depend on fish for their food security and 
income base. However, besides the direct effects on the 
fisheries sector, there were also indirect secondary effects 
which constituted major challenges: for example, the 
police occupied the fisheries complex as their operational 
basis because their station had been destroyed by the hurri-
cane (C16). 
Displacement and returning home were particularly chal-
lenging for families with young children since they did not 
have access to childcare and still needed to find employ-
ment (C17). The same interviewee mentioned the need to 
balance the need to look for work to rebuild the homes 
with the obligation to look after the children. This under-
lines the necessity for assistance after the return to areas 
affected by disasters and climate change and how fami-
lies may be differently affected if no childcare facilities 
are available. Without additional assistance, recovery to 
the former status is much slower, or may never be accom-
plished. In addition, a need for more support for small 
businesses in the aftermath of the storm was voiced (C17). 
The devastation of the storm, the displacement of 
Barbudans to Antigua and the allocation of aid afterwards 
led to tensions between Antigua and Barbuda. Interviewees 
claimed that financial aid had largely stayed in Antigua 
and even shipments of products for relief were said to have 
been held up and partially seized at the Antigua port. As 
a result of the contentions over land and the increasing 
tensions between the two islands, some Barbudans 
even voiced secession from Antigua as a possibility. One 
regional actor explained, “In Antigua, when the Barbudans 
moved across it caused an issue. Housing them for free 
that did cause a political issue, as well as the consideration 
of new land ownership in Barbuda, that did cause some 
tensions” (C23). With two different systems of land owner-
ship in place, the effects of Hurricane Irma reinforced 
disagreement between the two islands and exacerbated 
power imbalances.82 Overall, with even basic services still 
lacking, the situation in Barbuda leads to the question 
which factors enabled the Commonwealth of Dominica 
to recover faster from the effects of the cyclone and 
displacement.
82  Look, Friedman, and Godbout, “The Resilience of Land Tenure Regimes During 
Hurricane Irma.”
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The long-term effects of tropical cyclone-induced displacement 
When Hurricane Irma made landfall on Caribbean islands 
in September of 2017 the effects were devastating. The 
island Barbuda was completely destroyed and Barbudans 
were forced to evacuate to Antigua, as another hurricane 
approached. The infrastructural damages of the hur-
ricane and the recovery efforts continue to determine 
daily life on the island. The case of Barbuda shows that 
long after international attention has shifted away from 
disaster struck regions, people still to struggle with the 
aftereffects and are left more vulnerable than before 
to future climate shocks. A group interview of five men 
from Barbuda sheds light on the effects the hurricane 
season of 2017 had in this region. 
“We have it hard, trust me. My whole house blow down”, 
one of the younger men in the group says and imitates 
the sounds of strong winds and cracking glasses. He 
was not even able to see the house of his neighbours 
when screaming for help. The storm blew away homes, 
and with them memories, items of emotional value and 
financial assets. Moreover, many of the islands’ pigs, 
sheep and donkeys died. After the storm had passed, no 
gas, generators or clean water were available. Barbudans 
have strong ties to their land and the forced evacuation 
which ensued came as an additional shock to many.
One and a half years after the category 5 hurricane, the 
island still remains largely without electricity and the 
damage of both physical infrastructure and the natural 
environment is visible everywhere. The men talk about 
their lives after the storm and the many setbacks and 
obstacles of their ongoing recovery. Between the hurrica-
nes and the time of the interview many stayed for exten-
ded periods in Antigua, which was not directly affected 
by the hurricane. One of the men slept in Antigua’s natio-
nal cricket stadium for about a year. The rescue shelters 
and living conditions were inadequate for longer stays. 
Access to clothes, water and food was limited. Some 
were hosted in private homes, but largely the experience 
of displacement was traumatic. After their return, the 
men wanted to rebuild their homes together with their 
families, but construction material and machines were 
hardly available. Some of them are still living in tents or 
makeshift houses and the recovery remains slow. 
Walking through Barbuda, the enormity of the dest-
ruction is as visible as if the storm had passed days ago. 
There is no sufficient aid to build new homes or even 
replace all roofs which have been damaged or destroyed. 
Through fishing and hunting the men provide food for 
themselves and their families. Critical infrastructure is 
barely functioning. In the conversation the frustration 
with the situation of the men cannot be overheard. Just 
a few days ago the only school on the island had to close 
until clean water is available again. These pressing issues 
were hindering the men from returning to a normal life. 
Yet they are determined to stay on their island, their 
homeland.
© Kira Vinke
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Anguilla 
Anguilla is an internally self-governing Overseas Country 
and Territory of the UK. The country has 23 islands of 
which only one is inhabited, by approximately 17,000 
people.83 
Anguilla’s economy is based on tourism. The seasonality of 
the sector, widespread foreign ownership and the annual 
hurricane season “add considerable risk to economic 
growth and prosperity”, according to the government of 
Anguilla.84 
Like many Caribbean islands, Anguilla was severely hit by 
Hurricane Irma in September 2017. Since 1928, no other 
category 5 hurricane had made landfall on the island.85 
According to an official assessment, the hurricane severely 
damaged 90 % of the island’s buildings and destroyed or 
interrupted critical infrastructure, including the island’s 
electricity supply.86 Functioning electricity is crucial for the 
desalination of seawater on which Anguilla depends for 
freshwater supply. 
83  CIA World Factbook, “Anguilla,” accessed October 16, 2019,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html.
84  The Government of Anguilla London Office, “Anguilla and Hurricane Irma: 
Recovery, Resilience and Prosperity” (London: The Government of Anguilla, 
2017).
85 The Government of Anguilla London Office.
86  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
Hurricane Irma also destroyed Anguilla’s passenger ferry 
port which had been the main gateway to the island and 
ensured access to neighbouring Saint Martin on which 
Anguilla’s inhabitants find essential goods and services.87 
All schools on the island were severely affected by the 
hurricane and, for safety reasons, Anguilla’s only secondary 
school had to be demolished.88 The children on the island 
were still receiving education in temporary facilities at 
the time of this study. Anguilla’s hospital, a 32-bed facility 
providing public healthcare to the entire population and 
tourists, was also damaged and remains prone to flooding.89 
Even before Hurricane Irma hit Anguilla, high levels of 
unemployment had been a push factor for emigration of 
Anguillans, who hold British citizenship. Further emigra-
tion could lead to a brain drain and hinder the island’s 
development and recovery,90 but it could also serve 
economic growth through remittance-based investments. 
When asked if there was an awareness of how climate 
change may be affecting the population, one respondent 
noted: 
 –“It is true that we are seeing more catastrophic storms 
that were unprecedented and that set us back economi-
cally for a while. Also the threat of mosquito-borne 
diseases, which are also climate-related. We are going to 
see more outbreaks. We are experiencing that with the 
outbreaks of zika, dengue, chikungunya” (C07). 
The same interviewee explained how a single case of a 
dangerous vector-borne disease may influence tourism 
from abroad negatively for an extended period of time. 
There is a lack of research that details the future impact 
of climate change on the disease burden in the Caribbean. 
However, both changing climate conditions which can lead 
to further spread of disease-carrying mosquito species and 
increased international travel may lead to higher levels of 
epidemiological risks. It also shows how a tourism-based 
economy can be devastated by a variety of climate change 
effects and their coverage in the media. The aspect of 
healthcare access was also presented as a possible reason 
for the movement of people. One respondent explained the 
effects of the damages to the hospital: 
87  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
88  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
89  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
90  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
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 –“Some people left because they didn’t feel comfortable 
with the condition of the hospital at that point in time, 
in case that they had any complications [for example in 
their pregnancy] they went to have their child, but they 
came back” (C13).
Overall, multiple migration push factors and the networks 
of the Anguillan diaspora in the UK could lead to further 
outmigration. Considering the difficult situation in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Irma, with many having lost their 
jobs and/or their home and critical infrastructure being 
destroyed, the presence of a well-established Anguillan 
diaspora makes migration to the UK a rather “realistic 
option for many”, as stated in the government’s official 
assessment of the hurricane.91 There is no comprehen-
sive welfare system in place and many Anguillans lack the 
funds to rebuild their homes. Even when not faced with a 
crisis situation, Anguilla’s public infrastructure is inad-
equate for a population of over 17,000 and the tourists.92 
91  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
92  The Government of Anguilla London Office.
Difficult economic situations and missing or lacking public 
services have always been reasons to leave the island. 
One respondent provided an overview of the emigra-
tion of Anguilla’s population over the years. He described 
Anguillans as “a population on the move”. 
 –“We have always been a people on the move. In recent 
times with the downturn in our economy […] people are 
leaving the island because of the economics. […] In my 
opinion, more [for] economic opportunities rather than 
[because of] climatic conditions” (C15).
Another respondent elaborated on the link to environ-
mental change of Anguilla’s migration processes, noting 
that
 –“In the context of the Monserrat eruption, we were 
a [migrant] receiving country […]. But I think with 
Hurricane Irma there were some persons moving out of 
Anguilla and that is a multiplier. […] So, I think, hurri-
cane Irma could have been the final nail in the coffin for 
some persons. They said ‘hey let’s just move’. Persons were 
already traversing outside of Anguilla and going to the 
UK for example […] to make a better life. […] When we are 
hit, we are actually unintentionally moving to the UK” 
(C04). 
Barbuda  (© Kira Vinke)
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It is a common observation that when climate change 
impacts affect already economically deprived areas, it can 
be the triggering factor for outmigration. Another source 
supported this view with a similar observation: 
 –“After Hurricane Irma a lot of people have left. If you 
were a hotel worker, you already knew hotels in Anguilla 
close late August to early September and they reopen 
in November. Then Irma hits 2017 and that pushes the 
reopening almost for another year. Then the education 
aspect because even schools would have been closed, so 
people sent away their children” (C13).
Unlike in the case of displaced Barbudans in Antigua, 
people affected by the hurricane in Anguilla did not stay 
for long in government shelters, but instead lived with 
relatives or friends (C07 & C13). There was, however, no 
data collection on the people who stayed in private homes. 
As in other cases, the competition for labour in the after-
math of the hurricane and recovery period was identified 
as a source of social tension: 
 –“We had persons looking at who was getting jobs and 
looking at work permits that we issued because the 
thought was, why are you issuing work permits to 
persons when you have Anguillans out of jobs? But the 
fact was that most of the work permits were issued to 
persons that had a skill that we did not possess here, we 
needed the additional skill.” (C10). 
This situation again highlights the need for better access to 
secondary education and vocational training. 
Commonwealth of Dominica 
The Commonwealth of Dominica lies between the French 
Overseas Departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique. It is 
home to 74,000 people.93 
The Commonwealth of Dominica is among the five coun-
tries with the highest net migration rate, whereas the size 
of the diaspora is more than twice as high as the popu-
lating currently residing in the state.94 Pull factors include 
employment opportunities, the pursuit of higher educa-
tion elsewhere or the reunification with family members.95 
The extent of the migration and displacement following 
Hurricane Maria in 2017 may be some of the largest ever 
occurring in the Commonwealth of Dominica. Some 
people went to close-by French-speaking islands, many 
moved through Antigua to English-speaking territories 
and some migrated to the UK and the US, both for long and 
short-term. The full extent of human mobility in the after-
math of the 2017 Hurricane season is an area of research 
93  CIA World Factbook, “Central America: Dominica,” 2018, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/do.html.
94  Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, “Post-Disaster Needs 
Assessment Hurricane Maria September 18, 2017: A Report by the Government 
of the Commonwealth of Dominica” (Roseau, Dominica: Government of the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017), https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/
publication/dominica-pdna-maria.pdf.
95  Thomson Fontaine, “Tracing the Diaspora’s Involvement in the Development 
of a Nation: The Case of Dominica,” 2006, 20.
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which has not yet been fully explored and documentation 
is incomplete.
One interviewee described the partially chaotic movement 
of people after the cyclone: “Some of them had documents 
in order, some had damaged documents and others didn’t 
have documents at all as they were destroyed during the 
hurricane. We assisted them to get new documents” (C22). 
The situation in the Commonwealth of Dominica after the 
hurricane was very dire and many did not think they could 
return: “Some people thought that Dominica was finished, 
many people think there is nothing in Dominica for them to 
come back to, some people were really traumatised, weeks 
after the hurricane they were still trembling and feeling fear” 
(C22).
After the disaster, managing displacement posed serious 
problems. Immigration officials of other Caribbean states 
made use of the OECS freedom of movement agreement 
and tried to support Dominican migrants without docu-
ments.96 A Dominican official explained:
 –“Some of the challenges we had were families with chil-
dren coming to you with no travel documents and our 
system at the time was down. To process the passport we 
would have needed a computer and we had no elec-
tricity” (C22). 
These excerpts show that the nature of migration in 
the aftermath of an extreme event is often chaotic. One 
respondent working at an immigration office described 
a woman who wanted to enter another country: “Besides 
immigration trying to process people to go out, people who 
lived close to the sea and had access to a boat, they just 
boarded the boats and left” (C22). 
From the point of view of one of the receiving countries, 
the situation was expressed as follows: “Persons came here 
and we had to find the finances to set up a space for them, 
to feed them, to ensure that everybody was safe. There was 
nothing in place for that mass migration” (C28).
One example of planned relocation is the Dominican 
government’s response to the destruction of Hurricane 
Erika in 2015 in the community of Petite Savanne, where 
217 homes were destroyed. The village is located in one 
96 Francis, Ama, “Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration.”
of the most severely affected areas.97 A resident described 
what he saw as “worse than a war zone” and reported that 
people dug through mud, often with their bare hands, to 
rescue those trapped.98 Petit Savanne was cut off from the 
rest of the island for several days following the hurricane.99 
In September 2016 the government launched a building 
project called the Bellevue Chopin Housing Development 
to relocate the community. To meet the housing needs of 
the of 792 village residents, the construction of 341 units 
commenced. At the time of writing this report, some resi-
dents already lived in Bellevue Chopin.
97  Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, “Rapid Damage and Impact 
Assessment Tropical Storm Erika – August 27, 2015,” 2015,  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/142861467995411564/
pdf/104251-WP-PUBLIC-Rapid-Damage-and-Needs-Assessment-Final-
Report-Oct5.pdf.
98  Patrick Kneight, “Dominica Struggles to Recover from Devastating Storm 
Erika,” UNICEF Connect, September 3, 2015, https://blogs.unicef.org/blog/
dominica-struggles-to-recover-from-devastating-storm-erika.
99  Barry Alleyne, “Petite Savanne Residents Forced to Bury Dead,”  
www.nationnews.com, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.nationnews.
com/nationnews/news/71827/petite-savanne-residents-forced-bury-dead.
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Similar to the Bellevue Chopin, a real estate develop-
ment project was proposed by the government to provide 
new housing to citizens affected by Hurricane Maria. The 
proposed project is financed through the Government’s 
Citizenship by Investment Program and particularly 
addresses low and middle income groups.
According to the Post Disaster Needs Assessment, 
Hurricane Maria caused extensive damage in the housing 
sector: “Of the 31,348 homes comprising the Dominican 
housing stock, a total of approximately 4,700 houses (15 %) 
were identified as destroyed, (75 %) were estimated to have 
different levels of partial damage and only 3,135 (10 %) 
were considered as not affected by the event”.100 
Despite the government’s efforts to build new housing in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, some people were still 
in shelters at the time this study was conducted. “In the 
Roseau Area we still have about 300 people in shelters [as a 
result of the Hurricane]” (C30). Often displacements can last 
a long time: 
 –“There are people [here] since tropical storm Erika who 
have moved from their communities and have not 
returned. They don’t want to go through that experience, 
so the displacement aspect is seriously impacting persons. 
They don’t want to go back because they feel threatened 
that if they ever return and stay there for a while these 
events will continue to occur and impact them” (C31).
The aftermath of the cyclone also brought social tensions 
to Dominica:
 –“People were moved from their farms, from their liveli-
hoods and that creates a lot of tension. Also, there have 
been a lot of family separations, break up of marriages 
and things like that. We had some challenges when the 
government was allocating the housing units because of 
the breakup of the family structure” (C31).
While there is no quantitative evidence available for these 
claims, it could serve adaptation planning to investigate 
the importance of including societal and cultural aspects 
in the development of new housing, as well as the need for 
enhanced social services and psychological support in the 
aftermath of disasters. 
100  Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, “Post-Disaster Needs 
Assessment Hurricane Maria September 18, 2017: A Report by the Government 
of the Commonwealth of Dominica.”
Saint Lucia 
Politically, Saint Lucia is a regional hub and leader. As the 
host of the OECS Commission, the country has influence 
on regional policy as well as the opportunity to contribute 
to policy integration across governance levels.
Geographically, Saint Lucia is part of the Windward Islands 
group in the Eastern Caribbean. and has a land area of only 
616 km². It has a population of about 177,000 people.101 
Saint Lucia became independent in 1979. 
Unemployment is high with a fifth of the population out 
of work. Even higher is the percentage of youth unem-
ployment which is at 36.3 %.102 Castries has a population 
of 60,390, which accounts for 40 % of the country’s total 
population.103 
In 1995, the Saint Lucia Report on Poverty indicated that 
19.7 % of the households lived in poverty and a quarter 
of the population were poor. However, life expectancy in 
Saint Lucia is 75 years, which is high. Other social indica-
tors like primary school enrolment, which stands at 87 %, 
also show development progress. In 2017, Saint Lucia’s 
101  The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia, “Home – The Central Statistical 
Office of Saint Lucia,” accessed August 15, 2019, https://www.stats.gov.lc.
102  The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia, “Home – The Central Statistical 
Office of Saint Lucia.”
103 The Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia.
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Human Development Index placed the country in the high 
human development category.
The Government of Saint Lucia notes that although 
“Saint Lucia’s per capita income is relatively high among 
developing countries, it has been disadvantaged by its 
economic dependence on bananas and by its small size, 
small population, limited physical and human resources, 
and the frequency of hurricanes”.104 Tourism has become an 
increasingly important industry, which has enabled people 
to diversify their income. But it is also susceptible to the 
detrimental effects of climate change. 
As in other Caribbean SIDS, Saint Lucians have emigrated 
in search of economic opportunities in the past. Today, as 
Saint Lucia is one of the founding members of the OECS, 
Saint Lucians enjoy the right of free movement of persons 
in the group of Member States. Based on estimates for 
2020, the country has a net migration rate of -1.7 migrants 
per 1,000 people.105 In the past, emigrants from Saint Lucia 
have primarily chosen to migrate to other Caribbean 
countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and the 
neighbouring French Caribbean islands. In recent decades, 
emigration has also led to a slightly increasing number of 
Saint Lucians in Canada, the UK, and the United States.106 
In 2017, the highest share of Saint Lucians reported abroad 
(23,000) resided in the United States.107 These migrants 
tend to choose destinations for education, family, or 
skilled work.108 Of nearly 55,000 Saint Lucians residing in 
other countries in 2017, the number in developed regions 
outnumbered those in less developed regions three to 
one. By contrast, migration flows from the global south 
to Saint Lucia exceeded migration flows from the global 
north two to one. The UN estimates that the total migrants 
104  Government of Saint Lucia, “Economy of Saint Lucia – Key Facts 2015,” 2015, 
http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/countries/americas/st_lucia/
economy.
105  CIA World Factbook, “Net Migration Rate. Country Comparison Ranking,” 
accessed February 14, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/fields/347.html.
106  Nations Encyclopedia, “Migration – St. Lucia,” accessed August 15, 2019, 
https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/St-Lucia-MIGRATION.
html#ixzz5nIFGFRBI.
107  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant 
Stock: The 2017 Revision,” 2017, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp.
108  Caribbean Expert Group Meeting on Human Rights and Development in the 
Caribbean, “Migration in the Caribbean – What Do We Know?,” 2005, https://
repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38805/1/LCCARL054_en.pdf; 
Bradley B. Walters, “Migration, Land Use and Forest Change in St. Lucia, 
West Indies,” Land Use Policy 51 (February 2016): 290–300, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.11.025.
stock in 2017109 was 12,900. The countries with the five 
largest shares of reported foreign-born residents in Saint 
Lucia were Guyana (1,992), the UK (980), Trinidad and 
Tobago (787), Barbados (785), and the United States (669).110 
Before Hurricane Maria made landfall on 18 September, a 
reported 231 Dominicans resided in Saint Lucia. This study 
could not identify data detailing the exact migration and 
displacement stocks and flows following that event.
The extreme cyclone season of 2017 was a watershed 
moment for Saint Lucia’s experience with disaster displace-
ment. Saint Lucia is a coordinator in the Caribbean region 
for regional disaster response. In line with this, the island 
has received displaced persons from other OECS Member 
States on a number of occasions, and has more generally 
become a transit hub for people from the Commonwealth 
of Dominica bound to the US and for other Caribbean 
nationals to travel to the Commonwealth of Dominica. In 
2017, Saint Lucia was asked to take responsibility for the 
evacuation of Americans living on the Commonwealth 
of Dominica (C32). However, the early evacuation of 
foreigners was criticised by the local population. Also some 
complaints were made that Dominican migrants arriving 
in Saint Lucia were given better access to public housing 
and other services than Saint Lucians, which resulted 
in low level social tensions. Both claims show that even 
regional migration management can become politicised 
and contested. 
One prominent official interviewed for this study 
expressed the perception that the deficiencies in standard 
operating procedures limit the effectiveness of govern-
ment response to people on the move following disasters, 
as well as efforts for longer-term integration (C32). Such 
procedures would, inter alia, clarify the type and duration 
of humanitarian assistance provided to non-nationals on 
the territory of Saint Lucia. This is of particular concern for 
a hub like Saint Lucia. Ambitious integration efforts may 
be difficult to justify, for example, when faced with chal-
lenges to integrating unskilled migrants into the tourism-
oriented Saint Lucian labour market. 
However, the number of migrants who remained in Saint 
Lucia was estimated by government officials to be rela-
tively small, about two hundred people (C32). Migration, 
109 Estimates from UNDESA are based on data collected as of 1 July 2017.
110  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant 
Stock: The 2017 Revision.”
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displacement and planned relocation are not mentioned 
in the country’s National Adaptation Plan (NAP) of 2018, 
although Saint Lucia could be again indirectly or also 
directly affected by displacement resulting from tropical 
cyclone risks.111 
In Saint Lucia, several areas are prone to climate risks. For 
example, the fishing community of Anse La Raye – which 
was mentioned by interview partners in Saint Lucia – is 
located in a valley, making it highly susceptible to flooding 
during extreme precipitation events. Moreover, fisheries 
are suffering throughout the region due to widespread 
coral bleaching and the related diminishment of fish 
stocks. Despite the fact that the low-lying parts of the 
village are exposed to mud slides and in the long term also 
sea level rise, villagers who live in the area do not wish to 
move uphill because of the proximity to the ocean, which 
is their workplace. It was mentioned by one government 
official that in general resilience building measures in the 
country are preferred to human mobility options (C32). 
This case exemplifies that planned relocation would have 
to consider livelihood options and the feasibility of certain 
types of work in the destinations. 
111  Government of Saint Lucia, “Saint Lucia’s National Adaptation Plan Roadmap 
and Capacity Development Plan 2018–2028” (Castries: Department of 
Sustainable Development, Ministry of Education, Innovation, Gender 
Relations and Sustainable Development, 2018), https://climatechange.govt.lc/
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/NAP-Roadmap-and-Capacity-Building-PLAN-
FINAL.pdf.
4.5. 
Mapping Obstacles and Building 
Blocks for HMCCC People-Centred 
Planning 
The 2017 hurricane season appears to have prompted 
policymakers to consider climate change and human 
mobility questions more seriously, particularly after the 
devastation brought to Barbuda and the Commonwealth 
of Dominica. However, concrete actions and policies 
pertaining to HMCCC are largely lacking. Currently, only 
the Commonwealth of Dominica has developed provisions 
for the relocation of populations, and so far only as a reme-
dial measure for displacement, not as an anticipatory strat-
egy.112 Apart from this first step, mechanisms and resources 
are missing for managing the complexity of HMCCC.
Policy Gaps
Some experts specifically mentioned the need for migra-
tion policies (C07, C10, C14). One officer from Antigua 
and Barbuda criticised the absence of new policies after 
disaster and the insufficient documentation of migrants 
112  Clarke and Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape 
Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the 
Caribbean.”
Anse La Raye – fisheries based community, located in between a mountain range  (© K. Vinke)
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(C14), while others described the need for an overarching 
national policy on climate mobility (C17, C19, C31). An 
expert from Anguilla criticised migration policies as failing 
to attract professionals (C07). Policies that would aim at 
providing training for at-risk communities could help to 
fill such labour demands. A respondent from an intergov-
ernmental organisation stated that policies addressing the 
situation of people affected by climate change in terms 
of compensation, protection, economic and employment 
initiatives are missing (C09).113 A general gap concerns the 
planning dimension: many existing policies are reactive 
rather than preventative (C07).
Rights-Based and Gender-Sensitive 
Approaches 
The case study countries in the Caribbean are part of 
various international conventions that could guide 
the treatment of migrants and displaced persons. The 
Commonwealth of Dominica has signed and ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, while Saint Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda are 
not signatories.114 All three countries are signatories of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Great 
Britain extended the treaty to Anguilla. All four coun-
tries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
Saint Lucia and the Commonwealth of Dominica voted 
yes on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration in 2018, whereas Antigua and Barbuda neither 
voted nor abstained. In the same year, all countries 
approved the Global Compact on Refugees. 
Although Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, and Saint Lucia are signato-
ries of these different legal instruments, governments do 
not always implement the pertaining national regulations 
on the local level. Moreover, some policies or procedures 
do not actively take into account needs of women, children 
people living with disabilities. There is a general lack of 
awareness about these norms, requiring training alongside 
the improvement of institutional and human capacities 
for respecting, protecting and fulfilling all human rights. A 
senior regional official indicated that
113 Clarke and Johnson.
114  Anguilla is an overseas territory of Great Britain and not a UN Member state, 
therefore it is not included herein as a separate entity of analysis.
 –“Knowledge of human rights has not been prevalent. We 
need to do the assessment as to whether our laws recog-
nise human rights in an active way. We might be a signa-
tory to international conventions but whether at the 
local level the laws have been enacted even the awareness 
of the legal system, we might sign but even the capacity 
building of our judges and magistrates is not there yet” 
(C23).
Also for those who are working with displaced persons it 
may be necessary to provide information on people’s rights 
to make sure that standards are adhered to. Raising aware-
ness of human rights and redress mechanisms to migrants 
is also key for their empowerment. General education or 
pre-departure trainings are needed since many migrants, 
displaced and relocated persons are not fully aware of 
their rights. Legal provisions under the CARICOM and the 
OECS seem to have helped to improve the equal treatment 
of displaced persons: “The contingent rights protocol […] 
demands that once any citizen of the OECS enters another 
protocol member state they are treated like a citizen of that 
particular country.” (C27).
The lack of data makes it difficult to thoroughly assess 
and monitor violations of rights. For example, there is 
some general evidence that violent crimes can increase in 
the aftermath of extreme events according to the World 
Health Organization,115 but so far, no detailed study has 
investigated this question for the Caribbean. Gender-based 
violence requires special attention in this context. As one 
official from a regional intergovernmental association 
noted,
 –“[…] The issue of gender-based violence […] may increase 
during or shortly after a big event. We need to take a 
closer examination of that, maybe through the number of 
reported cases to hospitals. We may also want to take a 
look at inter-partner type violence and the whole gender 
dynamics around it. Also too, the abuse of the aged is 
something under the radar. The elderly are very vulner-
able. How does the disaster compound their living situa-
tion so issues of violence need to be explored in this area” 
(C26).
115  Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention, World Health Organization, 
“Violence and Disasters” (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 
20015), https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publications/
violence/violence_disasters.pdf.
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Deficiencies in the national and regional social safety net 
systems as well as in climate resilience overall are at the 
heart of weaknesses in governance of HMCCC. There are, 
however, limited advances in the portability of rights and 
in promotion of resilience-building. An academic expert 
working on disaster risk reduction in the region explains 
that the topic has not been addressed from a human rights 
angle:
 –“I have heard no discussion of human rights in the 
context of human mobility as a result of climate change.
[…] The whole issue of gender is more recognised these 
days, but I don’t think that we have looked at it in the 
context of environmental movement [of people]” (C19).
Weaknesses in governance are largely due to deficien-
cies in strategic engagement on HMCCC, despite interest 
in the topic. Governance of human mobility is largely 
seen as a matter of economic exchange and of sovereign 
national security, and not yet fully as a proactive means to 
protect citizens while promoting human development in 
the region. Good practices identified by this study include 
effective communication and coordination of regional 
and international institutions, and in some cases between 
environmental agencies or departments. In some cases, 
increased awareness has also led to an improvement of 
institutional capacity to address human mobility: “I think 
that in the region we are becoming more qualified. We have 
a lot more technical people who are training and have the 
exposure and we have the people who can actually advance 
this” (C13). A leading scholar stated that DRR and climate 
adaptation were well-aligned: “In the Caribbean, the link 
between disaster risk reduction and climate change adapta-
tion is quite strong at the programmatic level.” (C19). Other 
good practices included programmes in the agricultural 
sector that helped people to cope with climate impacts 
through access to labour and risk diversification (C02). 
Data Gaps
So far, the linkages between human mobility and climate 
change for the Caribbean have not been thoroughly inves-
tigated. One issue are data constraints. Several key inform-
ants considered data sources as incomplete or non-existent 
(C12, C14, C16, and C22) and pointed to insufficient data 
collecting capacities (C09) and limited cooperation (C03). 
Some respondents from ministries highlighted specific 
data needs. For example, documentation on displacement 
events is still weak. 
One interviewee underlined the need for more informa-
tion by explaining the type of data which was required. 
 –“The social services, the institutions and programmes 
that are available to people in the event of a hurricane 
or a disaster:” I would also like to have data on all those 
persons trained to give that kind of support […] For the 
children I would like to have information on the family 
unit. […][For example], who are the single parent families” 
(C27). 
Women, the elderly and children are particularly 
vulnerable in the case of a disaster and one respondent 
commented on the need of disaggregated data : “I think 
we need general information regarding the population: 
male, female, elderly, children, living conditions, so that at 
least you will be able to make assessments and plan how to 
move forward” (C16). The interview statements show that 
the development of new categories for data collection 
on HMCCC may be required to provide information on 
particularly vulnerable social groups. Another interviewee 
also noted the dearth of specific data: 
 –“It is challenging to find data specifically dedicated to 
the different forms of human mobility related to envi-
ronmental changes. Some sources may exist in terms of 
censuses, or disaster-related data, but it would be difficult 
to use them on an ongoing basis for policymaking” (C09).
Data collection is seen as a fundamental precondition 
to develop anticipatory mechanisms to manage climate 
change impacts (C16). There is insufficient data collection 
on the secondary effects of climate change impacts on 
livelihoods (C16) and immigration streams (C28), although 
it could improve risk reduction. The reasons for this are 
multifold; they include limited financial resources and 
technical capacities as well as standard procedures to 
execute data collection.
To bridge these data gaps, key stakeholders suggested 
several strategies building upon existing data collection 
tools. One was to streamline immigration data collec-
tion across the region (C14). One government official 
provided some insights into potentially useful sources for 
data collection, including schools which enrolled migrant 
students, port of entry documentation and applications for 
social protection services (C27). Focused on the develop-
ment of displaced people, one informant proposed to 
conduct a longitudinal survey over five to ten years to 
gather information about the reasons for migration and 
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people’s current livelihood; however, there are limitations 
in terms of finances and capacity to conduct such a survey 
(C15). 
Overall, the lack of data on human mobility in the context 
of climate change is a severe constraint for the improve-
ment of disaster-preparedness because without knowing 
past migration flows after extreme events it is difficult to 
prepare for future impacts.
MISSING INSTRUMENTS
The shortage of data and lack of policies on HMCCC in the 
Caribbean show the need for new procedures and instru-
ments. Mechanisms for tracking movements are missing, 
as well as the creation or maintenance of capacities, 
resources and knowledge. Effective displacement manage-
ment needs to include provisions for the safe transporta-
tion and sheltering of people,116 adherence to human rights 
standards and consistent data collection of migratory 
movements, including those persons finding shelter in 
private homes, so that they can also receive adequate access 
to social services. 
116  Clarke and Johnson, “Policy Analysis and Institutional Actor Landscape 
Relating to Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change in the 
Caribbean.”
In the case of the Caribbean, where free movement is 
partially granted, good communication and coordina-
tion among stakeholders at national and regional levels 
are essential for successful and efficient capacity-building. 
A regional stakeholder added: “We should ensure absolute 
harmonisation of processes and platforms” (C21). Regional 
entities like the OECS could improve coordination, but 
national ministries could also enhance their communica-
tion, coordination and operationalisation of existing policy 
frameworks (C17, C28). Inadequate cooperation can be a 
reason for insufficient data collection (C03). 
Education, be it specific schooling for the general public or 
capacity building and advanced training for practitioners, 
is another field that requires new approaches. Educating 
about climate change and its relation to human mobility, 
society, vulnerable groups and human rights is funda-
mental to raise awareness about the urgency of the topics. 
Reactive disaster management in Caribbean nations would 
also profit from improved knowledge about operational 
procedures117 and existing climate mobility policies (C13). 
Improving knowledge about impacts of climate change 
as well as applicable adaptation and mitigation options 
are needed. Education about climate change without the 
knowledge and political or economic ability to react will 
not be sufficient. 
117 Clarke and Johnson.
East Coast Dominica  (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)
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Empowerment and protection of affected people were 
also raised as topics. Missing support may increase already 
existing vulnerabilities because those already disadvan-
taged may not receive support, or do not know how to 
claim their rights. Two interviewees criticised the out-of-
date housing programmes and building codes which do 
not address urgent housing needs in case of disasters (C11 
& C15). The absence of policy guidance on HMCCC has 
been identified as a weakness.
Research
While the literature on human mobility in the context 
of climate change has grown, research gaps persist and 
are especially evident in the Caribbean. Developing and 
more specific research is also hindered by the absence of 
available data. One intergovernmental actor specified this 
research gap as a lack of “actionable research” which “is 
required to assist countries in developing evidence-based 
policies on all topics related to environmental migration” 
(C09). Such applied research should support Caribbean 
governments to coordinate human mobility in the context 
of climate change (C16), especially in the areas of imple-
mentation of policies, addressing educational deficiencies 
(C01), and adhering to the Human Rights Convention (C01). 
Furthermore, there are research deficits about physical 
impacts of climate change (C16), including the situations 
of elderly and children during and after extreme weather 
events, in particular with regard to their high mortality. 
Additionally, the situation and needs of families have to be 
identified. More knowledge is also needed on the specific 
pathways of environmental migration (C17, C19), the 
reasons for the reluctance to move out of exposed areas 
and how in situ adaptation can be facilitated and relocation 
incentivised (C31).
Entry Points
Considering the foregoing analysis, entry points for a 
better governance of HMCCC consist in capacity-building, 
coordination, communication, education, and reforming 
of housing policies. In general, good entry points for new 
instruments are the increasing awareness on climate 
change and human mobility among policymakers, existing 
communication and coordination systems, and existing 
standard protocols and procedures. In the Caribbean, 
regional entities like CARICOM, CCCCC, CDEMA or OECS 
could be included in the process of, for example, coordi-
nating migration, distributing knowledge to the national 
level and execute capacity building. Furthermore, deficien-
cies in monitoring and evaluation again highlight the need 
for more data collection and organisational instruments. 
Diversification of incomes constitutes another important 
entry point to increase adaptation capacities (C11 & C15). 
More diversified incomes would especially help exposed 
and vulnerable farmers, fishers, or the tourism industry. For 
example, successful coordination and political initiative led 
in the case of Anguilla to a relief-building programme that 
created partnerships between farmers and families in order 
to diversify income (C15), called family enhancement. 
Overall, it has been acknowledged that standard operating 
procedures such as protocols and guiding papers enable 
actors to structure themselves and react effectively.
Barbuda  (© Kira Vinke)
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4.6. 
Recommendations for the Caribbean
Caribbean policymakers and practitioners who are engaged 
in efforts to deal with the human dimensions of climate 
change are relatively advanced in some areas – in particular 
in addressing disaster displacement – as the interviews 
and communiqués reviewed for this research demonstrate. 
Challenges persist however in other areas, for example in 
designing frameworks to deal proactively with movements 
in the context of gradual changes. This section attempts to 
summarise priority areas for action – first at the regional 
level and then separately for the four study countries. 
Core Recommendations at the Regional Level
There is currently no specific regional framework to 
address climate-related human mobility in the Caribbean, 
neither in the case of disasters nor as a response to gradual 
environmental changes and the resulting degradation in 
socio-economic conditions. Nevertheless, Caribbean coun-
tries have repeatedly supported each other in the aftermath 
of disasters by flexibly exercising their sovereign rights 
within existing frameworks and mechanisms for regular 
temporary migration and for the relatively unhindered 
movement of goods. In the future, a more inclusive appli-
cation of the spirit of free movement of people between 
Member States by expanding visa categories in later phases 
of the CSME may further facilitate movement; however, 
these pathways are currently limited to highly-skilled 
workers.118 Furthermore, of the countries studied for this 
report, Anguilla is an associate member of CARICOM and 
not a part of the CSME. 
Regional organisations may also make use of interna-
tional venues to further work on HMCCC, such as through 
the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement, and the constituted 
bodies under the UNFCCC. As with other areas studied 
for this research, actions taken at the regional level will be 
more effective, due in part to the mobility of the popula-
tions and region-wide impacts of natural hazards.
118  At present, only people in ten highly-skilled labour categories can qualify 
for free movement permissions. Yet, some interviewees approached for this 
study suggested an expansion of visa categories to include low- and un-skilled 
people may benefit people on the move more broadly. Expansion is envisaged 
for later phase of implementation of the CSME, and largely determined at the 
national level through quotas and visas.
SET A STRATEGIC DIRECTION
Setting a clear, strategic, and objective-driven direction for 
policy development and implementation is an important 
component to effective public policy and governance.119 
Nations at the regional level can:
	§ Ensure sustained commitment at key levels of 
leadership; 
	§ Engage in regional and international dialogues and 
thereby in cross-country coordination; 
	§ Build institutional structures and capacities for effective 
implementation of policies and programmes; ensuring 
the full participation of affected communities, with 
consideration to vulnerable or marginalised groups; and 
	§ Support, monitor, and evaluate national efforts 
to manage support services for displaced persons 
following disasters, for example, by special task force(s) 
with multi-disciplinary personnel;
For effective governance of human mobility phenomena, 
these considerations – as well as the human rights and 
well-being of migrants, women, and vulnerable groups – 
must be considered for each stage of the migration cycle. 
While these efforts require bottom-up action by the 
nations in the region, namely through domestic legislation, 
coordination and direction-setting should also happen at 
the regional level. For the Caribbean region, the work and 
expertise of organisations like the OECS can be leveraged 
to set evidence-based strategic directions on a few priority 
areas that have region-wide implications.
FOSTER EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND 
DECISION MAKING
Enhanced monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for 
migration, displacement and planned relocations are 
needed across the Caribbean, especially in countries typi-
cally receiving displaced persons, such as Saint Lucia. Data 
paucity and limited data sharing are main barriers. The 
conducted interviews also pointed to limited existence of – 
or poor implementation of – standard operational proto-
cols, methods, and procedures for dealing with migrants, 
119  Adapted from the Auditor General of British Columbia and Deputy Minister’s 
Council, “Enhancing Accountability for Performance: A Framework and an 
Implementation Plan : Second Joint Report,” 1996, https://www.bcauditor.
com/sites/default/files/publications/1996/special/report/enhancing-
acountability-performance-frameworkand-implementationplan.pdf.
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displaced people, and relocatees. While existing procedures 
may become easily overwhelmed in emergency situations, 
technical experts can assist in calm periods to make proto-
cols adaptable to emergency situations. In addition, a few 
areas require operable solutions:
	§ Clear identification of roles and responsibilities for 
departments and offices involved in disaster response as 
well as their international partners, including military, 
police, relief agencies, and immigration, customs, and 
border officials,
	§ Registration and tracking of displaced people, with 
specific attention to vulnerable groups, and especially to 
children and the elderly;
	§ Emergency housing, and medium- to long-term 
housing strategies for displaced people and other 
vulnerable groups; 
	§ Improved distribution of relief items and/or cash 
services.
Building capacities will require a number of structural, 
institutional, and educational efforts. The interviews 
conducted for this research exposed a number of areas 
in which general awareness and specific expertise is low 
among practitioners as well as among affected communi-
ties, including in:
	§ Human rights in general, and rights of displaced people 
as well as labour rights in particular;
	§ Regional and international legal frameworks and poli-
cies relevant to migration, displacement, and planned 
relocations; as well as to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation;
	§ Gender-responsive programme implementation;
	§ Psychosocial support, especially for children and people 
with health needs;
	§ Support for people with physical and mental health 
needs, people with disabilities, and elderly persons.
More specialised technical expertise is needed in key 
governmental departments and ministries, especially in 
national offices and departments tasked with disaster 
relief provision and/or migration. Funding and availability 
of skilled professionals are the main barriers. Workshops 
organised externally and in collaboration with the OECS 
have contributed to recent capacity building of knowledge 
in this area.120 
Additionally, governments may consider working together 
to:
	§ Replicate expert trainings for key personnel at the 
national level – immigration officials, social protection 
specialists, emergency response managers, local govern-
ment officials and civil society programme managers – 
on HMCCC;
	§ Establish an expert group of regional actors involved 
in providing technical support to governments with 
regard to HMCCC, to ensure a coordinated response, 
more efficient use of expertise, and full knowledge of 
agreed conventions in the future.
FOSTER PARTICIPATORY, COMMUNITY-BASED 
APPROACHES
Mechanisms to include the meaningful participation 
of affected communities should be strengthened in 
the Caribbean. Multiculturalism is a main strength in 
disaster recovery in the Caribbean when it facilitates the 
peaceful hosting and integration of non-native peoples. 
Paradoxically, it can also create challenges, as people 
absorbed into receiving communities become invisible. 
Government support to the inclusion of displaced persons 
in disaster recovery are exacerbated by the dearth of regis-
tration and tracking mechanisms post-displacement, for 
both cross-border and internal displacement; the invis-
ibility of displaced person living in urban areas, in informal 
settlements, and with temporary hosts; and the reality 
that many people who move following disasters do note 
self-identify as an internally displaced person. In short, 
specific needs and vulnerabilities are difficult for govern-
ment service providers and their NGO partners to address. 
A large number of people who were evacuated or who 
self-evacuated from the Commonwealth of Dominica in 
120  See, for example, relevant workshop hosted in 2019 by IOM: Caribbean 
Migration Consultations, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change 
(MECC): Capacity Building Workshop in the Eastern Caribbean (Not Directly 
Affiliated with CMC),” 2019, https://caribbeanmigration.org/events/migration-
environment-and-climate-change-mecc-capacity-building-workshop-
eastern-caribbean. And a co-organized one in 2018 by GIZ and OECS: OECS 
Communications Unit, “Launch of the Caribbean Component of the Global 
Programme ‘Sustainable Management of Human Mobility in the Context 
of Climate Change,’” May 9, 2018, https://pressroom.oecs.org/media-alert-
launch-of-the-caribbean-component-of-the-global-programme-sustainable-
management-of-human-mobility-in-the-context-of-climate-change.
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response to Hurricane Maria only found accommoda-
tion with host families through social media networks 
or distant acquaintances in Saint Lucia. Over time, such a 
situation can involve multiple risks of abuses, for example, 
sexual exploitation and rent discrimination.
Some main areas that could be strengthened include:
	§ Improve early warning systems and early response 
mechanisms, which may be supported by projections 
of future tropical cyclone formation and storm surge 
simulations 
	§ Ensure due consultation with and participation of 
displaced people that may face specific vulnerabilities, 
including women, youth, elderly, people in poverty, 
people with disabilities, minorities, and other marginal-
ised groups, with consideration to the intersectionality 
of these groups;
	§ Implement safety net mechanisms for losses and 
damages in the context of extreme weather, for 
example, cash-for-work programmes;
	§ Develop emergency communications systems, consid-
ering also the role of social media networks, working 
with the information and communications technology 
sector;
	§ Work with the private sector to continue to develop 
insurance schemes, including disaster risk insurance, 
crop insurance, and livestock insurance; and 
	§ Continue to develop and raise funds for the Carib-
bean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility, and develop 
mechanisms for funds to reach local affected communi-
ties, in consultation with said communities.
As well as working to improve the overall human rights 
environment, governments can develop specific policy 
measures and programmes to:
	§ Facilitate the widening and deepening of diaspora 
networks;
	§ Facilitate the transnational circulation of skills and 
portability of social benefits (e.g. social security);
	§ Develop programmes to prevent grievous rights abuses 
migrants are disproportionately subjected to – for 
example, human trafficking and forced labour – by 
prosecuting offenders, protecting survivors, and 
develop partnerships to prevent abuses.
STRENGTHEN ANTICIPATORY EFFORTS TO MANAGE 
MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT
CARICOM states could expand migration levels for low- 
and un-skilled categories through temporary migrant 
worker programmes. In addition, targeted skills matching 
programmes for temporary migration can be increased 
for all skills categories. Such programmes help fill imme-
diate labour shortages for specific sectors or occupa-
tions, and are most effective if accompanied with skills 
training and/or vocational programmes for both migrants 
and non-migrants in areas of origin. Enacting migra-
tion programmes is the responsibility of the relevant 
labour ministry in each nation, and in some cases, requires 
parliamentary approval. Such arrangements may be 
coordinated at the regional level through the next phase 
of CSME implementation, as well as through multilateral 
arrangements with non-CSME CARICOM observers like 
Anguilla, and are especially coherent with Objectives 5, 7 
and 18 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration (2018).121 In addition, the CDEMA Council of 
Ministers and CDEMA CDM Strategy for 2014 – 24 are likely 
to be among the best available vehicles for enhanced coor-
dination at the regional level, extending plans, guidelines, 
and best practices to national offices for disaster services. 
Concretely, Caribbean governments could seek to further:
	§ Work with the private sector to identify related skilled 
and unskilled labour market requirements at the 
regional level; 
	§ Target programmes and financial support for education 
and training in identified skill gap areas;
	§ Work with the private sector, including recruitment and 
job placement firms, on skills-matching programmes.
121  E.g. 5(b): “Develop flexible, rights-based and gender-responsive labour 
mobility schemes for migrants, in accordance with local and national labour 
market needs and skills supply at all skills levels, including temporary, 
seasonal, circular and fast-track programmes in areas of labour shortages, by 
providing flexible, convertible and non-discriminatory visa and permit options, 
such as for permanent and temporary work, multiple-entry study, business, 
visit, investment and entrepreneurship” (A/RES/73/195, adopted 19 December 
2018, emphasis added).
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EXECUTE ACTIONS TO ABATE CLIMATE RISKS
Establishing effective policies to manage migration and 
displacement is essential to minimise potential challenges 
of human mobility and to deliver on the positive potential 
of migration for development. In addition, policies and 
programmes to undercut the root causes of displacement 
and distress migration, and specifically targeting people 
already affected by climate change impacts, are also key. 
Areas that merit improvement in the Caribbean include:
	§ Mechanisms to request relocation and resettlement in 
anticipation of severe hazards and climate risks; and
	§ Empirical and legal thresholds to designate areas as 
unsafe or unfit for human habitation.
	§ Strengthen global mitigation ambition through 
increased representation at international forums
Planned relocations are currently uncommon in particular 
in OECS states, where free movement facilitates evacuation 
and return in the context of disasters, or labour migra-
tion in the case of long-term effects. Planned relocations 
may nonetheless become more frequently requested in the 
future, as threats of hazards on whole communities – espe-
cially near the coast – become more severe. Countries will 
need to enact a legislative framework to relocate people in 
coherence with international standards, informed by the 
Guidance on protecting people from disasters and environ-
mental change through planned relocation122 and opera-
tional Toolbox for Planning Relocations to Protect People 
from Disasters and Environmental Change.123 
A major imperative for reducing climate risks consists in 
rapid emissions mitigation. While the SIDS have histori-
cally produced few emissions, they are strongly affected by 
the impacts of climate change. Taking an active stance in 
the relevant climate fora can potentially help to advance 
mitigation efforts by other, larger emitters. At the same 
time, adaptation to unavoidable impacts is key. CARICOM 
states form part of the Group of Latin American and 
Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) at the United Nations 
(UN) and have advanced relatively ambitious Nationally-
Determined Contributions (NDCs)124 and NAPs.125 In the 
interviews conducted, reports of participation in interna-
tional efforts to combat climate change were mixed. While 
awareness of the existence of the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement was relatively high, awareness of the respec-
tive nations’ participation in and commitments to these 
processes was limited. This indicates a need for strength-
ened two-way communication between siloed depart-
ments and ministries tasked with international coopera-
tion and those charged with more local implementation of 
policies related to development, humanitarian response, 
migration, and labour. Moreover, preparation for and 
participation in the COP negotiations could be further 
strengthened by further trainings and staff support of the 
respective negotiating teams. 
FOSTER A PRACTICE-KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY AND 
DEEPEN NETWORK DENSITY
The interviews carried out for this research indicated a 
relatively strong network of actors in HMCCC, particularly 
those working for regional organisations and in national 
disaster offices. This study also identified a significant 
number of UN agencies, charitable organisations, and 
122  The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of 
International Migration, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), “Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and 
Environmental Change through Planned Relocation.”
123  IOM, Georgetown University, and UNHCR, “A Toolbox: Planning Relocations 
to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change | Environmental 
Migration Portal,” 2017, https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/toolbox-
planning-relocations-protect-people-disasters-and-environmental-change.
124  United Nations Climate Change and UNDP, “Regional Dialogue on Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) for the Caribbean: 8–10 October 2018. 
Rodney Bay, Saint Lucia. Dialogue Report,” 2018, https://www.undp.org/
content/dam/LECB/events/2018/20191008-caribbean-ndc-dialogue/undp-
ndcsp-caribbean-dialogue-report.pdf.
125 International Organization for Migration, “Migration In the Caribbean.”
Sorgossum – Barbuda  (© Kira Vinke)
4 – THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN 
HOME LANDS – ISLAND AND ARCHIPELAGIC STATES’ POLICYMAKING FOR HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 59
international NGOs working in the Caribbean, particularly 
in the areas of disaster response. Many of the contribu-
tions of these organisations were perceived as positive. 
However, key informants revealed a number of dependen-
cies to these organisations as well as deficiencies in their 
operations. One key example is that the operation of NGOs 
may on occasion complicate or hinder national-level data 
collection in regards to displaced populations, largely due 
to the existence of parallel systems or unilateral actions. 
In addition, some remarked that the provision of assis-
tance de-linked from government programmes, such as 
the provision of unsolicited goods, can hamper or skew 
government relief planning and provision. Overall, in order 
to further strengthen the current practice community, 
greater coordination with international community would 
help to reduce redundancies and adverse effects. Related to 
this, were International Non-Governmental Organisations 
(INGOs) to place greater emphasis on employing local 
expertise and labour, it would help to further expand and 
deepen the local network’s knowledge and capacities. 
IMPROVE DATA AND KNOWLEDGE
Basic migration and displacement data are important for 
the implementation, follow-up and review of any migra-
tion or displacement management policy, as well as for 
identifying and assisting groups with special needs or 
vulnerabilities.126 The same can be said for baseline data, 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and is recognised 
as particularly important in the case of planned relocations. 
Paucity of data underlies the lack of monitoring and evalu-
ation of programmes and policies in a few critical areas: 
stocks and flows of migrant and displaced people, welfare 
of vulnerable groups, gender, and integration of migrants 
and displaced people. Insufficient registration procedures 
and lack of registration for spontaneous arrivals (i.e., people 
not arriving through a recognised air or sea port), which 
are especially common in the context of emergency situ-
ations, can leave migrants and displaced people at greater 
risk of being subjected to exploitative working conditions, 
inadequate housing, and human trafficking. 
Key challenges include coordination and data sharing 
with destination countries, inadequate funds to carry out 
household surveys, and a dearth of qualified data scientists 
126  See also footnote 14 in: The Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, 
Institute for the Study of International Migration, and Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Guidance on Protecting 
People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned 
Relocation.”
and other technical specialists in the region. In addition, a 
primary and remediable reason for the lack of data iden-
tified in this study is the absence of standard operating 
procedures or protocols for data collection, and especially 
a lack of protocols adaptable to emergencies. Policymakers 
and practitioners are acutely aware of the need for longitu-
dinal and disaggregated data on displaced people. 
A simple and standard, ideally electronic, method of data 
collection could be considered and standardised across 
OECS and CARICOM countries. With proper planning, 
entry forms can be made more useful and adapted to 
emergency situations. Systems for capturing or estimating 
spontaneous arrivals can be adapted from other contexts.127 
Current data collection methods would be strengthened 
by: 
	§ Collection of data on entries and exits of CARICOM and 
non-CARICOM nationals;
	§ Disaggregation of data by sex, age, migration status, and 
others; 
	§ Improvement of techniques to estimate irregular 
migration, with specific attention to human trafficking;
	§ Inclusion of migration questions in census surveys, 
with a view to capture migration flows as well as spon-
taneous arrivals; 
	§ Provision of trainings for migration specialists on data 
collection methods and data analysis;
	§ Facilitation of trainings for immigration officials and 
border authorities on migration and displacement, as 
well as on data collection. 
Thematically, research has majorly focused on displace-
ment due to sudden-onset hazards, and rarely on gradual 
environmental degradation or slower-onset impacts of 
climate change. Research on these topics can be improved 
by strengthening general, representative and longitudinal 
migration and displacement data, and supplemented with 
tailored household surveys. 
127  See, for example, the work on mixed migration flows provided through the 
UNHCR Operational Data Portal (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/
mediterranean) and IOM’s Missing Migrants project (https://missingmigrants.
iom.int).
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Key informants interviewed for this research noted a 
number of areas that merit further attention: 
	§ The impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of 
human rights; and on livelihood security;
	§ Longitudinal studies of people internally displaced by 
disasters;
	§ Longitudinal, tracking studies of migrants in receiving 
countries and return migration;
	§ The impacts of climate change on climate-prone 
sectors,128 especially tourism, agriculture, and general 
outside labour and the resulting impacts on migration 
and residence;
	§ The impacts of hurricanes and severe storms – in 
particular, in the context of warming scenarios in which 
they are more intense and frequent129 – on infrastruc-
ture, human settlements, as well as the resulting need 
to develop evacuation and displacement management 
plans.
Policymaker trainings, expert workshops, and public 
education campaigns would be particularly useful for 
topics such as:
	§ Human rights conventions and related documents;
	§ The basis of climate science and of climate change 
scenarios, and the projected impacts of climate change;
	§ The rights of migrants and displaced people (informed, 
among other things by the Guiding Principles of 
Internal Displacement);
	§ National and regional frameworks for migration, 
including the Global Compacts on Migration and 
Refugees. 
128  IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
ed. Christopher B. Field et al. (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA: Cambridge University Press, n.d.), 1–32.
129  Kerry Emanuel, Ragoth Sundararajan, and John Williams, “Hurricanes and 
Global Warming: Results from Downscaling IPCC AR4 Simulations,” Bulletin  
of the American Meteorological Society 89, no. 3 (March 1, 2008): 347–68,  
https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-89-3-347.
National Level
ANGUILLA
Anguilla’s status as an Overseas British Territory is a 
double-edged sword for addressing human mobility in the 
context of climate change. Anguilla is both traditionally 
a migrant-receiving country for migrants and displaced 
people from within the sub-region as well as a sending 
country for Anguillans seeking to reside temporarily or 
permanently abroad, mainly in the UK. 
Specific recommendations for Anguilla are:
	§ Address barriers to in-migration; 
	§ Elaborate solutions for people living in protracted 
displacement due to disasters; 
	§ Prepare more to receive and absorb migrants and 
displaced people, especially for undocumented arrivals, 
including children;
	§ Scale up resilience-building efforts, especially the rein-
forcement of infrastructure and telecommunications 
infrastructure.
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
Antigua and Barbuda have no strategy to deal explicitly 
with the influence of climate impacts on human move-
ment. The relevant authorities are aware of the need 
to integrate lessons from the 2017 hurricane season, in 
particular the mass evacuation of all Barbudans, into strat-
egies to plan for and respond to disasters. Greater technical 
support and political will be required to also proactively 
treat the causes of disaster displacement, with due consid-
eration to people with specific needs and vulnerabilities.
Moreover, strategies should be sensitive to the historical 
disparities in wealth and resilience between the two islands 
that leave some residents more exposed to climate change 
risks than others. Many of the same factors contributing 
to displacement also provide barriers to recovery, integra-
tion, and inclusion. For example, the reported discrepancy 
between education levels of Antiguans and Barbudans 
contributes to the challenge of integrating displaced chil-
dren into new schools. 
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Any successful long-term strategy must address the factors 
underpinning the well-documented dispute over land 
rights in Barbuda.130 Similar cases in areas governed by 
customary land tenure in SIDS around the world may 
provide good practices and lessons learned. Such dynamics 
are particularly important in consideration of planned 
relocation and resettlement plans. For example, Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea provide an interesting comparison of 
successful and failed policies (see also the Pacific chapter of 
this report).131 
Priority areas for Antigua and Barbuda are:
	§ As with all countries in the region, continue efforts to 
reduce poverty and vulnerability, and to narrow the 
gaps of inequality; 
130  For example of a documentation of this issues, see: Neil Collier, Ora 
DeKornfeld, and Ben Laffin, “No Man’s Land: Barbuda After Irma,” Times 
Documentaries, November 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/
americas/100000005425833/barbuda-after-hurricane-irma.html.
131  Dalila Gharbaoui and Julia Blocher, “Limits to Adapting to Climate Change 
Through Relocations in Papua-New Guinea and Fiji,” in Limits to Climate 
Change Adaptation, ed. Walter Leal Filho and Johanna Nalau, Climate Change 
Management (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 359–79,  
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64599-5_20.
	§ Facilitate hybrid132 and pluralistic133 arrangements for 
legal land tenure;
	§ Enhance mechanisms for communities to secure their 
livelihoods, for example, by strengthening the legal 
basis for communal land ownership, enabling people 
return and rebuild, and/or developing mechanisms to 
request resettlement internally;
	§ Provide assistance to people living on marginal and 
exposed land, who are at greater risk of climate impacts;
132  Cosmin Corendea and Tanvi Mani, “Deriving a Legal Framework to address  
Climate Change Induced Migration in the Pacific,” in Klima- und 
umweltbedingte Migration: Weltweit eine zunehmende Herausforderung, ed. 
Stefan Burkhardt and Silke Franke, vol. 107, Argumente und Materialien zum 
Zeitgeschehen, 2017, 75–83, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6458/__
AMZ-107_INTERNET.pdf; Cosmin Corendea, “Development Implications of 
Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific,” Climate Law and Governance 
Working Paper Series (Centre for International Sustainable Development Law  
(CISDL), 2016), https://migration.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/
development-implications-of-climate-change-and-migration-in-the-pacific.htm.
133  Dalila Gharbaoui and Julia Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters: Relocation as 
Adaptation to Climate Change in Fiji Islands,” in Migration, Risk Management 
and Climate Change: Evidence and Policy Responses, ed. Andrea Milan et al., 
vol. 6, Global Migration Issues (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 
149–73, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42922-9_8.
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	§ Enable greater participation of civil society in strategic 
planning and policy implementation (see recommenda-
tions section “Foster Participatory, Community-Based 
Approaches”, above), with equitable participation of 
Antiguans and Barbudans. For example, targets (or 
more ambitiously, quotas) for inclusion of Barbudans – 
also in terms of gender parity – can be set for political 
representation.
COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA
As a small country with a relatively resource-dependent 
economy, Dominica is a source of migration as well as a 
destination for return migration. Dominicans are acutely 
aware of gaps in infrastructure, communications, public 
education, overall disaster preparedness and rapid response 
uncovered by the devastating experience of Hurricane 
Maria in 2017. While the limitations of forecasting played 
a significant role in the humanitarian impact of the 
hurricane,134 an improvement in overall preparedness will 
be needed to avoid similar consequences in the future. 
134  In short, the hurricane was expected to lose force and move, but 
ultimately gained strength and hit the island head-on with 257,495 km/h 
winds, causing wide-spread damage that shocked citizens. See: 
Claire Phipps, “Hurricane Maria: Dominica ‘in Daze’ after Storm Leaves 
Island Cut off from World,” The Guardian, September 21, 2017, sec. 
World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/21/
dominica-daze-hurricane-maria-island-caribbean-rescue.
A key gap identified in the region that was decidedly 
important in Dominica’s recent experiences was the lack 
of government leadership in evacuating people and the 
resulting contributions to spontaneous, unassisted depar-
tures. With only commercial transport options available, 
people unable to pay were trapped and many ultimately 
suffered from long-term psychological challenges.
Main priority areas for Dominica are:
	§ Work with partner governments and the private sector 
to accelerate recovery, ensuring the integration of 
lessons learned from the 2017 experience and a transi-
tion to resilience building;
	§ Facilitate the return migration of residents, as well as 
the transfer of social and financial remittances of dias-
pora members;
	§ Acknowledge the advantages of free movement in 
assisting families to rebuild, and further develop the 
portability of social benefits;
	§ Prepare for the provision of psychosocial support in the 
medium- to long-term following disasters, with due 
attention to gendered effects of displacement, including 
trauma;
Saint Lucia  (© Ragna John)
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	§ Enhance disaster preparedness, especially for mass 
evacuations;
	§ Provide psychosocial support, with due consideration 
to gender, age, and household attributes. 
SAINT LUCIA
As a regional hub and thriving economy, Saint Lucia 
traditionally receives migrants and displaced persons. 
The government, together with the OECS Commission, 
has already hosted or endorsed a number of activities 
intended to strengthen the country’s and its regional 
partners’ response to human mobility. Activities include 
capacity building workshops135 and trainings, in particular 
since 2017. While no national framework exists explic-
itly targeting the impact of climate change on mobility 
patterns, Saint Lucia is poised to lead the region in devel-
oping such a framework.
Saint Lucia has the advantage of a relative abundance of 
technically skilled residents who can contribute to the 
development of new policies or adaptation of existing poli-
135  For past trainings on related topics, see https://bit.ly/2Z1xfH6; for a  
February 2019 training on environment-mobility linkages specifically, see 
https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/migration-environment-and-climate-
change-regional-capacity-building-workshop-eastern-caribbean.
cies to address human mobility in the context of climate 
change. This is in part due to the in-migration of people 
working in areas such as emergency management, DRR, 
and climate change mitigation. This so-called “brain gain” 
can be leveraged through the OECS, with positive spill-over 
effects for national response.
Nevertheless, key recommendations for Saint Lucia 
include:
	§ Integrate the HMCCC in government plans and 
proposals;
	§ Strengthen data collection on migration trends, espe-
cially longitudinal studies on displaced people and 
migrants living in Saint Lucia;
	§ Transfer or replicate regional-level training and 
capacity building at the national level, particularly in 
the areas of human rights and migration data for all key 
stakeholders – immigration officials, social protection 
specialists, disaster response management professionals, 
local government officials and civil society programme 
managers – working with partner governments and 
intergovernmental organisations in the region.
Barbuda  (© Kira Vinke)
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5
5.1. 
Planned Relocation and the Demand 
to Stay – Pacific Island Nations at 
Crossroads
In 2017, the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place under the presi-
dency of Fiji. It was the first time that a Small Island 
Developing State (SIDS) chaired this important decision-
making body. While COP23 was held in Bonn, Germany, 
for logistical reasons, Fiji’s COP presidency provided Pacific 
Islands Countries (PICs) a prominent forum to express 
their concerns about the risks they face in a warming and 
transforming world. In his closing speech, COP President 
Frank Bainimarama, Fiji’s prime minister, described why 
Fiji decided to put emphasis on people and their stories: 
“We wanted to make a connection between these complex 
negotiations and the real, everyday concerns and aspira-
tions of people the world over”.136 
In the Pacific island states of interest in this study – namely 
Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu – the adverse effects 
of climate change are “real, everyday concerns”. People 
already have to adapt to climate change. Given the often 
high exposure of PICs to climate hazards, climate change 
has the potential to significantly alter human mobility 
patterns in the region. Notwithstanding some national 
differences in the approach to human mobility in the 
context of climate change (HMCCC), officials from several 
PICs have openly discussed the potential of climate change 
impacts – like sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion, and 
changes in extreme weather events – to drive out-migra-
tion. Nevertheless, climate-induced human mobility has 
not been a top priority among policymakers in the Pacific.
136  Frank Bainimarama, “‘We Must Put People First’ – President’s Closing 
Speech at COP23,” Cop23, November 18, 2017, https://cop23.com.fj/
must-put-people-first-presidents-closing-speech-cop23.
Other pressures, such as the so-called “urban pull” or 
poverty, dominate the discourse on migration in the region 
as interviews conducted for this study indicate. However, it 
is not possible to make a clear distinction between non-
climatic and climatic factors as they interact. The following 
interview excerpt by a university lecturer illustrates how 
non-climatic and climatic factors are framed in the current 
discourse on HMCCC: 
 –“[Climate change is] considered as one of the drivers of 
human mobility, but not necessarily one of the main 
drivers, since there are already many other existing issues 
that are usually worsened by the impacts of climate 
change. It’s these issues that tend to be a priority to 
policymakers rather than climate change where human 
mobility is concerned. For instance, if infrastructure is 
damaged, that becomes an economic issue, or if there’s 
increased salt water inundation, then it becomes an 
agricultural issue. So issues such as food security or 
water issues are the frontline drivers, rather than climate 
change [per se]. However, in the years to come, gradual 
impacts such as sea level rises will become the frontline 
drivers of human mobility” (Pac15).
Despite the dominance of socio-economic pressures 
in the migration discourse, some governments have 
started to actively address climate-induced migration. In 
2018, Fiji launched Planned Relocation Guidelines, with 
support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and expertise from many interna-
tional experts.137 The guidelines have been acknowledged 
as an advancement in the policymaking on HMCCC. In 
2018, Vanuatu also broke new ground by launching its 
National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced 
137  Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines:  
A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation” (Suva, Fiji: 
Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2018), https://cop23.com.fj/wp-content/
uploads/2018/12/CC-PRG-BOOKLET-22-1.pdf.
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Displacement.138 Tuvalu and Kiribati have been the target 
of several research studies and policymaker capacity 
building programmes.139 However, specific legislation has 
not yet been launched in these two countries.
This chapter will show the different reasons why policy-
makers in Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu have different 
ways to approach climate change as a potential driver of 
human mobility. Either way, since disasters tend to exac-
erbate pre-existing vulnerabilities,140 governments in the 
Pacific need to address legal, institutional and operational 
gaps in disaster response in order to minimise the burden 
of disaster-induced displacement for particularly vulner-
able sections of affected communities, such as people 
living with disabilities and chronic illness, women, children 
(especially when unaccompanied), the elderly, or members 
of minorities.
Background: Migration in the Pacific 
Across communities of the Pacific Ocean, human mobility 
has played an important role over thousands of years in the 
formation of societies.141 People have left densely popu-
lated places, fled conflicts, or found new livelihoods.142 In 
the twentieth century, Australia and New Zealand became 
major areas of destination for Pacific islanders looking for 
better education or employment opportunities.143 Another 
important area of destination are the United States of 
America. In the 2017 American Community Survey about 
1,460,000 people identified as “Native Hawaiian and Other 
Pacific Islander alone or in combination”, whereas about 
50,000 identified as Fijian.144 
138  International Organization for Migration, “Vanuatu Launches National Policy 
on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement,” International 
Organization for Migration, September 28, 2018, https://www.iom.int/news/
vanuatu-launches-national-policy-climate-change-and-disaster-induced-
displacement.
139  Notably, the outcomes of the Pacific Climate Change and Migration 
(PCCM) project: https://www.unescap.org/subregional-office/pacific/
pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project.
140  The Nansen Initiative, “Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced 
Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change.”
141  Corendea, “Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the 
Pacific.”
142 Corendea.
143 Corendea.
144  U.S. Census Bureau, “2017 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates: 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone or in Combination by 
Selected Groups,” 2017, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
While migration has been part of their life throughout 
centuries, Pacific islanders traditionally have strong ties to 
their land.145 Scholars and practitioners alike recommend 
that this sense of place, intrinsically linked to identity 
and culture, be explicitly taken into account into the now 
prevalent discussions on relocating people away from dete-
riorating environmental conditions.146 A regional expert 
on climate change adaptation addressed this point in an 
interview: 
 –“There is a need to have the voices [heard] of those people 
who are threatened by climate change and [who] need 
to move when developing policies, but it may be difficult 
to capture their input because they are unwilling to be 
relocated. They are attached to their land as it is a big 
part of their identity and gives them a sense of belonging” 
(Pac15).
The quote indicates why the idea of planned relocations 
has been politically fraught: many people do not want to 
leave for any reason. A regional key informant summarised 
the different positions governments in the Pacific take 
on migration as adaptation: “Some countries have spoken 
of migration with dignity, while others are refusing even to 
discuss the matter, as it could lead to a cost-benefit anal-
ysis about saving the islands versus continued emissions” 
(Pac16). 
Governments across the Pacific are facing active civil 
society movements. The youth-led grassroots network 
Pacific Climate Warriors, for instance, demands more 
ambitious climate protection from the international 
community to protect their islands and cultures. This 
was demonstrated by their blockade of the large coal 
port in Newcastle, Australia, in 2014.147 Pacific Climate 
Warriors have a clear message: “We are not drowning. We 
are fighting”.148 That the government of Fiji signed the 
Declaration on Children, Youth and Climate Action at 
145  Corendea, “Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the 
Pacific.”
146  Karen E. McNamara and Helene Jacot Des Combes, “Planning for Community 
Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji,” International Journal of Disaster 
Risk Science 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2015): 315–19, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s13753-015-0065-2.
147  Karen E. McNamara and Carol Farbotko, “Resisting a ‘Doomed’ Fate: An 
Analysis of the Pacific Climate Warriors,” Australian Geographer 48, no. 1 
(January 2, 2017): 17–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2016.1266631.
148 McNamara and Farbotko.
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COP25 in Madrid in December 2019149 signals the govern-
ment’s intention to integrate the voices of these and other 
young climate activists into policies. The declaration was 
initiated by UNICEF and at its launch UNICEF Global Chief 
of Communication Paloma Escudero emphasises that 
long-term investments are needed in order to increase the 
resilience of communities and, if successful, “children are 
not uprooted from home and school” when facing extreme 
weather events.150 
The 2016 Regional Civil Society Organization Forum is 
another example of civil society engagement in climate 
action in the Pacific. The forum led to a position paper 
on climate change and disaster risk reduction in which 
representatives from diverse civil society organisations 
urged leaders of PICs “to commence dialogue on migra-
tion and planned relocation”.151 While addressing migration 
as one possible adaptation strategy, the forum explicitly 
asked Pacific leaders to “develop[…] a Pacific Framework 
149  Voices of Youth by UNICEF, “Declaration on Children, Youth and Climate 
Action,” Voices of Youth, 2019, https://www.voicesofyouth.org/campaign/
cop25-join-declaration-children-youth-and-climate-action.
150  UNICEF, “COP25: UNICEF Global Chief of Communication Paloma Escudero 
Remarks at High-Level UNICEF-OHCHR Event,” 2019, https://www.unicef.
org/press-releases/cop25-unicef-global-chief-communication-paloma-
escudero-remarks-high-level-unicef.
151  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “2016 Pacific Civil Society Organisations 
Position Paper on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management,” 2016, 
http://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2016-Pacific-Civil-
Society-Organisations-Position-Paper-on-Climate-Change-_-DRM.pdf.
for Climate Mobility that will enable our people to migrate 
with justice and dignity”.152 
In the interviews, respondents emphasised the need to 
protect cultural identity and heritage when discussing 
planned relocation and how important it is to involve the 
affected communities at every step in the relocation process. 
Loss of cultural identity due to planned relocation is a topic 
of considerable relevance and the ability to engage in one’s 
own cultural practices is protected for example under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. Evidence from several PICs emphasises the impor-
tance of traditional knowledge and customary practices in 
responding to climate change and making communities 
more resilient, including customary resource management 
or the role of leaders and social networks.153 Particular atten-
tion should be paid to vulnerable and marginalised sections 
of societies because existing economic and social inequali-
ties are likely to worsen without inclusive and participatory 
processes to manage mobility.154 
152 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
153  Ainka A. Granderson, “The Role of Traditional Knowledge in Building Adaptive 
Capacity for Climate Change: Perspectives from Vanuatu,” Weather, Climate, 
and Society 9, no. 3 (May 18, 2017): 545–61, https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-
16-0094.1; Heather McMillen et al., “Small Islands, Valuable Insights: Systems 
of Customary Resource Use and Resilience to Climate Change in the Pacific,” 
Ecology and Society 19, no. 4 (December 8, 2014), https://doi.org/10.5751/
ES-06937-190444.
154 Gharbaoui and Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters.”
Vanuatu  (© Kira Vinke)
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Experience shows that planned relocation can be a 
complicated, lengthy and costly process. In this regard, the 
different capacities of Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
to address and manage HMCCC are of importance. This 
may include diverse features such as: financial or tech-
nical capacities, past experiences with planned relocation, 
international networks, or the possibility to relocate within 
national boundaries or not. This aspect is summarised by 
an academic:
 –“Fiji, however, may be well ahead in terms of adminis-
tering relocation of those vulnerable communities, as 
can be seen in the examples of Vunidogoloa, Tukuraki, 
and, Narikoso. Also, Fiji has the resources and funding 
to successfully move communities, as well as to ensure 
that these communities are relocated within the same 
land boundary. Hence, avoiding land issues and conflicts. 
This may be problematic in places such as Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, because land is scarce, so any relocation that may 
need to take place will have to occur elsewhere; outside 
of the land boundary of the community moving or across 
international borders” (Pac15).
The different capacities of the focus countries to address 
matters relating to HMCCC were constantly raised by 
informants in the interviews. This study presents and 
discusses these insights about strengths and weaknesses of 
the current framework to address HMCCC in Fiji, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu in order to understand policy trajec-
tories in the countries. Given current projections of climate 
change in the Pacific (see next section), key informants 
expressed the need to maintain and reinforce efforts to 
address HMCCC. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies 
may serve as an entry point for this when climate change 
projections are integrated in planning (Pac15) and when 
adequate resources are available (Pac16).
Information Base of the Pacific Chapter
This chapter builds on literature from several academic 
areas as well as on semi-structured interviews with key 
experts from different fields of work. The sample of inter-
viewees attempts to reflect the interdisciplinary nature of 
human mobility in the context of climate change (HMCCC). 
The authors employed snowball and “critical case” sampling 
techniques common in sociological research. The presen-
tation of findings below intends to improve the database 
on applied knowledge on managing HMCCC in order to 
contribute to sustainable solutions of migration manage-
ment. The expert interviews targeted the institutional 
actor-landscape relating to HMCCC in the region whereas 
stakeholders’ opinion on strengths and weaknesses of 
existing policy frameworks was a major area of interest. In 
total, 34 interviews were conducted with key experts from 
regional and international intergovernmental organisations, 
national ministries or agencies, and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (Regional level: 5, Fiji: 10, Kiribati: 4, 
Tuvalu: 5, Vanuatu: 10). 19 of the interviewees were men 
(56 %), 15 women (44 %). 
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OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS IN THE PACIFIC
Type Nation(s) Interviewee No. Sum
Ministry or Other Central National Body Fiji Pac02, Pac05, Pac08, Pac09, Pac10 5
Kiribati Pac11, Pac14 2
Tuvalu Pac21, Pac22, Pac23 3
Vanuatu Pac27, Pac31, Pac32, Pac34 4
Provincial or Municipal Body Kiribati Pac12 1
Private Sector Fiji & Vanuatu Pac06, Pac26, Pac28 3
Intergovernmental Organisation - Pac01, Pac16, Pac17, Pac18, Pac19 5
Non-governmental Organisation - Pac07, Pac13, Pac20, Pac24, Pac25, Pac29, Pac33 7
Academia Fiji & Vanuatu Pac03, Pac04, Pac15, Pac30 4
Total 34
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5.2. 
Climate Change-Related Drivers of 
Human Mobility in the Pacific 
The small island states spread across the tropical Pacific 
are among the countries most vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change. This has several implications 
for human mobility. More intense and frequent extreme 
weather events can, for instance, increase the number of 
displacements in the short term while also enhancing 
the likelihood of migration in the long term. Risks associ-
ated with sea level rise, such as loss of land from erosion 
or the salinisation of soil and fresh water resources, may 
lead to an increasing number of communities in need of 
planned relocation. In Fiji, some communities have already 
requested assistance for relocation to move out of harm’s 
way. In the case of low-lying coral atolls, interactions 
between rising sea levels and wave-driven flooding may 
not only lead to severe and frequent damage to the atolls’ 
infrastructure but also impact freshwater lenses, rendering 
some islands uninhabitable within a few decades.155 With 
limited available and fertile land for relocation within 
their national boundaries, cross-border migration within 
the region or to far-off destinations may become the most 
feasible options for some Pacific island populations.156 A 
recent ruling by the UN Human Rights Committee sheds 
light on the climate-migration nexus in island and archipe-
lagic nations and the issue of “unhabitability”.157 
In 2015, Ioane Teitiota, a national from Kiribati, sought 
asylum in New Zealand claiming that rising sea levels and 
other effects of climate change pose a threat to his life 
because they make his home country Kiribati uninhab-
itable. Mr. Teitiota’s wife also gave testimony about the 
family’s difficult situation in Kiribati, discussing saltwater 
intrusion and related health concerns.158 The case was 
rejected and the family was deported to Kiribati. Following 
155  Curt D. Storlazzi et al., “Most Atolls Will Be Uninhabitable by the Mid-21st 
Century Because of Sea-Level Rise Exacerbating Wave-Driven Flooding,” 
Science Advances 4, no. 4 (April 1, 2018): eaap974, https://doi.org/10.1126/
sciadv.aap9741.
156  Asian Development Bank, “A Region at Risk: The Human Dimensions of 
Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific” (Mandaluyong City, Philippines:  
Asian Development Bank, 2017), 90, http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/TCS178839-2.
157  UN Human Rights Committee, “Views Adopted by the Committee under 
Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication 
No. 2728/2016,” 2020, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/
treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f127%2fD%2f27
28%2f2016&Lang=en.
158 UN Human Rights Committee.
this, Mr. Teitiota brought the case to the UN Human Rights 
Committee, arguing that New Zealand had violated his 
right to life. While the Committee concluded that the 
deportation of Ioane Teitiota to Kiribati did not constitute 
a violation of his rights, it did acknowledge the serious 
situation in Kiribati159 and, moreover, opened the door for 
climate-related asylum claims.160 
In what has been called a “historic”161 or a “landmark”162 
ruling, the Committee precisely concluded that “without 
robust national and international efforts, the effects of 
climate change in receiving states may expose individuals 
to a violation of their rights under articles 6 or 7 of the 
Covenant, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obli-
gations of sending states”.163 Concerning the situation of 
countries at risk of being entirely lost as a result of sea level 
rise, the Committee stated that “the conditions of life in 
such a country may become incompatible with the right to 
life with dignity before the risk is realized”.164 
The potential impact of climate change on patterns of 
human mobility in the Pacific has led to a growing body 
of research on the matter in the past years, ranging from 
qualitative case studies to big projects by intergovern-
mental organisations. A multi-country study from the 
United Nations research branch, for example, highlighted 
the potential for climate-affected people either to become 
“trapped” in worsening conditions or to migrate from 
outer islands to the capital.165 Respondents in the present 
study mentioned the devastating effects of tropical 
cyclones throughout the interviews. As stated by one 
159 UN Human Rights Committee.
160  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Historic UN Human 
Rights Case Opens Door to Climate Change Asylum Claims,” January 21, 
2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E.
161 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
162  Kate Lyons, “Climate Refugees Can’t Be Returned Home, Says Landmark 
UN Human Rights Ruling,” The Guardian, January 20, 2020, sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-
returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling.
163  UN Human Rights Committee, “Views Adopted by the Committee under 
Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication 
No. 2728/2016.”
164 UN Human Rights Committee.
165  Andrea Milan, Robert Oakes, and Jillian Campbell, “Tuvalu: Climate Change and 
Migration: Relationships Between Household Vulnerability, Human Mobility 
and Climate Change,” November 1, 2016, http://collections.unu.edu/view/
UNU:5856; R. Oakes, A. Milan, and J. Campbell, “Kiribati: Climate Change 
and Migration – Relationships between Household Vulnerability, Human 
Mobility and Climate Change” (Bonn: United Nations University Institute for 
Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), 2016), https://www.unescap.
org/sites/default/files/Online_No_20_Kiribati_Report_161207.pdf.
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regional official: “[Some climate shocks] are beyond the 
coping capacity of the communities.” (Pac18). 
When discussing the impacts of sea level rise on a specific 
country or region, it is important to know that rates of sea 
level rise are not uniform across the globe.166 In the Western 
Tropical Pacific, satellite altimetry helped to detect rates of 
sea level rise between three and four times faster than the 
global average (between 1993 and 2009).167 Above-average 
rates of sea level rise combine with the impacts of El Niño-
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), bringing unusually high king 
tides and exacerbating their erosive effects. For example, 
the experience of high spring tide floods at Funafuti 
Atoll, Tuvalu, is well documented by inhabitants.168 The 
central area of Fongafale is already below spring tide level, 
166  B. Meyssignac et al., “An Assessment of Two-Dimensional Past Sea Level 
Reconstructions Over 1950–2009 Based on Tide-Gauge Data and Different 
Input Sea Level Grids,” Surveys in Geophysics 33, no. 5 (September 1, 2012): 
945–72, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10712-011-9171-x.
167 Meyssignac et al.
168  M. Becker et al., “Sea Level Variations at Tropical Pacific Islands since 1950,” 
Global and Planetary Change 80–81 (January 1, 2012): 85–98,  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2011.09.004.
indicating that the annual damages must be remediated 
quickly and sustainably. Saline flooding, which threatens 
the subsistence agriculture economy, is likely to become 
more frequent and severe.169 Starting in 2002, communities 
residing in low-lying areas on the Torres Islands in Vanuatu 
have been displaced due to rising sea levels in combination 
with tectonic subsidence.170 
In the interviews conducted for this study, key experts 
spoke about current climate change impacts that are felt in 
their countries and/or region, as well as how these impacts 
undermine people’s livelihoods.171 One interviewee from 
a regional intergovernmental organisation said that 
climate change “undermines all livelihoods in some ways”, 
169  Hiroya Yamano et al., “Atoll Island Vulnerability to Flooding and Inundation 
Revealed by Historical Reconstruction: Fongafale Islet, Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu,” 
Global and Planetary Change 57, no. 3–4 (June 1, 2007): 407–16, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2007.02.007.
170  Valérie Ballu et al., “Comparing the Role of Absolute Sea-Level Rise and 
Vertical Tectonic Motions in Coastal Flooding, Torres Islands (Vanuatu),” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 32 (August 9, 2011): 
13019–22, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1102842108.
171  This section mainly refers to answers given by regional experts. For country-
specific insights, see chapter 5.4.
Narikoso – Fiji  (© GIZ)
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giving the example of fishermen who are faced with 
different weather conditions or need to follow their fish 
to “new” zones further out at sea (Pac16). Another inter-
viewee remarked on how rising sea levels impact agricul-
tural yields when land is inundated (Pac17). Many other 
respondents referred to impacts on people already living 
under difficult conditions and primarily relying on natural 
resources, which leads to concerns about food security 
(Pac03, Pac19). One expert summarised these climate 
change impacts: 
 –“Those communities that rely heavily on fisheries and/
or agriculture feel the impacts of climate change more 
strongly, such as change in rainfall and temperature 
patterns, shifts in agricultural seasons, reduced harvest or 
agricultural yields. Moving fish stock makes it harder to 
catch fish, and these communities find it harder to adapt, 
and this has an impact on the household level of income” 
(Pac18).
The cumulative, erosive effects of both slow- and sudden-
onset hazards and structural vulnerabilities leave some 
households in the focus countries with very limited capaci-
ties to respond or adapt. Informants from regional organi-
sations emphasised the specific vulnerability of coastal 
communities and people residing on low-lying islands 
and atolls to climate change throughout the interviews. 
How this related to human mobility, however, has not 
yet been fully understood. Regarding this, an informant 
from an international NGO summarised that “scenarios of 
how climate change affects people’s livelihoods, linking the 
science and the impacts on the communities and how this 
leads to migration trends would be useful” (Pac18).
Physical and Mental Health Impacts
HMCCC has many health-related implications. Worsening 
environmental conditions, including impacts of climate 
change on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) or food 
security, may drive migration. On the other hand, climate-
induced human mobility can impact individuals’ physical, 
social and mental well-being. Informants raised concerns 
about risk factors or health outcomes potentially related 
to climate change (for example, impacts on food security 
or fatalities related to extreme weather events). Many, 
however, said that more research is required on the health 
effects of climate change, be it impacts due to slow onset 
events such as heat or drought or health-related impacts 
of rapid onset events (for example Pac15). Emerging health 
issues due to slow onset events are, for example, changing 
patterns of waterborne diseases such as dengue fever. 
Typhoid and cholera also give rise to concern. Generally, 
climate change acts as a risk multiplier of known health 
issues. Climate-related impacts to WASH may limit 
people’s ability to recover from health problems. A govern-
ment representative from Fiji talked about a pilot project 
undertaken by the Ministry of Health in 2012 to 2014 
which looked at the effects of temperature rise on airborne 
and waterborne diseases in order to improve climate 
change adaption (Pac01).172 
Concerning mental health effects, one academic addressed 
the need to investigate the long-term effects of traumatic 
experiences post-disaster: “Some assessments are done 
immediately after a disaster by psychologists, but there 
needs to be some evaluation of long-term trauma, or how 
people are coping psychologically a year after a natural 
disaster has occurred” (Pac15). The academic gave the 
example of alcohol abuse by men in Kiribati post-disaster 
“as a means of escape” (Pac15). When asked about mental 
health effects, another respondent said: 
 –“This is not something that comes out very explicitly 
when talking to affected communities, but through 
conversations, one does get the sense that these commu-
nities are experiencing social stress. Particularly from 
having to adapt to reduced household incomes because 
their fisheries or agricultural forms of livelihoods are 
being affected by impacts of climate change” (Pac18). 
One informant, who has talked to villagers from 
Vunidogoloa, Fiji’s first community to be relocated because 
of climate change, emphasised that trauma counsellors 
are much-needed (Pac08; more on the case can be found 
in the country-specific insights). The respondent gave 
insights into the stress villagers experienced prior to relo-
cation “because they were always frightened of any silent 
king tide that might come through to the village” (Pac08). 
While villagers reported better sleep after the relocation 
(Pac08), new stressors emerged, since the community that 
had previously lived close to the sea had to adjust to a 
completely different environment (Pac01). 
172  The project focused on “the increase in water and air borne diseases due to the 
temperature in place” (Pac01).
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Generally, evidence from the interviews indicates that 
there are negative consequences on the mental well-being 
of affected communities in the Pacific. One respondent 
indicated why further research on the health impact of 
displacement is needed: “Natural disasters like cyclones are 
expected to worsen in strength, so we can expect to see more 
of these types of trauma” (Pac16). One expert talked about 
mental health effects in the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone 
Winston: 
 –“I have come across communities where the young 
children have been affected psychologically and this, I 
can actually name the particular village I went to in the 
province of Ra, village is Nabukadra where the village 
headman explained that, 3-4 months after Winston, 
whenever they feel there is a heavy rain or strong wind, 
children would just run and go under their bed, cry and 
some would be so scared, young people are vulnerable 
psychologically and mentally to the impacts of climate 
change” (Pac05).
RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE
The climate change-related drivers of migration outlined 
in this section, including health impacts, indicate the 
magnitude of the challenges that policymakers need to 
address in the Pacific, even if global warming would be 
kept well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels as agreed 
upon in the Paris Agreement. PICs, however, vary signifi-
cantly in their ability to respond to the adverse effects of 
climate change in an effective and integrated manner.173 
This also applies to the governance of climate change-
induced migration even though different approaches to 
HMCCC also play a role here as the next chapter will show.
173  J. Roy et al., “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing 
Inequalities,” in Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the 
Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related 
Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the 
Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, 
and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty, ed. V. Masson-Delmotte et al. (In Press, 2018), 
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Chapter5_
Low_Res.pdf; C. Cvitanovic et al., “Linking Adaptation Science to Action to 
Build Food Secure Pacific Island Communities,” Climate Risk Management 11 
(January 1, 2016): 53–62, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2016.01.003.
5.3. 
Regional Policies and Actors 
Addressing Climate Migration
Regional declarations such as the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism, approved by Pacific Islands Forum Leaders 
in July 2014, show the commitment of Pacific leaders to 
collectively address strategic issues and common chal-
lenges such as climate change.174 Regional cooperation 
is a crucial component to finding effective and sustain-
able mechanisms for all forms of climate-induced human 
mobility in the Pacific. In the aftermath of extreme events, 
regional actors already play an active role in managing or 
responding to displacement, as discussed by respondents. 
Regional actors are also important in discussing HMCCC 
at the global level. One expert, for instance, talked about 
a cooperation between the Pacific Islands Forum and the 
Small Island Developing States group to bring their case to 
the UN Security Council:
 –“[T]hey have started to put a case up to the UN Security 
Council to make the case that climate change is indeed a 
threat and it will cause the nation states to loose national 
jurisdiction or boundaries and it will cause wide scale 
migration for reasons on the inundation of islands and 
also the drying of the major water basins and rivers in 
the world because of the glacier melt” (Pac08).
Regional Actor Landscape 
For this study, interviews with experts from the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum (PIDF), the Pacific Island 
Forum Secretariat (PIFS), the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), and the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) were 
conducted. Apart from these organisations, experts 
have mentioned, among others, the Pacific Immigration 
Development Community and the Pacific Community 
(SPC) as important stakeholders for HMCCC. PIDF, PIFS, 
SPC, and SPREP are members of the Council of Regional 
Organisations in the Pacific (CROP), a network of intergov-
ernmental regional organisations from the Pacific which 
intends to improve cooperation and coordination “to work 
174  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “The Framework for Pacific Regionalism” 
(Suva, Fiji: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2014), https://www.forumsec.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Framework-for-Pacific-Regionalism.pdf.
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toward achieving the common goal of sustainable develop-
ment in the Pacific region”.175 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) is an intergovernmental body and 
currently has 21 members which are Pacific island states 
or territories, among them Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu.176 One of the Secretariat’s tasks is to provide train-
ings on global policy negotiations and to give technical 
advice during meetings, for example, at COPs, according to 
an interviewee familiar with SPREP (Pac16). Furthermore, 
“SPREP’s work engages communities with climate services 
to help them predict and plan better” (Pac16). The inter-
governmental body also engages in “practical adaptation 
solutions for some livelihood impacts” (Pac16). One example 
for such activities is the Pacific Adaptation to Climate 
Change (PACC) Programme.177 HMCCC is on the organi-
sation’s agenda: “Through the Nansen Initiative and now 
the Platform for Disaster Displacement, SPREP has been 
engaged on this issue for some time” (Pac16).178 
The Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), the next 
regional actor to be introduced, is an important stake-
holder for issues related to HMCCC. In the 2015 Suva 
Declaration on Climate Change, PIDF nations highlight 
that climate change already leads to displacement and 
declare “the loss of land and territorial integrity […] results 
in breaches of social and economic rights”.179 Ensuring poli-
cies that safeguard human rights is an important part of 
the discussion on HMCCC for PIDF (Pac17). In 2017, PIDF 
co-hosted an event on climate-induced human mobility.180 
The event led to the launch of a declaration on climate-
induced displacement which aimed to influence the Global 
175  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Council of Regional Organisations of the 
Pacific – Forum Sec,” accessed November 27, 2019, https://www.forumsec.
org/council-of-regional-organisations-of-the-pacific.
176 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “The Framework for Pacific Regionalism.”
177  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Secretariat of the 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), “Pacific Adaptation to 
Climate Change (PACC) | National Adaptation Global Support Programme,” 
accessed October 22, 2019, https://www.globalsupportprogramme.org/
projects/bf-pacc.
178  For example this report on joint efforts with the Nansen Initiative:  
https://www.sprep.org/news/protection-people.
179  Pacific Islands Development Forum, “Suva Declaration on Climate Change” 
(Suva, Fiji: Pacific Islands Development Forum Secretariat, 2015),  
http://www.piango.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PACIFIC-ISLAND-
DEVELOPMENT-FORUM-SUVA-DECLARATION-ON-CLIMATE-CHANGE.
v2.pdf.
180  Pacific Islands Development Forum, “Side Event: Climate-Induced 
Displacement,” accessed August 7, 2019, http://pacificidf.org/climate-induced- 
displacement.
Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.181 In 
addition, PIDF signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) under which a “human rights 
checklist for use by relocation projects and initiatives” is 
to be developed and promoted (Pac17). Other activities 
planned in the project include education on human rights, 
including environmental rights (Pac17).
The third regional actor, the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS), supports its Member States in global 
policy discussions and provides them with technical exper-
tise for negotiations, alongside SPREP (Pac19). Founded 
in 1971, it comprises 18 members, among them the focus 
countries.182 According to a regional security expert, PIFS 
is advocating for climate change to become a topic in the 
security discourse (Pac19). The interviewee pins his hopes 
on the Boe Declaration to provide guidance in terms of 
key climate-related security risks for the Pacific (Pac19). 
The Boe Declaration on Regional Security was adopted 
in 2018.183 Representatives from Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu were present at the forum which had the meeting 
theme “Building a Strong Pacific: Our People, Our Islands, 
Our Will”.184 In the Boe Declaration, forum leaders “reaf-
firm that climate change remains the single greatest threat 
to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples 
of the Pacific” and declare their commitment to the Paris 
Agreement.185 While the Boe Declaration does not specifi-
cally address human mobility,186 it is important for regional 
cooperation on climate change in general.
181  Pacific Islands Development Forum, “Climate-Induced Human Mobility,” 
accessed August 7, 2019, http://pacificidf.org/climate-induced-human- 
mobility.
182  PIFS compromises the following 18 Member States: Australia, Cook Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New 
Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
183  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Forty-Ninth Pacific Islands Forum Nauru, 
3rd – 6th September 2018,” accessed August 9, 2019, https://www.forumsec.
org/forty-ninth-pacific-islands-forum-nauru-3rd-6th-september-2018.
184 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
185  Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “Boe Declaration on Regional Security,” 
2018, https://www.forumsec.org/boe-declaration-on-regional-security.
186 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
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Relevant Regional Policies for HMCCC
A number of informants approached for this study 
expressed doubt in the state of governance of HMCCC in 
the Pacific. For example, a climate change advisor stated 
that “[v]ery few officials are familiar with the issues, across 
the region” (Pac16). At the same time, several interviewees 
from regional institutions referred to good cooperation 
practices in the region when managing disaster displace-
ment. Several regional frameworks address disaster risk 
management. Key experts named, for example, the Pacific 
Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative 
(PCRAFI) (Pac16) and the Framework for Resilient 
Development in the Pacific (FRDP) which “addresses the 
impact of climate change as well as disaster risk in the 
Pacific” (Pac01). 
The FRDP is authored by different organisations from the 
international and regional level187 and therefore combines 
scientific knowledge and regional practitioners’ insights.188 
Specifically, the framework aims to “provide […] high level 
strategic guidance to different stakeholder groups on how 
187  The these organizations are the Pacific Community (SPC), the Secretariat of 
the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat (PIFS), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and 
the University of the South Pacific (USP).
188  Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP), “Framework 
for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Address 
Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP). 2017 – 2030” (Suva, 
Fiji: Pacific Community, Geoscience Division, 2016).
to enhance resilience to climate change and disasters, in 
ways that contribute to and are embedded in sustainable 
development”.189 Priority actions for national as well as 
subnational governments and administrations in the FRDP 
call upon them to integrate human mobility issues in their 
disaster risk management planning, to protect and target 
those most vulnerable to climate-induced displacement 
and migration in policies, but also to strengthen institu-
tional capacities.190 Regional labour migration policies and 
schemes are listed as priority actions for governments and 
regional organisations as targeted adaptation measures 
to protect those most vulnerable to climate change and 
displacement.191 
The Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP) Taskforce will 
guide and support the implementation of the FRDP.192 At 
the inaugural Pacific Resilience Meeting, which brought 
together more than 300 stakeholders in Suva, Fiji, in May 
2019,193 participants reaffirmed the framework’s impor-
tance for the region “to guide actions aimed at strength-
ening Pacific resilience at the regional, national and local 
levels”.194 When the FRDP document was launched in 2016, 
regional and international organisations welcomed the 
“the world’s first integrated regional framework to build 
resilience to climate change and disasters”.195 The inte-
grated approach to address and manage climate change 
disaster risks with regionally coordinated and coherent 
responses may help to build more efficient strategies to 
address the cross-cutting issue of HMCCC.
189  Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP).
190  Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP).
191  Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP).
192  Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP), “PRP Taskforce,” accessed August 12, 
2019, http://www.resilientpacific.org/taskforce.
193  Global Island Partnership, “Inaugural Pacific Resilience Meeting Held from 1 
to 3 May 2019 in SUVA, Fiji…,” 2019, http://www.glispa.org/news/community-
highlights/408-inaugural-pacific-resilience-meeting-held-from-1-to-3-may-
2019-in-suva-fiji.
194  Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP), “Pacific Resilience Meeting – Outcomes 
Statement,” The Pacific Community (SPC), 2019, https://www.spc.int/updates/
news/2019/05/pacific-resilience-meeting-outcomes-statement.
195  UNDP Pacific Office, “New Framework to Build Resilience to Climate 
Change and Disasters in the Pacific Islands,” 2016, http://www.pacific.undp.
org/content/pacific/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/09/16/
new-framework-to-build-resilience-to-climate-change-and-disasters-in-the-
pacific-islands.html.
Vanuatu  (© Kira Vinke)
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5.4. 
Country-Specific Insights
Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu differ in their capacities 
and in their approaches to address HMCCC as discussed in 
the introduction. This chapter presents country-specific 
insights from the interviews. It discusses the actor land-
scape of each island state, including a short summary of 
stakeholder’s opinions on communication and cooperation 
on HMCCC, and summarises key policies and/or instru-
ments related to HMCCC.
Fiji
The Republic of Fiji is by far the most populous state 
among the PICs chosen for this study. The country 
consists of 332 islands of mostly volcanic origin covering 
a land area of 18,274 km².196 At 1,324 m, Mount Tomanivi 
on Fiji’s largest island Viti Levu is Fiji’s highest point. 
Approximately 70 % of the Republic’s total population of 
around 880,000 people live on Viti Levu197 and roughly half 
of all Fijians live in urban settings.198 
196  CIA World Factbook. “Australia – Oceania: Fiji,” accessed August 14, 2019, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fj.html.
197  The Fijian Government, “Fiji Bureau of Statistics Releases 2017 Census 
Results,” Fiji Government Online Portal, 2018, https://www.fiji.gov.fj/
Media-Centre/News/Fiji-Bureau-of-Statistics-Releases-2017-Census-Res.
198  Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Fact Book. Australia – Oceania: Fiji.”
Fiji functions as a regional hub in the Pacific. It is both a 
country of origin, with many Fijians migrating interna-
tionally, and a country of destination or transit within 
the region. Concerning cross-border migration, figures 
from 2017 estimate a net migration of about -31,000 (2012: 
-52,000; 2007: -23,700). Among the top areas of destina-
tion are Australia, New Zealand and the Unites States of 
America. In 2016, the Fijian Diaspora in Australia stood at 
98,000 with about 62 % of them being first generation Fijian 
migrants.199 
Interviewees contacted for this study mentioned major 
impacts of climate change like rising temperatures, coastal 
erosion, and land degradation through flooding and 
tropical cyclones as possible triggers for Fijians to move 
within the country or abroad. One interviewee discussed 
how some family members had eventually decided to 
leave their home in Nadi on Viti Levu and move to higher 
grounds because they had experienced more severe 
flooding recently (Pac02). The expert then elaborated on 
climate-related factors prompting people to migrate in Fiji:
 –“In essence, hydro-meteorological disasters – especially 
flooding – are the major reason why people migrate in 
Fiji. Most Fijian villages are located along the coast and 
continuous inundation may force people to relocate to 
higher grounds. I don’t know to what extent it is really 
happening, but livelihoods of most of these communities 
are dependent on agriculture [and] farms are affected by 
saltwater intrusion. These are simple examples of [why] 
people in Fiji in particular may relocate due to climate 
change. But there are a lot of other pressures of migra-
tion apart from climate change, but these are some of the 
reasons with respect on the impacts of climate change” 
(Pac02).
According to another interviewee, consistent flooding 
causes problems in parts of Rakiraki (Pac04). With liveli-
hoods depending on agriculture, saltwater intrusion takes 
away farmland and, thus, the basis of existence (Pac02, 
Pac10). Apart from continuous inundation as a result of sea 
level rise, flooding may also be caused by tropical cyclones 
and “ongoing intense rainfall throughout the year in Fiji 
affecting people in low-lying areas” (Pac15).
199  UN DESA Population Division and UNICEF, “Fiji: Migration Profiles,” 2014, 
https://esa.un.org/miggmgprofiles/indicators/files/Fiji.pdf.
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One interviewee said that “[t]here are also seasonal changes 
to tropical cyclones and people are not well-prepared for 
these intense cyclones such as TC Winston in Fiji in 2016” 
(Pac15). Another one called these impacts “devastating” 
(Pac04). One respondent also emphasised that “most people 
would prefer not to move” (Pac06). Many of the key inform-
ants referred to Tropical Cyclone Winston and the destruc-
tion it caused on some islands or in the province Ra on Viti 
Levu (e.g. Pac04). There are still parts of Fiji that have not 
fully recovered from Winston. While disasters are times of 
social disruptions and disturbances, in some cases commu-
nity response mechanisms have been positive, as described 
by one expert: 
 –“Three weeks after Winston, all different faiths came 
together to help the communities. They bring food, 
clothing and other things to help these communities 
and to me that actually is an eye opener, where all these 
religion groups have a common policy to help humanity 
who are desperate and in a dangerous situation” (Pac04).
An expert described a similarly positive experience in 
the aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Mona: “Despite of the 
different religion and backgrounds we have, everybody 
is just helping each other out when it comes to natural 
disasters” (Pac05). Nevertheless, in order to avoid tensions, 
the importance of fair distribution of donations among 
different groups was mentioned (Pac07).
When asked about the main factors motivating people  
to migrate, experts often named a combination of “oppor-
tunities and constraints” (Pac03). While climate change  
and environmental degradation may contribute to the 
decision to migrate, the main factors motivating people 
to leave Fiji are usually others. One expert summarised 
that it is “ [u]sually a combination of reasons such as 
economic aspects; moving to greener pastures to upgrade 
living standards. It’s also a strategy of people to reduce risk 
by diversifying livelihoods, as opposed to relying on one 
source of livelihood” (Pac03). Education was named a driver 
for migration several times, often from outer islands to the 
mainland (Pac05, Pac07, Pac10). Rural-to-urban migration 
for work purposes is also one factor for migration in Fiji 
(Pac07) or, more broadly “[g]etting more economic opportu-
nities and better access to utilities” (Pac09). Land tenure has 
been named “one major setback in informal settlements” 
(Pac07).
THE RELOCATION OF VUNIDOGOLOA VILLAGE
Several of the experts interviewed for this report made 
references to the case of Vunidogoloa or other Fijian 
villages which have been relocated. One interviewee 
named the case of Vunidogoloa on Vanua Levu an example 
of how climate change undermines livelihoods of people 
because people had to move due to coastal erosion and 
inundation (Pac01). In 2014, the village of Vunidogoloa 
relocated to a new site about 1.5 km inland and on higher 
ground, following several years of consultations.200 The 
process started in 2006 when the village head requested the 
government’s support to relocate the village, which gradu-
ally became uninhabitable due to the effects of sea level 
rise.201 At the new site, the population of about 150 villagers 
were equipped with resources to meet their livelihood 
needs, including fishponds and fruit plantations.202 
Lessons learned from the relocation of Vunidogoloa seem 
to have fed in the formulation of the Planned Relocation 
Guidelines, according to one expert working at the govern-
ment at that time (Pac01). There were several critical 
remarks on the case. One interviewee said that “the setup 
of the houses in their relocated area is not that of a typical 
Fijian village setting” (Pac15). Another criticised this as well, 
and hoped that lessons will be learned from this for future 
planned relocating processes:
 –“I hope the relocation guideline will take into considera-
tions people’s traditional structures and house place-
ments and the practicality of the current location. You 
can’t model the traditional setting everywhere, but so 
long as the people are consulted. I’m also looking at the 
demographics – the young people, the women, people 
with disabilities – where they have their own experi-
ence and their stories and their needs must be taken into 
consideration” (Pac08).
One interviewee emphasised that evaluation is critical and 
that evaluation of relocated communities should take place 
on a regular basis, maybe every five or ten years (Pac15). 
Reflecting on the case of Vunidogoloa, researchers have 
also highlighted the need to integrate customary patterns 
of land use and land tenure in discussions and policies on 
200 Gharbaoui and Blocher, “The Reason Land Matters.”
201 Gharbaoui and Blocher.
202  Gharbaoui and Blocher; Annah E. Piggott-McKellar et al., “Moving People in a 
Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fiji,” Social Sciences 8, no. 
5 (May 2019): 133, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133.
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planned relocation in Fiji.203 In the interviews, one expert 
described how relocation may cause tensions between 
clans: 
 –“In the past, there’s been tension when a clan moves 
to another clan’s space because when they’ve been 
given permission, they start developing things without 
informing the other clan. It also has to do with respect, 
and there is cultural protocol you have to follow. I think 
it’s just how you approach that in a kinship manner so 
that there’s no conflict later on” (Pac04).
Another case of climate-induced and government-led 
planned relocation efforts in Fiji is the small village of 
Narikoso, located on Ono Island, Kadavu, where houses 
were flooded during high tides.204 The relocation of 
203  Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur, and Priyatma Singh, “Customary Land and 
Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, 
Vanua Levu, Fiji,” in Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries: Fostering 
Resilience and Improving the Quality of Life, ed. Walter Leal Filho, Climate 
Change Management (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 19–33, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2; Gharbaoui and Blocher, “The 
Reason Land Matters.”
204  Fiji Government Online Portal, “Narikoso Village to Be Relocated,” Fiji 
Government Online Portal, September 4, 2013, https://www.fiji.gov.fj/
Media-Centre/News/NARIKOSO-VILLAGE-TO-BE-RELOCATED.
Narikoso is supported by SPC and GIZ.205 The pilot project 
focuses on the building of new houses. Some houses of 
the small village are powered by solar panels and include 
coastal protection measures.206 
FIJI – ACTOR LANDSCAPE
The Fijian government increasingly acknowledges that 
communities may require relocation due to their liveli-
hoods being affected by the impacts of climate change. 
Planned relocation is more and more often framed as an 
adaptive strategy. This is perhaps best demonstrated by 
Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guidelines, published in 2018 (see 
next chapter). 
Asked about important institutions and/or actors for 
responding to the challenges of climate-induced human 
mobility in Fiji, key experts named, among others: the 
National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), the 
Climate Change and International Cooperation Division 
of the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Rural and 
Maritime Development, the Ministry of Lands and Mineral 
205  UNOCHA, “Fiji: Building Resilience in the Face of Climate 
Change,” OCHA, January 13, 2017, https://www.unocha.org/story/
fiji-building-resilience-face-climate-change.
206  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), “The  
Pacific Islands Are Adapting to Climate Change,” accessed November 8, 2019,  
https://www.giz.de/en/workingwithgiz/57747.html.
Narikoso – Fiji  (© GIZ)
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Resources, the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, Commissioners 
Offices, and the Fiji Meteorological Services. Other answers 
included the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB), or, more 
generally, NGOs (local and international), the civil society, 
or faith-based organisations. Two experts explicitly named 
the Red Cross as an important stakeholder in HMCCC 
(Pac04, Pac08).
The importance of various institutions of the United 
Nations (UN) was stressed by several key informants in the 
interviews (for example, by Pac03 and Pac08), among them: 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), also known as the UN Refugee Agency; 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM); the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World 
Food Programme (WFP); and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Regional organi-
sations such as PIFS were also mentioned (Pac03), and 
a representative from the NDMO named the European 
Union (Pac05). Another interviewee included “the commu-
nities themselves, so that their views are also taken into 
account” (Pac06). 
As compared to others in the region, Fiji has relatively 
strong institutional capacities to manage issues related to 
HMCCC at national and local levels. At the national level, 
two government agencies are of particular importance in 
this regard, namely the Climate Change and International 
Cooperation Division (CCICD) and the National Disaster 
Management Office (NDMO). These two separate agencies 
are guided by their own policies and acts.
The Climate Change and International Cooperation 
Division (CCICD) is a department of the Ministry of 
Economy207 and the responsible government agency for 
addressing issues and policies related to climate change.208 
The division has also been involved in a village profiling 
system to map stakeholders such as NGOs and their 
geographical areas of responsibility (Pac01). Some areas 
and communities were not covered at all and this finding 
resulted in the proposal of the Integrated Vulnerability 
Assessment (IVA) (Pac01).
The second important actor is the National Disaster 
Management Office (NDMO) which coordinates opera-
tions and manages displacement in cases of civil conflict 
or disaster. Preparedness is an integral part of the NDMO’s 
work and mandate (Pac05). Generally, measures range 
from the household level to national level plans. Tasks 
of the NDMO include, inter alia, issuing flood warnings 
to communities or planning evacuations. A training unit 
conducts disaster introduction trainings in rural as well 
as urban areas. New tsunami sirens were installed and 
are frequently tested with drills being regularly held for 
coastal communities, schools and business houses. The 
NDMO is working to raise public awareness about the 
sirens and what to do in case of a warning. According to an 
expert familiar with the NDMO’s work, the NDMO places 
particular emphasis on work with communities in order 
to strengthen capacity building at the ground level (Pac05). 
The NDMO also heads the process of aligning reloca-
tion processes at the local level with the newly developed 
national Planned Relocation Guidelines (Pac01). 
Among other stakeholders named by key informants (see 
above), the iTaukei Affairs seems to be particularly relevant 
for planned relocations. They ensure that proper consul-
tations, assessments and prioritisation are conducted to 
identify most vulnerable iTaukei communities. In this 
regard, one interviewee said that “[t]he iTaukei Affairs were 
collecting data on Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) 
for communities, which will inform government on priority 
communities for relocation” (Pac09). Referring to the IVA, a 
government employee said the following:
207  Apparently, the division has been shifted between different departments in 
the last ten years (Pac01, Pac08). It might be interesting to investigate whether 
and how this has affected planning.
208  Climate Change and International Cooperation Division (CCICD), “Fiji Climate 
Change Portal,” accessed August 9, 2019, http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj.
Village marked for relocation  (© Kira Vinke)
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 –“If the IVA project still existed it would have been a very 
good information for this because actually they have the 
geographical location in Fiji and they were going into 
having a database where it identifies the sectors that the 
communities are vulnerable in” (Pac01).
Several key experts spoke about strengths and weak-
nesses in the government’s current strategy to address 
HMCCC. One expert stated that “[t ]here is a lot of talk on 
institutional capacity building, but the nuts and bolts of 
it has not really been very clear” (Pac04). One expert said 
that “[p]roper, structured protocols for communications 
between government and the communities [are needed] 
that [are] actually being abided by on the ground” (Pac03). 
Concerning capacities in the government to manage 
migration, displacement and planned relocations, some 
experts thought that technical expertise is quite strong 
(Pac01, Pac02, Pac05, Pac08, Pac09). One expert was of the 
opinion that “[t]here are capacities available, but not really 
utilised and known so the government has to seek interna-
tional consultants for support in these areas of expertise” 
(Pac07). Besides, planning should be more inclusive (Pac07), 
and sensitive: “People need to know the process of their own 
moving and government needs to be sensitive to that as well 
so the dialogue is a pre-requisite” (Pac08). 
Equipment may be an issue (Pac05, Pac09), the same is true 
for financial resources since relocation is costly (Pac08, 
Pac09). In this regard, one respondent said that the govern-
ment relies on donors (Pac09). One expert named inter-
ministerial coordination and communication a weakness 
in planned relocation processes:
 –“Each Ministry has their own mandate or work plans, 
so we have to synchronise with each other to get things 
done because, like I mentioned, networking plays a big 
part when we try to get a request. You just stick your way 
into it. But we don’t want it that way and that is one 
issue that we are trying to work on for relocation itself. 
If you need a particular assessment or work done, [it’s 
like:] which Ministry, which department, and who’s the 
focal person of contact there? Not just Ministry of Labour. 
And you just find your way in. So if you have a contact 
list, everything is there available. We are working on that 
weakness, but I think we made a big improvement from 
last year” (Pac05).
Fiji is also strongly involved in regional or international 
dialogues and cross-country coordination. As discussed 
in the introduction, the twenty-third session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) took place under the 
presidency of Fiji. While the event gave a prominent voice 
to SIDS at the global level, it also helped to create aware-
ness in Fiji on the climate change-related problems that 
need to be addressed (Pac01). Summing up, a government 
employee said the following about Fiji’s COP presidency:
 –“Because of our COP23 Presidency and Fiji being the first 
Small Island Developing State to be a COP President – in 
fact, [also] the first Pacific Island, if you have to count 
Australia and New Zealand – we are very much seen as 
leaders in the Climate Justice fight, despite the fact that 
people might hold their own opinion about whether we 
were worthy enough. But the fact is we assumed that role 
because of the confidence and the trust placed in us, apart 
from the 193 parties to the convention. It is quite a proud 
legacy and the opportunity may never come again, and 
so it’s something that Fiji can be proud of” (Pac08).
According to the expert, the Ministry of Economy works 
collaboratively with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when 
formulating national potions for global climate change 
negotiations and negotiating them at COPs (Pac08). Both 
actors are therefore important in Fiji’s regional and inter-
national engagements.
FIJI – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN CLIMATE 
MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 
There is no law that specifically addresses migration, 
displacement or planned relocation in the context of 
climate change in Fiji. However, relocation guidelines – the 
first for the Pacific – were launched by the Climate Change 
and International Cooperation Division during COP24 in 
Katowice in December 2018. At the event, Fiji’s Minister for 
Defence and National Security, Hon. Inia Seruiratu, empha-
sised that planned relocation is “viewed as an option of 
last resort”.209 The guidelines also emphasise that planned 
relocation should only be considered “when all adaptation 
options have been exhausted”.210 
209  Fijian Government, “Fiji High-Level Climate Champion Officiates at the 
Launch of Fiji’s Relocation Guidelines,” 2018, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=9aBuI30mh3A.
210  Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines:  
A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation,” 2.
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The scope and purpose section of the Planned Relocation 
Guidelines states that they are “[t]o ensure an inclusive and 
gender responsive consultative and participatory process 
to strengthen communities’ riposte to climate change 
impacts, and ensure community engagement and owner-
ship in the relocation process”.211 The guidelines, thus, 
aim to function as a coordination mechanism to facilitate 
“clear, inclusive and comprehensive procedures” of all 
stakeholders.212 The section also underlines the “richness of 
the indigenous knowledge, the multi-cultural and inter-
faith composition of the Fijian population”.213 
How the guidelines will be implemented and translate into 
concrete actions on the ground remains to be seen. The 
fact that the language is rather inclusive in the scope and 
purpose section, as well as throughout the 22-page-long 
document, gives some cause for optimism that the needs 
and voices of the affected communities are heard and, 
moreover, their knowledge is recognised and integrated.214 
Much will depend on the yet to be developed Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs), as a project manager of a 
European-funded planned relocation project emphasised: 
“When you have a SOP in place, there’s a method on how 
211  Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, “Planned Relocation Guidelines: A 
Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation.”
212 Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji.
213  Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji.
214  For details on the drafting process and who was consulted, please refer to 
the “Background” section in the guidelines. A speech of Ambassador Nazhat 
Shameem Khan at a UNHCR Meeting in October 2017 also contains a few 
details on the drafting process: https://www.unhcr.org/59d531fa7.pdf.
you plan [the relocation]; if you don’t have a method, it’s 
just a piece of paper. So SOPs are lessons learnt” (Pac05). The 
same respondent also mentioned that, for relocation plan-
ning, “the whole of government is involved […] right to the 
Prime Ministers’ office” and that the expertise of interna-
tional partners is needed, for example to conduct trainings 
(Pac05).
References to HMCCC can be found in several earlier plans 
and documents from the Government of the Republic of 
Fiji, paving the way for the Planned Relocation Guideline. 
Fiji’ Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, 
published in 2014, for instance, names soil erosion and 
saltwater intrusion as key reasons to relocate and identi-
fies “[r]elocation of population and economic activities” as 
one adaptation measure for the coastal zone.215 Table 7.3 
lists vulnerable communities in Fiji, many of them with 
the label “[p]otential relocation” or “[p]ossible relocation”.216 
Fiji’s Climate Vulnerability Assessment, launched in 2017 
just before COP 23, does not specifically address HMCCC 
as a separate topic but discusses several aspects of human 
rights, such as psychological health concerns or gendered 
vulnerabilities in human mobility issues.217 References 
215  Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji: Second National 
Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change” (Suva, Fiji: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 
Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2014), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
natc/fjinc2.pdf.
216 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
217  Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Climate Vulnerability Assessment: Making 
Fiji Climate Resilient” (Suva, Fiji: Government of the Republic of Fiji, 2017).
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to HMCC can also be found in the 5-Year and 20-Year 
National Development Plan, published in November 
2017.218 The government has identified 830 communities 
for relocation which are particular at risk from climate-
related events, out of which 48 are said to be “in urgent 
need of relocation”.219 The annual targets at the end of the 
plan name two villages as the expected outcome for the 
years 2017 to 2022.220 
Fiji’s first-ever National Adaptation Plan (NAP), launched in 
2018, critically discusses several issues related to HMCCC.221 
A section on “Human settlement”, for instance, makes 
references to past planning and management deficien-
cies that have led to failures in providing safe and afford-
able land for the construction of houses.222 In combination 
with urban migration, this has led to a growing number of 
informal settlements which are described as particularly 
vulnerable to climate hazards.223 The section also briefly 
refers to gendered vulnerabilities in such settlements.224 
The NAP declares the government’s intention that “any 
relocation be voluntary and as a result of meaningful and 
informed consultation that fully respects the rights of 
affected persons”.225 However, while the NAP “emphasises 
the need for human mobility issues to be incorporated into 
sub-national development planning processes and for a 
comprehensive approach to community relocation to be 
developed”,226 steps forward and details for such develop-
ments are not explicitly laid out. Notably, Fiji’s NAP also 
has a section on values. In this section it is stated that “[a]
daptation planning can never be apolitical. Climate change 
impacts and influences social and economic groups differ-
ently. For instance, climate change is not gender neutral”.227 
218  Ministry of Economy, “5-Year & 20-Year National Development Plan: 
Transforming Fiji” (Suva, Fiji: Ministry of Economy, Republic of Fiji, 2017), 
https://www.fiji.gov.fj/getattachment/15b0ba03-825e-47f7-bf69-
094ad33004dd/5-Year---20-Year-NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN.aspx.
219 Ministry of Economy.
220 Ministry of Economy.
221  Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji National Adaptation  
Plan: A Pathway towards Climate Resilience” (Suva, Fiji, 2018),  
http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/document/republic-fiji-national- 
adaptation-plan-pathway-towards-climate-resilience.
222 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
223 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
224 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
225 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
226 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
227 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
A few months after the launch of the Planned Relocation 
Guidelines, Fiji released its new National Climate Change 
Policy.228 The new policy replaces the National Climate 
Change Policy of 2012, in which issues relating to HMCCC 
are hardly addressed and relocation as adaptation is not 
mentioned at all.229 This very fact, however, seems to have 
triggered the development of the Relocation Guidelines, 
according to a government representative. At Fiji’s first 
National Climate Change Summit at the end of 2012, the 
Climate Change Division “took that on board and tried to 
find a solution and address that particular gap” (Pac01). The 
policy gap has not only been addressed with the launch 
of the Planned Relocation Guidelines, the new National 
Climate Change Policy also has several links to HMCCC. 
One strategy of the policy covers migration, displacement 
and planned relocation: 
 –“Human mobility is established as a priority human 
security and national security issue. Legal frameworks, 
policies and strategies to manage climate and disaster-
induced displacement are used to protect human 
rights and reduce long term risks. Planned relocation is 
supported through relevant resourcing and national poli-
cies and strategies as a form of adaptation. Cross-border 
migration issues and policy development is supported 
through the United Nations and the Global Compact for 
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The role of climate 
change in human displacement is articulated and inter-
national responsibilities defined”.230 
Fiji’s new National Climate Change Policy also makes 
references to the Planned Relocation Guidelines and their 
operationalisation.231 The policy was drafted in consulta-
tion with several stakeholders – government and non-
government ones – over a period of two years.232 
228  Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030” (Suva, Fiji: 
Ministry of Economy, Government of Fiji, 2019), http://fijiclimatechangeportal.
gov.fj/sites/default/files/documents/National%20Climate%20Change%20
Policy%202018%20-%202030.pdf.
229  Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji: National 
Climate Change Policy” (Suva, Fiji: Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community, 2012), http://fijiclimatechangeportal.gov.fj/document/
republic-fiji-national-climate-change-policy.
230  Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030.”Ministry of 
Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030.”
231  Precisely, the policy states the following: “Fiji’s National Planned Relocation 
Guidelines are operationalized through the development of Standard 
Operating Procedures which establish pro-active processes for addressing 
the risk of climate and disaster-driven displacement. At-risk communities 
are successfully relocated and supported. National procedures for assessing 
and implementing planned relocations are enabled bay relevant financial 
mechanism.”
232 Ministry of Economy, “National Climate Change Policy 2018 – 2030.”
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The year 2019 saw more policy developments which are or 
could be of relevance for HMCCC, indicating the concerted 
efforts of the Fijian Government to address the topic. In 
June 2019, the Parliament of the Republic of Fiji enacted 
“Act 21 Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund” 
in June 2019.233 The act has the aim to “establish a trust 
fund for the planned relocation of communities in Fiji 
that are adversely affected by climate change” and lays 
out purposes, operational procedures and regulations of 
the fund.234 Money from the fund may be invested, inter 
alia, in identifying or assessing communities at risk and 
finding relocation sites. More general investments may 
be in research on planned relocation processes, including 
activities that aim at ensuring adequate livelihoods situa-
tions of relocated communities.235 In December 2019, the 
Fijian Government launched Displacement Guidelines 
at COP25 in Madrid.236 Taking into consideration existing 
policy frameworks at national and global levels, Fiji’s 
Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate 
Change and Disasters aims to further increase protection 
mechanisms in place, reduce vulnerability and address an 
increasing demand.237 
233  Parliament of the Republic of Fiji, “Act 21 Climate Relocation of Communities 
Trust Fund,” Pub. L. No. 21 of 2019 (2019), http://www.parliament.gov.fj/acts/
act-21-climate-relocation-of-communities-trust-fund.
234 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji.
235 Parliament of the Republic of Fiji.
236  The Fijian Government, “The Official Launch of Fiji’s-Displacement Guideline,” 
2019, https://www.fiji.gov.fj/getattachment/37b65740-c9fe-43ef-bada-
474b3254bca1/The-Official-Launch-of-Fiji%E2%80%99s-Displacement-
Guideli.aspx.
237  The Fijian Government.
Apart from the Trust Fund and the Fiji’s Displacement 
Guidelines, other recent developments may become 
relevant in the near future. The Fijian Government has 
published a draft of the Climate Change Bill 2019 which 
makes several reference to displacement and planned 
relocation.238 The minister responsible for climate change, 
for instance, should “convene other ministries to support 
national efforts to mainstream climate change mitiga-
tion, adaptation and climate displacement into devel-
opment planning, decision making and policy”.239 The 
draft suggests that the minister “may convene a Cabinet 
Committee on Climate and Disaster Risk” which should, 
inter alia, “support and provide oversight, where required, 
to the relocation of at-risk communities and other 
matters relating to climate displacement”. The draft 
also addresses the operationalisation of the Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the relocation guidelines. 
Recognising the specific vulnerability of people living on 
SIDS in the Pacific to sudden and slow-onset events, a 
section of the draft bill discusses regional displacement.240 
The draft explicitly asks to “to facilitate [their] acceptance” 
in Fiji.241 
Despite these positive developments for HMCCC in 
general, key informants spoke about weaknesses of current 
policies and instruments directed at disaster response. One 
of the interviewees named outdated policies as a weakness 
of current response mechanisms, specifically naming the 
Natural Disaster Management Act of 1998 and the National 
Disaster Management Plan of 1995 (Pac01). According to 
another interviewee, these two policies are currently being 
reviewed (Pac05).242 The aim of this review process is to 
improve response and make disaster management more 
robust (Pac15).
238  Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Draft Climate Change Bill 2019” (2019), 
http://www.economy.gov.fj./images/CCIC/uploads/BILL/Draft-Climate-
Change-Bill.pdf.
239 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
240 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
241 Government of the Republic of Fiji.
242  Precisely, the expert said the following: “Fiji has a good, robust system, but we 
are looking at improving them and at the moment we are looking at the Natural 
Disaster Act and Plan where the Act is 21 years old, and the plan is 22 years old, 
and we are doing consultations to review the act within government and outside 
of government so we can do it more robust and better. The reason being: we 
have declared and non-declared disasters, it’s a non-declared disaster where 
NDMO have little powers to assists where there is a landslide and it blocks some 
roads and when they come to ask for assistance we don’t have the power and 
laws to assist, but if it declared, then we can actually assist.” (Pac15).
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A Talanoa Dialogue on Planned Relocation 
Qelekuro village is a small coastal village in Tailevu Pro-
vince on Fiji’s main island Viti Levu. Away from the hustle 
of the capital Suva, in the village the culture and tradi-
tions of Fiji are deeply intertwined with daily routines and 
livelihoods. Members of four tribes reside in Qelekuro. 
The farm lands of three tribes, however, are located far 
away from the village. Despite the natural beauty of the 
surroundings, the destruction of the last cyclone is still 
visible, almost three years after it has changed the lives 
of the villagers. In 2016, the village was severely affected 
by Tropical Cyclone Winston. Water swept over the small 
seawalls and several houses were destroyed by water 
intrusion and strong winds. A mother of nine lost her 
live243 and some people suffered from typhoid fever in 
the aftermath of the storm.244 
The combined effects of different climate change 
impacts have led to a discussion about inland relocation 
of at least parts of the village. Because of their exposure 
to sea level rise-induced coastal erosion and cyclone 
damages, the houses near the coastline are planned 
to be relocated. In a Talanoa dialogue members of the 
community share their experience about the situation 
in Qelekuro, among them representatives of a women’s 
group, youth representatives, and the village headman. 
Talanao is an inclusive and participatory dialogue format 
used to solve differences in the Pacific.245 The idea is to 
share views and exchange experiences through storytel-
ling in order to deepen understanding and, in the end, 
decide collectively for the greater good.246 In 2018, the 
concept has been used by UNFCCC to bring together 
stakeholders in informal dialogues in order to assess 
countries’ climate action after the Paris Agreement, 
243  Mere Naleba, “Salacieli, 10, Tells of Her Fiji Night of Terror as Her Mum  
Dies,” Asia Pacific Report, February 22, 2016, https://asiapacificreport.nz/ 
2016/02/22/salacieli-10-tells-of-her-fiji-night-of-terror-as-her-mum-dies.
244  Health & Nutrition Cluster, “Fiji. Tropical Cyclone Winston. Reporting 
Period (09.03.2016 – 18.03.2016),” no. Bulletin # 2 (March 18, 2016), 
http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/HNC-Bulletin_
Issue2_20160318.pdf.
245  Talanoa Dialogue Platform, “What Is Talanoa?,” Talanoa Dialogue Platform, 
accessed November 26, 2019, https://talanoadialogue.com/background.
246 Talanoa Dialogue Platform.
step up national and global efforts, and discuss the way 
forward.247 
After the formal opening procedures of the Talanoa, vil-
lagers of Qelekuro share how coastal erosion increasingly 
impacts their livelihoods: “Coconut trees and coastal plants 
used to stand in front of the village and big trees were cover-
ing the coastal areas but they are all lying in the sand now,” 
one member of the community explains. Around the coast-
line the village is almost entirely deforested. Another person 
talks about the destructive effects of flooding: “Today, 
when its high tide or king tide, the waves are higher than the 
sea wall and smash the sides of the houses near the coast. 
Houses will be flooded. When the river that runs through the 
village is flooded at the same time, villagers residing in low 
lands away from the coast are also affected. They are afraid 
during bad weather.” When asked whether anyone has left 
the village because of the additional pressures, the village 
headman responds that so far no one has gone elsewhere in 
response to these problems.
247  COP24 Presidency Bureau, “Fiji and Poland Issued the Talanoa Call for Action,” 
COP 24 Katowice 2018, accessed November 26, 2019, http://cop24.gov.pl/
news/news-details/news/fiji-and-poland-issued-the-talanoa-call-for-action.
© Kira Vinke
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The village headman recalls how a key representative from 
the National Disaster Management Office visited  Qelekuro 
village after Cyclone Winston and, considering the visible 
impacts, told him that the village has to be relocated. 
Since this conversation, the village headman has been 
torn whether to ask for government assistance to build a 
stronger seawall, or whether to encourage people to move 
to higher grounds, he explains to the group. Villagers had 
already discussed the impacts of coastal erosion on the 
houses and decided that at minimum new houses should be 
constructed on higher grounds. 
However, relocating the old brick houses is difficult for 
them without any financial assistance. Moreover, the land to 
the coast is culturally significant to the villagers and espe-
cially the elder population does not want to abandon their 
land. Currently, there are no NGOs working in the village 
who could assist in this transition, the community represen-
tatives say. 
“The changes in the weather patterns have strongly affec-
ted our agriculture here” adds one villager. Agriculture is 
the main source of food and income in Qelekuro village 
and farmers usually sell their produce in the Suva market 
on Saturdays. However, the effects of the changes in the 
environment make it harder for longstanding agricultural 
practices to continue, as some of the farmers elaborate. A 
traditional farming calendar which the elders used for deci-
ding what to plant when, seems to be no longer applicable 
due to the changes in seasons. In some areas even fruits no 
longer grow. 
Qelekuro is surrounded by freehold lands. The villagers 
share the land that is left. They used to work together on 
the small piece of land around the village until the youth 
moved further inland to plant valuable “yaqona” (kava) and 
other root crops. But, “planting kava has led to deforesta-
tion near the river and this has created problems for the 
newly established farming areas”, the village headman exp-
lains. Switching to more profitable cash crops is therefore 
not without risks. 
The women’s group voices worries about the changes they 
witnessed. They discuss the many ways people in the village 
suffer from illness because of the changes in weather pat-
terns. Moreover, of special importance to them are the dif-
5 – THE PACIFIC 
ferent pressures on the ocean and on coastal areas. They 
describe how mangroves act as a sea wall and minimise 
the impact of waves on the coasts. In the past, women of 
Qelekuro used to catch large fish. However, fishing does 
no longer provide a solid alternative source of income as 
the nearby stocks are already overfished. Furthermore, 
the women’s group raised concerns about the Chine-
se-owned cement factory on the freehold land near their 
village. The company has been extracting gravel from the 
rivers which has increased risks to reefs in their fishing 
ground. The women mention that the waste from the 
cement factory is flushed into the sea and the resulting 
changes in sedimentation have negatively affected the 
marine ecosystem. 
Despite the limited resources and the various environ-
mental pressures, the villagers of Qelekuro try to adapt 
to climate change. They discuss initiatives to improve 
livelihoods and the measures already taken to live and 
work under changing conditions. For example, the official 
village boundary was extended after two clans had wil-
lingly given pieces of their land. Most of the new houses 
in the village were built within the newly demarcated 
boundary. However, the discussion shows that relocation 
is not an easy task. The youth representatives suggest 
seeking assistance from the government to construct 
new roads which will make the farms that are located 
far away from the village more accessible. This would 
also allow to build houses inland, if needed. They see 
relocation as the best adaptation option because of the 
increasing impact of changes. Already, plans are in place 
for all youth to build their houses on the new parts of 
the village. The women emphasise that relocation should 
take place within the village and relocation should enable 
members of different tribes to stay together. In the end 
the village committee will decide about the placement 
of new houses. Faced with multiple challenges, finding 
common ground between protecting ancient lands and 
adapting to future changes, has to be carefully discussed. 
The Talanoa offered a way to find a joint understanding 
and a collective way forward. 
After the closing ceremony, the village headman walks 
around Qelekuro and explains the unprecedented 
destruction that occurred. Looking over the still visible 
damage in his village, he says: “We have to prepare.”
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Kiribati
The Republic of Kiribati is situated in the Central Pacific 
Ocean and consists of 33 coral atolls with a total land 
area of about 800 km² . Kiribati is highly vulnerable to the 
adverse impacts of climate change, particularly sea level 
rise. Apart from the highest point of 81 m on the raised 
coral atoll Banaba, the atolls mostly rise only 3 to 4 m above 
sea level. Kiribati is home to more than 110,000 people, 
the majority of whom are concentrated on Tarawa.248 
Movements to the capital are more common than interna-
tional migration.
Kiribati’s islands are spread over a large area. This has 
several implications for HMCCC. One concern, for instance, 
is communication to remote islands before a disaster hits: 
“When it comes to informing people on impeding natural 
disasters it’s pretty hard to reach the islands in a timely 
manner” (Pac14). Reaching remote islands after disas-
ters and providing relief may also prove to be difficult as 
discussed by one expert:
 –“One of the weaknesses is the response time in providing 
aid for communities affected in the outer islands. Due 
to the limited shipping services in the island, priority 
communities in South Tarawa are usually assisted 
first before they cover the outer islands. In most cases, 
response usually takes more than 2 weeks to reach 
affected communities” (Pac12).
248  National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance, “2015 Population and Housing 
Census. Volume 1: Management Report and Basic Tables” (Bairiki, Tarawa, 
Kiribati: Republic of Kiribati, 2016), http://www.mfed.gov.ki/statistics/
documents/2015_Population_Census_Report_Volume_1final_211016.pdf.
There is currently no mechanism in place to request relo-
cation or assistance for affected communities in Kiribati 
(Pac11, Pac12, Pac13). One respondent noted that “in some 
cases we do assist them when they seek assistance from the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Sustainable Energy and they 
come up with a report” (Pac12). One interviewee working in 
the government explained why an institutional structure 
to request for relocation may not be needed from his point 
of view:
 –“There are no mechanisms in place yet because most 
communities move to their family lands and usually do 
not request government for assistance. The family system 
is quite strong in Kiribati where families can usually 
accommodate the affected ones” (Pac11).
Asked about the main factors motivating people to migrate 
in Kiribati, one expert said that “I guess they are looking 
for the bright lights here in South Tarawa but mainly for 
education and health facilities” (Pac12). Rural-to-urban 
migration to Kiribati’s already densely populated capital 
South Tarawa would put further pressure on the capital. 
A government employee “[has] not come across any case 
that they say they have migrated because of climate change 
events”, linking migration to better livelihood opportuni-
ties or education (Pac14). It is something people do out of 
“their own personal choice” (Pac14).
Some experts made references to regions or communi-
ties that may be particularly vulnerable to climate change 
and therefore for which HMCCC may be a pressing issue. 
This includes the northern and most southern islands. One 
interviewee identified coastal communities, especially in 
the southern islands of Tamana, Arorae and Nikunau, as 
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prone to disasters (Pac12). The focus on southern islands 
is also supported by another interviewee who is referring 
to more frequently occurring king tides and greater sea 
level rise in the south (Pac13). Droughts on the southern 
islands and extensive rainfalls on the northern islands are 
additional pressing influences (Pac13, Pac14). One expert 
referred to research gaps and said that there was a need to 
understand internal relocation trends (Pac11).
Several interviewees made references to social tensions 
in the aftermath of disasters in Kiribati. These may be due 
to the distribution of aid between different communi-
ties or as a result of shrinking freshwater resources (Pac08, 
Pac11, Pac12). One expert gave the example of water tanks 
which had been installed near churches and which were 
only used by communities belonging to their respective 
church (Pac11). Another expert talked about land issues. 
When people are forced to leave their land due to erosion 
and move further inland or just to another part of their 
land, “they are causing a lot of land issues”, according to the 
expert (Pac14). This may also create tensions within fami-
lies, because the system of landownership in Kiribati is: “all 
land is owned by families” (Pac14).
KIRIBATI – ACTOR LANDSCAPE
The government of Kiribati has been at the forefront of 
raising awareness on the severe effects of climate change 
on low-lying island states and the possible necessity 
for relocation. This became most evident in 2014, when 
Kiribati’s then President Anote Tong announced that his 
government had finalised the purchase of 20 km² of land 
on the Fijian island of Vanua Levu.249 While President 
Tong spoke of efforts to address climate-related impacts 
on the economy and on food security,250 local and inter-
national responses associated the acquisition with the 
possibility of seeking refuge outside of Kiribati in times of 
rising sea levels.251 In any case, the pronouncement marked 
increasing international awareness about the exposure of 
small island states to climate change.
249  Office of the President, “Kiribati Buys a Piece of Fiji,” Press Release by the 
Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati, April 30, 2014, http://www.climate.
gov.ki/2014/05/30/kiribati-buys-a-piece-of-fiji.
250 Office of the President.
251  Laurence Caramel, “Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati 
Buys Land in Fiji,” The Guardian, July 1, 2014, sec. Environment, https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-
vanua-levu; Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf, “Climate Change and the 
Imagining of Migration: Emerging Discourses on Kiribati’s Land Purchase in 
Fiji,” The Contemporary Pacific 29, no. 2 (2017): 231–63.
As noted above, climate-related migration is a politically 
divisive issue, as many people do not want to leave their 
ancestral home. The current government does not focus on 
HMCCC. When asked about capacities needed to address 
the issue, a government official from Kiribati stated: “Since 
migration in the context of climate change is not a priority 
of the current government, there is no urgent need by the 
government to build capacity on it” (Pac11). A key expert 
from Fiji talked about this change in addressing HMCCC 
in Kiribati: “They are exploring other options and some 
colleagues from Kiribati have highlighted that this new 
President’s focus has changed so [that] Kiribati is able to help 
itself, and that’s where they will go on from there” (Pac01). 
One interviewee from Kiribati summarised: “There is no 
institutional structure to look into climate migration […] 
more efforts are channelled on mitigation and adaptation” 
(Pac11).
Key respondents from Kiribati noted that the Ministry 
of Health and Medical Services, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Sustainable 
Energy, the Ministry of Environment, Lands and 
Agricultural Development, and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade are important government actors in 
issues related to migration, displacement, and planned 
relocation (Pac11, Pac12). According to interviewees, the 
right to enact laws for HMCCC is shared as follows: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for external 
migration, and the Island Council takes care of internal 
migration (Pac11, Pac12, Pac13).252 
In the case of a disaster, the National Disaster Management 
Office takes care of people (Pac11) while the National 
Statistics Office (Pac12, Pac13) and the Kiribati 
Meteorological Office (Pac14) have auxiliary roles. The 
National Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP) iden-
tifies roles and responsibilities of national agencies.253 
International actors like the Red Cross or Australia’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provide “huge 
support” in responding to disasters and assessing impacts, 
according to a government employee working in a central 
national agency (Pac11).
252  One respondent said that the Office of the President would be responsible for 
planned relocation laws (Pac11).
253  Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, Government of Kiribati, 
“Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management,” 2016, http://www.mfed.gov.
ki/publications/climate-change-and-disaster-risk-management.
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Concerning climate change administration in general, 
one expert mentioned that the human resource base is 
too weak at the national level and more technical capacity 
is needed (Pac11). Coordination at local levels is better, 
according to the expert (Pac11). One respondent working 
in an Urban Council, made a longer comment on weak-
nesses in the institutional structure:
 –“One weakness that I’ve noticed is the conflict between 
the agencies, like the climate change unit within the 
Office of the President and the Ministry of Environment. 
When it comes to climate change, there is confusion to 
which agency that takes the lead role. There is an imple-
menting body and there is a focal point, but we target all 
our proposals to the office of the president” (Pac12).
Generally, the National Expert Group on Climate Change 
and Disaster Risk Management (KNEG) functions as the 
advisory body for climate change and disaster risk manage-
ment in Kiribati and should also coordinate measures.254 
According to a government employee, the group compro-
mises senior government representatives from several 
ministries as well as representatives from NGOs and key 
partners such as faith-based organisations and “meets on 
an ad-hoc basis” (Pac11). The KNEG is involved in agenda 
setting, policy design and the implementation of interven-
tions and provides technical advice (Pac11). One expert 
describes the KNEG as a “vital group” (Pac13).
Several experts made references to weaknesses in coopera-
tion, coordination and communication of stakeholders 
working on issues related to HMCCC in Kiribati. One inter-
viewee, for instance, said that capacities are available in the 
administration to address HMCCC, but “there needs to be 
coordination to better utilise the existing capacity” (Pac13). 
One interviewee discussed the good coordination prac-
tices of the NDMO (Pac14). Similarly, another respondent 
mentioned good coordination practices amongst the 
clusters involved when people are displaced by disasters 
(Pac11). One respondent also addressed the implementa-
tion of projects or interventions related to HMCCC by the 
government of Kiribati or NGOs and summarised that  
“[i]t requires coordination to ensure that everyone is doing 
the right thing for the right reasons and also aligning to 
254  Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), “Whole of Island Approach – Abaiang 
Atoll, Kiribati. Integrated Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment – Synthesis 
Report.” (SPREP, SPC and GIZ, 2014).
the national priorities and efficiently using the resources” 
(Pac11). 
KIRIBATI – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN 
CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 
Currently, Kiribati does not have a specific policy or 
programme on HMCCC. Nevertheless, several policy docu-
ments from Kiribati make references to issues relevant 
for HMCCC. However, these must be interpreted in light 
of the policy priority shifts in addressing climate-induced 
mobility in Kiribati in 2016 when the current govern-
ment came into power. A government official explained 
this shift, referring to the national consultation on climate 
change held in Tarawa during which “[m]ost of participants 
expressed their views on remaining on the islands of Kiribati 
and building their resilience” (Pac11). This, according to the 
official, provided the new government with a clear policy 
mandate to put resilience on top of the agenda in order to 
“ensure that [communities’] land and livelihoods will be able 
to withstand the stressors of climate change” (Pac11). Forced 
movements should be avoided (Pac11, Pac12, Pac14). 
In 2015, Kiribati issued the National Labour Migration 
Policy. The policy does not only recognise international 
migration as a mechanism to address limited opportuni-
ties in Kiribati and to promote socio-economic develop-
ment, but also as a response to climate change.255 In the 
Preface, then President of the Republic of Kiribati Anote 
Tong emphasised: “[international labour migration] is 
also a critical component in the concept of Migration 
with Dignity, which articulates the importance of training 
I-Kiribati to take upskilled labour migration opportuni-
ties in response to climate change threats to livelihoods at 
home”.256 Or in the words of an interviewee: “Kiribati has 
a migration policy in place that focuses on equipping their 
citizens with livelihood skills that can be put to use in their 
destination countries should they choose to migrate” (Pac15). 
In the National Labour Migration Policy the government 
states that “[it] is committed to proactively expand labour 
mobility opportunities to disadvantaged population groups 
including women, youth, and outer island residents”257 and 
discusses how the human rights of migrant workers can be 
protected in general.258 
255  Government of Kiribati, “Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy” 
(Government of Kiribati, 2015), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--
-asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-suva/documents/publication/wcms_431833.pdf.
256 Government of Kiribati.
257 Government of Kiribati.
258 Government of Kiribati.
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Given current climate change projections, HMCCC may 
resurface in the future as a topic requiring urgent action 
by the government of Kiribati. Land scarcity is increas-
ingly becoming a problem, and the still ambitious upper 
temperature limit of the Paris Agreement of 2°C would 
require relocations. One interviewee noted that internal 
relocation programmes are problematic because there is 
not enough suitable land (Pac15). Besides, further rural-to-
urban migration to South Tarawa would put the capital’s 
infrastructure under further pressures. Roughly 50 % of the 
total population reside in South Tarawa.259 The government 
is actively trying to provide housing as well as reloca-
tion options within Kiribati for the growing population. A 
government official working in a central national agency 
talked about a major housing project near the airport 
in Temaiku, which is in the planning stage and should 
be conducted with the help of New Zealand (Pac11). He 
also talked about a proposal to relocate communities to 
Christmas Island (Pac11). Another government employee 
stated that “Temaiku has been identified as a sight for devel-
opment to cater for those communities relocated from South 
Tarawa” (Pac12).
259  National Statistics Office, Ministry of Finance, “2015 Population and Housing 
Census. Volume 1: Management Report and Basic Tables.”
The National Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP), 
launched in 2012, regulates operational arrangements in 
case of a disaster.260 In the interviews a key government 
official discussed strengths and weaknesses of current 
disaster response mechanism. The interviewee emphasised 
“ongoing coordination” within the administration and how 
humanitarian organisations start to help within a short 
timeframe, also with funding. The respondent also high-
lighted that government funds were available for affected 
people and that “[t]he government has increased funding 
assistance to these displaced farmers and people through the 
years”. As weaknesses in the government’s current disaster 
response mechanism one expert mentioned response 
time to reach remote islands, which he attributed to “poor 
shipping and infrastructure”, as well as limited resources to 
assist affected communities and provide them with “water 
and other basic humanitarian needs” (all Pac11). Assistance 
in the aftermath of a disaster is on “request basis” whereas 
“[t]he initial assessments are conducted by the Disaster Office 
engineers to determine the scope of damage before any 
intervention is done” (Pac11). A large share of government’s 
funds for relief or resilience is allocated to the construction 
of seawalls (Pac11, Pac12, Pac14).
260  Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, Government of Kiribati, 
“Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management.”
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Tuvalu 
The Tuvalu archipelago covers a land area of 26 km² and 
consists of nine small islands, six of them atolls and three 
of them limestone reef islands. It is situated approximately 
1,100 km north of Fiji in the Pacific Ocean. As a small 
and low-lying island nation, Tuvalu’s maximum eleva-
tion is approximately 4 m which implies a special expo-
sure to some adverse effects of climate change. Census 
figures from 2011 show a population of approximately 
11,000 people in Tuvalu.261 
Tuvalu’s territory is spread over a large area. This fact 
makes all islands, especially coastal areas, prone to sea level 
rise, as noted by all informants from Tuvalu (Pac20 – Pac24). 
However, one interviewee emphasised that it was impor-
tant to differentiate between the different islands: “For 
drought, we have our Northern islands. We know through 
our climate data that they are more vulnerable than the 
Southern islands. So there are some islands that we know 
have certain vulnerabilities as compared to other islands” 
(Pac21). 
261  Tuvalu Central Statistics Division, “Tuvalu Statistics at a Glance,” 2011,  
https://tuvalu.prism.spc.int.
TUVALU – ACTOR LANDSCAPE
Several state actors were identified in the interviews which 
are relevant for responding to the challenges of HMCCC 
in Tuvalu. These include the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Home Affairs and Rural Development. 
In the institutional arrangement on climate change in 
Tuvalu the National Advisory Council on Climate Change 
(NACCC) is of particular relevance. One expert described 
the operational procedures of the NACCC within the 
government, how stakeholders feed into legal processes 
and how policies are enacted:
 –“The NACCC reports directly and provides technical 
guidance/advice to the cabinet on matters related to 
climate change, including migration or human mobility. 
Any issues that will come up, we’ll bring up to the 
NACCC and they will deliberate on that before they make 
a recommendation or guidance to Cabinet. Cabinet 
will have the final say. If it is a legislation, it will go to 
Parliament” (Pac21). 
The NACCC includes members from government depart-
ments as well as NGOs and CSOs. The same interviewee 
thinks that the NACCC “is well established” (Pac21). Other 
than government institutions, the Red Cross, which is also 
a NACCC member, has been named an important stake-
holder. At the regional level, the council works closely 
with UNOCHA as well as other agencies from the United 
Nations (Pac20). One expert named IOM and the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP) as partners the office has worked with on 
issues related to climate-induced migration while saying 
that “there is very minimal work that has been done in this 
area. I can sense from discussions with Vanuatu that it is a 
very complex issue to relocate people” (Pac21).
Concerning communication and coordination between 
actors, one expert noted that the “NACCC was a way 
forward in harmonising and working in collaboration with 
relevant stakeholders, building partnerships” (Pac23). At 
the same time, staff turnovers and a shortage of human 
resources hinder communication (Pac23). A NGO repre-
sentative wished for more acceptance and respect of 
the youth in contributing or assisting in climate change 
matters (Pac20).
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TUVALU – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN 
CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT 
While climate change as a driver of human mobility is 
a sensitive, but recognised topic among policy actors 
in Tuvalu, the state does not have a policy on climate-
induced human mobility yet. Several stakeholders noted 
that no mechanism exists to request planned relocations 
(Pac21, Pac23, Pac24). An employee from a key government 
body shared insights from interviews which indicate that 
climate-related impacts have driven international labour 
migration because “[people] say they cannot do agricul-
ture or fishing because of the increasing impacts of climate 
change, so they rather do fruit picking and do other seasonal 
work outside Tuvalu that will allow them to earn an income” 
(Pac21). The same expert explains why polices on HMCCC 
are not on the top of the government’s agenda:
 –“Basically because migration is not something the 
Government is paying attention to. We develop a strong 
belief that people don’t want to move. They want to stay 
here. However, we have made efforts to recognise the 
right of people who are being displaced, they are being 
forced to move. And one of the initiatives that Tuvalu 
took forward to the UN General Assembly is a draft UN 
resolution on people displaced by climate change and 
that discussion is being led by our mission in New York” 
(Pac21).
Several policy documents mention HMCCC. Tuvalu’s 
National Strategy for Sustainable Development for the 
years 2016 to 2020 names international migration a limited 
strategy for households in Tuvalu to diversify risks of 
climate stressors.262 The strategy also makes references to 
questions of identity and discusses the deep connection 
of the people of Tuvalu to the sea and ancestral land.263 
According to the strategy, Tuvalu intends to strengthen 
legislation efforts on climate change and migration.264 
In the National Climate Change Policy of 2012 migra-
tion/resettlement plans for each islands are listed as one 
strategy to be prepared.265 Furthermore, a “[s]pecial Pacific 
262  Government of Tuvalu, “TE KAKEEGA III: National Strategy for Sustainable 
Development2016 to 2020” (Funafuti, Tuvalu: Government of Tuvalu, 2016), 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-tuv-2017-
2019-ld-02.pdf.
263 Government of Tuvalu.
264 Government of Tuvalu.
265  Government of Tuvalu coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, 
Tourism, Environment and Labor, “TE KANIVA: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 
2012,” 2012, 26, https://www.pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/
documents/TCCP%20Te%20Kaniva%20English%20final%20web%20new.pdf.
Access Category (PAC) for Tuvaluans” is mentioned.266 The 
policy stresses that preparedness is not only crucial in 
order to guarantee the security of Tuvaluans, but also to 
protect their cultural identity and maintain their national 
sovereignty against the impacts of climate change.267 
Aspects of national sovereignty are also highlighted in 
Tuvalu’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC): “While longer term impacts such as sea level rise 
could result in the unavoidable out-migration of some of 
her people, they have a right to pursue any and all means 
to ensure their nation survives and the legacy remains, 
with future generations living productive lives on these 
islands”.268 
Respondents pointed out that there are mechanisms in 
place to help people in the aftermath of a disaster. The 
government provides shelter, food, and funds if houses 
have been destroyed (Pac21, Pac22, Pac24). People can 
submit a request to the Tuvalu Survivor Fund and seek 
for assistance if their house has been destroyed (Pac21, 
Pac24). But government provision of food and water after 
a disaster may only last for a short period of time (Pac24). 
The disaster risk management team has a rapid assess-
ment team and since recently the CCD as support (Pac21). 
According to a government employee, Tuvalu’s central 
disaster management act, the National Disaster Risk 
Management Act of 2008,269 is currently being reviewed: 
 –“We have a legislation, the National Disaster Risk 
Management Act that is currently under review as we 
learned a lot from TC’s Pam and Ula because they came 
very close. Within one year. Pam was in March 2015 
and Ula was in 30 December 2015, so while we were 
still recovering, we were hit again. We have learned a 
lot from the two cyclones. In 2012 we declared a state 
of emergency for drought. So we have some experi-
ence that have helped us to strengthen and better reflect 
climate scenarios and early warning systems. We are now 
reviewing the Act to reflect the reality of the work that is 
being carried out” (Pac21).
266  Government of Tuvalu coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, 
Tourism, Environment and Labor, “TE KANIVA: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 
2012.”
267  Government of Tuvalu coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, 
Tourism, Environment and Labor.
268  Government of Tuvalu, “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: 
Communicated to the UNFCCC on 27 November 2015,” 2015, https://
www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tuvalu%20First/
TUVALU%20INDC.pdf.
269  Government of Tuvalu, “National Disaster Management Act. 2008 Revised. 
CAP. 20.38,” 2008.
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Vanuatu
Vanuatu, a 12,190 km² archipelago in Melanesia, is 
comprised of 83 volcanic islands and divided into six 
provinces – Malampa, Penama, Sanma, Shefa, Tafea, Torba. 
Its highest point is the 1879 m high Mount Tabwemasana. 
Over 272,000 people are living on Vanuatu’s islands.270 
Vanuatu ranks first on the WorldRiskIndex 2018 as the 
country with the highest disaster risk worldwide.271 It is not 
only vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change 
but also prone to geological hazards like earthquakes or 
volcanic eruptions. Climate-related and geological hazards 
that undermine the livelihoods of the Ni-Vanuatu exacer-
bate pre-existing issues.
Given Vanuatu’s high exposure to climate risks, inter-
viewees discussed several climate change impacts on the 
state. They mentioned sea level rise, salinisation, coastal 
erosion, tropical cyclones and their increased frequency 
and intensity, extreme weather events, or changes in 
seasonal patterns such as prolonged periods of droughts. 
270  Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO), “2016 Post-TC Pam Mini-Census  
Report. Vol.1. Republic of Vanuatu” (Port Vila, Vanuatu: Republic of Vanuatu, 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Management, Vanuatu National Statistics 
Office), 1, accessed August 14, 2019, https://vnso.gov.vu/index.php/
component/advlisting/?view=download&fileId=4542.
271  Hans-Joachim Heintze et al., “WorldRiskReport 2018. Focus: Child Protection 
and Children’s Rights” (Berlin and Bochum: Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft and 
Ruhr University Bochum – Institute for International Law of Peace and 
Armed Conflict (IFHV), 2018), 31, https://weltrisikobericht.de/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/190318_WRR_2018_EN_RZonline_1.pdf.
One expert expressed regret about how “coastal erosion […] 
destroys items of cultural significance” in Vanuatu (Pac33). 
The effects of climate change on food security were 
frequently discussed in the interviews. A technical advisor 
for development, for instance, gave an account of how the 
salinisation of agricultural land, changes in the occurrence 
of El Niño and La Niña, or, more generally, changes in 
seasonal patterns impact food production (Pac28). Another 
respondent summarised that “changes in seasonal patterns 
is affecting how and when people harvest and the amount 
being harvested and this also affects what’s available for 
sale in the local markets” (Pac33). A representative from a 
women’s organisation talked about a project with FAO on 
food security (Pac29). One expert from a state authority 
explained that many people had to rely on food provisions 
for a long period of time and farmers needed seeds and 
planting materials (Pac31).
Many interviewees talked about Tropical Cyclone Pam 
which hit Vanuatu in March 2015 and caused widespread 
damage. The severe category five cyclone killed dozens and 
damaged or destroyed 90 % of the buildings in the capital.272 
Then President Baldwin Lonsdale blamed climate change 
for this devastation.273 Vanuatu is still recovering from Pam, 
one of the worst disasters in Vanuatu’s history. One expert 
talked about social tensions that may arise in the aftermath 
of a disaster, giving the example of lootings (Pac31).
Some experts spoke about regions of Vanuatu that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change. Populations that live in coastal areas, at river banks 
or near volcanoes are especially prone to certain environ-
mental impacts (Pac31, Pac33). An informant noted that 
“the Malampa province has the least amount of support, and 
assistance should be strengthened for this province” (Pac25). 
One interviewee pointed out that being aware of the hard 
crop growing conditions of smaller islands is important 
to recognise the existing pressing influence (Pac32). One 
expert characterised “communities living on small, low-
lying islands” as particularly vulnerable to sea level rise 
and gave the example of “Emao [where people] have been 
displaced due to sea-level rise” (Pac33). 
272  Claudine Wery, “Vanuatu President Begs World to Help Rebuild, Blames 
Climate Change, after Cyclone Pam,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 17, 
2015, https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/vanuatu-
president-begs-world-to-help-rebuild-blames-climate-change-after-cyclone-
pam-20150317-1m0oeo.html.
273  The Government of Vanuatu published the “Cyclone Pam Post Disaster Needs 
Assessment” and the “TC Pam Lessons Learned Report.”
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Displacement of whole communities and state-led reloca-
tion have already taken place in Vanuatu. The case of the 
state-led relocation of Lataw, located on Tegua Island of 
the Torres Islands, got international attention because 
of a press release by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) which named the villagers the first 
climate change refugees.274 According to one interviewee, 
that was the only official relocation in Vanuatu (Pac26).
VANUATU – ACTOR LANDSCAPE
In 2018, Vanuatu launched its “National Policy on Climate 
Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement”. A result 
of this policy is high awareness among policymakers on 
HMCCC. When asked whether climate change is a driver 
of migration, one respondent, for instance, just answered: 
“Definitely” (Pac25).
A law expert described the process to enact policies 
related to migration, displacement, and planned reloca-
tion: “Within the Ministry of Climate Change, the Minister 
and Director General are working closely with the Prime 
Minister’s office and there is a department within the Prime 
Minister’s office for policy” (Pac27). The Council of Minister, 
the countries’ supreme decision-making authority, has to 
give its final approval (Pac27, 32). The Ministry of Climate 
Change Adaptation, Meteorology, Geo-Hazards, Energy, 
Environment and Disaster Management was generally 
perceived to be an important stakeholder in HMCCC, not 
only for the policy process (Pac26, Pac27, Pac33, Pac34). 
Several other government organisations were identified 
as important stakeholders to provide input in the policy 
process, among them the National Disaster Committee 
(Pac32) and Vanuatu’s NDMO (Pac32). 
One expert also mentioned the importance of civil society 
organisation (CSOs) “and those partners that work at the 
community level such as VCAN” as important for designing 
policies on HMCCC (Pac33). According to an expert from an 
NGO, The Vanuatu Climate Action Network (VCAN) “also 
contributed to the climate change policy and maintains a 
good working relationship with the National Advisory Board 
and, hence, the government recognises VCAN as a reliable 
source of information” (Pac25). VCAN has been established 
under the Vanuatu NGO Climate Change Adaptation 
Program275 and “facilitates the sharing of lessons and good 
274  Ballu et al., “Comparing the Role of Absolute Sea-Level Rise and Vertical 
Tectonic Motions in Coastal Flooding, Torres Islands (Vanuatu).”
275  More information can be found here: http://www.sids2014.org/index.php? 
page=view&type=1006&nr=2750&menu=1507.
practice approaches among over 20 civil society organi-
sations and with the Government of Vanuatu”.276 VCAN 
“provides a space for training and dialogues on many issues 
related to climate change”, among them displacement 
(Pac33). The secretariat aims to keep members updated on 
climate change discourses on the regional level (Pac33).
When asked about relevant stakeholders to respond to 
challenges of HMCCC in Vanuatu in general, one expert 
summarised: “Ministry of Climate Change, Ministry of 
Lands, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and the 
established cluster groups which include NGOs as well 
(education, WASH, health, food and agriculture, shelter)” 
(Pac32). Apart from governmental entities, respondents 
also identified non- or inter-governmental organisations 
like IOM and OXFAM as significant (Pac27). 
In the case of a disaster, the NDMO is the responsible 
government agency to coordinate and manage the govern-
ment’s response to displacement: “Everyone has to come 
under the umbrella of NDMO” (Pac26). When a disaster 
strikes, assessment teams go out, report to the NDMO and 
implement and carry out disaster responses (Pac34). One 
interviewee said that the NDMO creates a lot of aware-
ness on HMCCC (Pac29). After Tropical Cyclone Pam, the 
government of Vanuatu made the decision to establish a 
standing cluster system to improve disaster coordination 
and preparedness.277 The cluster is organised in eight tech-
nical clusters headed by ministries or the NDMO and often 
co-lead by NGOs. The Logistics Cluster, for instance, is led 
by the NDMO and co-led by OXFAM.278 
Financial resources are scarce and hinder stakeholders’ 
work on HMCCC in Vanuatu. An expert from a key govern-
ment agency referred to missing human and financial 
capacities:
276  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for 
Sustainable Development, “Vanuatu NGO Climate Change Adaptation 
Program,” 2014, http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?page=view&type=1006&
nr=2750&menu=1507.
277  National Disaster Management Office, “Cluster System,” accessed August 8, 
2019, http://www.ndmo.gov.vu/resources/clusters.
278  Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office, “Logistics Cluster (VLC),” 
accessed November 7, 2019, http://www.ndmo.gov.vu/resources/
clusters/95-vlc.
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A NGO expert describes a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) through which OXFAM and other civil society 
organisations (CSOs) may be able to improve disaster 
planning and map in advance areas where people can be 
accommodated when disasters strike (Pac25). The same 
respondent also said that the NDMO is often perceived to 
be solely responsible for handling disaster displacement 
and disagrees on this matter: “there needs to be a more 
multi-sectoral approach to addressing this issue” (Pac25). 
The expert also refers to the importance of state authorities 
at the local level: “Provincial authorities should take the lead 
in disaster preparedness and awareness at the grassroots 
level” (Pac25). Coordination improvement measures are 
required for the intersection of government and aid organ-
isations which might enable a quicker disaster response 
(Pac24, Pac32, Pac33). The National Disaster Committee is 
also an important stakeholder (Pac32). 
One expert who has been part of the COP delegations in 
2017 and 2018 summarised that “Vanuatu is participating 
well and is helping the Alliance of Small Islands in all its 
submissions and on adaptation and mitigation” (Pac34). 
The same expert discussed limited funding for the partici-
pation in COPs by the government279 and how this makes 
it difficult for the delegation from Vanuatu to be actively 
279 According to the expert, the number is limited to four.
involved in all relevant thematic areas during negation 
processes:
 –“For a small Pacific island like us and other Pacific 
Islands it’s very important that we involve in any COP 
discussion, it’s always a nightmare to make sure that we 
have the number to go to COP, but Vanuatu has been 
sending quite a good number of delegations attending 
COP since prior to 2015” (Pac34).
Several experts discussed communication and coor-
dination between actors. One expert from a govern-
ment department said “the impacts of climate change 
are affecting us more than the efforts we are putting in. 
Coordination amongst stakeholders and financial resource 
need to be improved.” (Pac32). One respondent also made 
general comments about the government’s capacity to 
manage disaster displacement:
 –“Negotiations with customary landowners or the host 
communities tend to drag out and government is not 
fully equipped in terms of moving large masses and 
people are left to live in tents, accessing services such as 
health dispensaries are limited because the clinics are not 
fully stocked or have the resources to accommodate the 
increase in people within that community” (Pac25).
© Kira Vinke
 –“Since 2015 we really hit the ceiling in terms of human resources and everything 
because we experienced Cyclone Pam and a major relocation from one of the 
islands due to volcanic activities, and this year the volcanic eruption in Ambrym 
Island, and so right now we are kind of strained, but at the same time it also 
reflects the other department, and, like I mentioned, the what’s written in the 
policy is really good, but the issues lies with the implementation part of it” (Pac34).
94
One interviewee from a NGO addressed the difficulties 
people face when seeking assistance from the government: 
“They have to have their communication links strengthened, 
people are not aware of the structure and to whom you have 
to seek assistance right from community level, like commu-
nity reps, because there might be misleading information” 
(Pac26). The same interviewee also criticised the structure 
of direct reporting from the community to the Ministry 
of Climate Change and said a technical officer should be 
involved in order to “give a fair assessment on the issue in 
the communities” and prevent false information (Pac26). 
One expert named the establishment of the clusters a 
strength in the institutional structure to address HMCCC in 
Vanuatu (Pac32).
VANUATU – KEY POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS IN 
CLIMATE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT
Vanuatu launched its National Policy on Climate Change 
and Disaster-Induced Displacement in 2018.280 The intro-
ductory part of the policy, titled “Statement of key issues 
and context” defines what is meant by displacement in 
such a way that people not familiar with the issue can 
understand the concept.281 The policy also introduces 
to frameworks of disaster-induced displacement from 
national, regional, and global levels and draws on princi-
ples included in several of these frameworks.282 At the same 
time, Vanuatu recognises its pioneering role in developing 
a policy on climate-induced disaster displacement.283 For 
the national level, several policy documents are discussed 
as relevant for the new policy, including Vanuatu’s 
National Sustainable Development Plan 2030, which is 
known as “The People’s Plan 2030”, and Vanuatu’s Climate 
Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for 2016 to 
280  Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO, “Vanuatu National 
Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement” (Port Vila, 
Vanuatu: NDMO, Ministry of Climate Change Adaptation, Meteorology, 
Geo-Hazards, Energy, Environment and Disaster Management, Government 
of Tuvalu, 2018), https://ndmo.gov.vu/images/download/Vanuatu-National-
Policy-on-Climate-Change-and-Disaster-Induced-Displacement-2018-
published.pdf.
281 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.
282  Explicitly mentioned are the following global ones: the Sendai Framework, 
the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the Task Force on Displacement, the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, the Agenda for the Protection of Cross- Border Displaced 
Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, the Guiding 
Principles for Early Recovery and, the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions. 
On a regional level, the Framework for Pacific Regionalism, the SAMOA 
Pathway, and the FRDP are emphasized.
283  Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO, “Vanuatu National 
Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement.”
2030 (VCCDRRP).284 While the policy’s name suggests 
that it focuses primarily on displacement in the context 
of climate change, migration and planned relocation are 
integral aspects of Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate 
Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement. The policy, for 
instance, “acknowledges the risks of relocation if carried 
out without appropriate safeguards” and lays out principles 
for relocation processes.285 
The policy identifies twelve strategic priority areas, which 
are grounded on a comprehensive analysis of existing 
policy and institutional gaps.286 Weaknesses in planning, 
responsibilities, inter-ministerial communication and 
coordination in general are discussed. These may affect 
long-term recovery needs or “clear policy gaps in terms 
of addressing the needs of people who are living in and 
moving into informal settlements, as well as displace-
ment stemming from evictions, rezoning, development 
and infrastructure projects”.287 Women’s leadership, gender 
responsiveness, social inclusion as well as community 
participation are listed among the core cross-cutting 
priorities.288 The annex includes, among other things, a 
stakeholder map and relevant national policies.289 
Since the policy was launched only a few months before 
the interviews took place, key experts could not say much 
about the implementation of the policy. One expert shared 
his thoughts about the policy and combined this with 
the decentralisation act: “The policy helps communities to 
understand the different scenarios that may require reloca-
tion and the act empowers people at the community level” 
(Pac33). Some experts talked about how the policy came 
into being. One expert, for instance, said that Tropical 
Cyclone Pam and the volcanic eruption on the island of 
Ambrym demonstrated the need for the formulation of a 
displacement policy and accelerated the process (Pac31). 
Another referred to the policy’s “rights-based approach to 
displacement in the context of climate change and disasters” 
(Pac30). An expert from an internationally operating NGO 
shared thoughts on the policy’s strengths and weaknesses:
284  Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO. In the policy a 
comprehensive list of relevant national policy documents is provided in 
annex D (p. 53).
285 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.
286 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.
287 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.
288 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.
289 Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office NDMO.
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 –“The strength probably lies in the area where the 
newly enacted displacement policy offers some form 
of protection to communities that are being displaced 
or relocated. The weakness is the policy is not specific 
to the many different cultures of the various islands in 
Vanuatu” (Pac33).
The National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-
Induced Displacement is not the only document from the 
government which makes references to HMCCC while 
addressing human rights. The People’s Plan 2030 touches 
on the topic of human mobility from a societal aspect, 
addressing efforts to build resilience and adaptive capaci-
ties.290 Both documents explicitly include or promote 
human rights, including gender equality. 
As briefly discussed above in the case of the NDMO, 
inadequate human resources affect the management of 
HMCCC in Vanuatu. An academic described Vanuatu’s legal 
and policy framework to address HMCCC as “very strong” 
while emphasising at the same time that “there is limited 
capacity to implement laws and policies” in terms of finan-
cial, technical, and human resources (Pac30). Several inter-
viewees from government agencies and non-governmental 
organisations alike discussed how insufficient resources 
affect the implementation of the new policy. A govern-
ment employee, for instance, stated: “What is written on the 
policy is very good, but we lack the resources to implement 
it” (Pac34).
There are some mechanisms in place for people to obtain 
assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. These include 
planting materials or shelter kits (Pac32). One expert talked 
about food provision:
 –“The Food security cluster is led by the department of 
agriculture and they encourage people to replant and it 
is also providing the planting materials, tips on how to 
earn some money after disaster, they even go as far as 
providing chicks and also seedlings” (Pac34).
290  Government of the Republic of Vanuatu, “Vanuatu 2030 The People’s Plan: 
National Sustainable Development Plan 2016 to 2030” (Port Vila, Vanuatu: 
Department of Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination, Republic of  
Vanuatu), accessed August 8, 2019, https://www.gov.vu/attachments/
article/26/Vanuatu2030-EN-FINAL-sf.pdf.
5.5. 
Mapping Obstacles and Building 
Blocks for HMCCC People-Centred 
Planning 
The analysis of relevant national policy documents from 
Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu shows that promising 
policy developments to address climate-induced human 
mobility are underway. Awareness of the need to address 
HMCCC exists in all countries. Referring to several extreme 
events, an interviewee summarised that “people around the 
Pacific have stood up and taken notice that when faced with 
these issues, they need to act, the strength is the communica-
tion and the awareness made by some member countries is 
good” (Pac19). The same respondent also gave the example 
of how disaster response teams of the Pacific Community 
(SPC) provided assistance in Vanuatu in the aftermath of 
Tropical Cyclone Pam (Pac19).
At the same time, disasters may also create tensions in the 
region. A government employee from Fiji discussed how 
institutional capacity building to address and manage 
HMCCC within the country is rather challenging and Fiji’s 
capacities might be overstrained if having to handle cases 
from abroad:
 –“All capacities and even our laws need to be worked in. 
It’s almost like an overhaul in how you do things, you are 
really challenging the way the state handles migration 
like an ordinary situation. In extraordinary situations 
where climate change is involved, where people will be 
asking to enter your borders, to protect the interest of the 
state and looking after your welfare and responsibility to 
care for the others, it’s going to be a bit sensitive for Fiji to 
adhere to” (Pac08).
Policy Gaps
Despite the comparative advancement of policy develop-
ment on HMCCC in the region, several regional inform-
ants outlined weaknesses in responding to disasters. This 
may be due to lack of financial resources (Pac15), problems 
to disseminate information or warnings to remote places 
(Pac15), missing technical capacities or expertise (Pac19), 
inefficient coordination structures (Pac15), or poorly 
managed transportation when providing aid (Pac15). 
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One interviewee talked about his experience in disaster 
coordination with external partners, saying that some of 
them “want to run the show or they think they should be 
the lead agency”, and he emphasises that the NDMO of the 
respective country should lead (Pac19). According to an 
expert in climate change adaptation, 
 –“Fiji is making an effort to improve infrastructure and 
be better at disseminating information and warn-
ings but because of the geographical isolation of some 
islands there is still more work to be done to disseminate 
information to these remote places in a more timely and 
efficient manner, and to improve transport and efficiency 
in providing relief and aid” (Pac15).
One expert also addressed the “[l]ack of resources to build 
back better as opposed to a quick fix to get people back into 
shelter” as a weakness in current disaster response (Pac16). 
As discussed in the country-specific insights, insufficient 
resources are major barriers to policy implementation of 
climate change and disaster displacement policies in all 
focus countries. 
Gender-Sensitive Approaches
Girls and women are particularly vulnerable in times of 
crisis. Gendered vulnerabilities, thus, need to be addressed 
in policies as well as in practice on HMCCC. Why gender 
matters in climate change is summarised by Margaret 
Alstom:
 –“It matters because the experiences of women and men 
during and after times of climate crisis are different – a 
difference based on cultural norms and practices, on 
work roles and access to resources, on safety and security 
and on different levels of vulnerability resulting from a 
combination of these factors”.291 
Awareness about gender differences during and in the 
aftermaths of disasters seems to exist at NDMOs across the 
Pacific according to a security advisor: “every NDMO across 
the region, at the operation level they are very aware of the 
different needs between men, women and children in times 
of disaster” (Pac19). Generally, though, respondents were 
291  Margaret Alston, “Introducing Gender and Climate Change: Research, Policy 
and Action.” In,” in Research, Action and Policy: Addressing the Gendered 
Impacts of Climate Change, ed. Margaret Alston and Kerri Whittenbury 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2013), 3–14.
rather hesitant to discuss gender, even if asked explicitly 
about the situation of women and girls, or answered in 
more general terms (“there needs to be more dialogue about 
these rights”) (Pac03). Gender and human rights both are 
topics that are rather sensitive which may partly explain 
why informants were hesitant to respond or give detailed 
accounts. Some informants referred to global agreements 
such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which all focus 
are parties to,292 or Beijing+25 (Pac08). 
An issue of concern seems to be women’s sexual and repro-
ductive health in the aftermath of a disaster: “Due to the 
reduced household income they did not have enough money 
to buy items such as sanitary pads” (Pac18). An NGO expert 
also discussed a case in Maéwo, Vanuatu, where “the health 
facility was not equipped to cater for the pregnant women 
who had relocated there” (Pac25). The same expert also 
summarised that post-disaster assessments have shown 
that the needs of women and children differ and that their 
needs were not always addressed sufficiently (Pac25). An 
expert from Vanuatu discussed operational procedures in 
the aftermath of a disaster:
 –“Whenever there is a disaster, including displacement of 
people, the gender and protection cluster always brings 
up the right of women, women and everyone that is 
being displaced, their security, making sure that wherever 
they are there should be some means for protection for 
example; in rural communities just going to the bath-
room is risky for some women, hence there should be 
some lightings or whatever for the security of women. So 
therefore security of women is always brought up when-
ever there is disaster or displacement” (Pac34).293 
292  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Status of Ratification. 
Interactive Dashboard,” 2019, https://indicators.ohchr.org.
293  Asked why it is dangerous, the expert replied: “It could be going to the 
bathroom or just fetching water, it could be risky for women because, for 
instance, for displaced people it’s not your village so a human being living in 
a new environment you will obviously develop that fear so we want to protect 
them and the gender and protection cluster always make sure that there should 
be lightings and always make sure that whoever is going to fetch water can 
be accompanied by someone older just for protection. I’m saying fetching of 
water because, I don’t know much in other parts of the world, but here in the 
Pacific fetching of water is mostly done by girls/women so this is why we want 
somebody to accompany them to fetch water because anything can happen and 
the rape rate in Vanuatu is quite high as well so we try to protect them as much 
as we can” (Pac34).
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As discussed above, both Fiji’s Planned Relocation 
Guideline and Vanuatu’s National Policy on Climate 
Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement make explicit 
and detailed references to gender. In Kiribati, experts 
noted a limited awareness of human rights, including the 
rights of women. There is a gap on research which explic-
itly addresses gendered vulnerabilities in the context of 
climate-induced human mobility in the Pacific. 
Data Gaps
Deficiencies and challenges in data management have been 
mentioned throughout the interviews by experts from all 
focus countries. Even if available, informants said that data 
is dispersed or difficult to access (Pac19). 
In Fiji, there seems to be an agreement from those inter-
viewed that data relevant to displacement, planned relo-
cation, and migration is lacking. An academic said that 
data on HMCCC is “almost non-existent” (Pac03), while 
another academic emphasised the difficulty to get data 
from the government (Pac15). One interviewee said there 
is no database in place for locally displaced people in Fiji 
(Pac01). A government official shared that data collection 
on HMCCC is a real challenge given how understaffed they 
are.294 An officer from a ministry stated that “[t]here should 
be a database where all the data and research that has been 
conducted to be available. It also minimises the problem of 
replicating projects which has been done in the past” (Pac09). 
Another government employee indicated his support for a 
database while at the same time stressing data protection 
concerns: “Some data that is not for public viewing” (Pac05). 
The Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) seems to 
have been helpful in detecting and closing some data gaps, 
but data may not be openly available (Pac01).
In Kiribati, the National Statistics Office has data on human 
mobility (Pac11, Pac13). Informants from Kiribati were not 
aware of data linking human mobility and climate change 
(Pac11, Pac13, Pac14). One informant working in a key 
government agency stated that there is a need to under-
stand internal migration trends and that this information 
could also be useful for development plans (Pac11). Existing 
data is fragmented (Pac11, Pac13, Pac14), or data collectors 
294  This insight was shared in a GIZ project workshop on HMCCC in Much, 
Germany, on June 25, 2019, in which representatives from several PICs gave 
their opinion on preliminary results from the interviews conducted for this 
study.
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are not willing to share data (Pac11, Pac13). A meteorology 
expert pointed to the fact that the country only has five 
operational weather stations even though it covers a vast 
area in the Pacific Ocean (Pac14). 
Tuvalu tracks migration data of the Pacific Access 
Categories (Pac21) and conducts a census every 10 years 
(Pac24). According to one informant the “immigration 
[department] does not capture people who have moved for 
good” (Pac21). The same informant also emphasised that 
there is a need to clarify within the government what 
HMCCC really means and how to distinguish people falling 
in that category from others (Pac21).
In Vanuatu, informants said that migration data is both 
lacking and difficult to assess (Pac26, Pac27, Pac28, Pac32, 
Pac33), or may be outdated (Pac26). There seems to be no 
central database for inter-island mobility and internal 
return migration (Pac28). One informant shared that 
census data and data from other sources (statistics office, 
population count on the ground) do not match (Pac26). 
Census figures from 2009 are the most recent reliable 
statistics on migration in the country (Pac26, Pac32). This 
might have severe consequences when disasters strike as 
indicated by one informant: “In the aftermath of [Tropical 
Cyclone] Pam, which hit Vanuatu in 2015, the government 
had to rely on 2009 census data to estimate the number of 
people living in the islands that were severely affected by 
[Tropical Cyclone] Pam” (Pac27). After Tropical Cyclone 
Pam the Vanuatu National Statistics Office released a 
“Mini-Census Report”.295 In the foreword, minister Gaetan 
Pikloune explains that some changes in data collection 
were introduced which intend to “improve the informa-
tion available to assist with disaster preparedness and 
response”.296 
In sum, data collection, data availability and data manage-
ment are all issues that need to be addressed in Fiji, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. As opposed to many others, one 
regional expert was of the opinion that most of the data is 
available and that it is rather a problem of data manage-
ment and missing research (Pac17). The expert gave the 
example of a missing nexus between existing projec-
tions on sea level rise and census data, concluding that a 
linkage could provide important information on vulner-
able communities under different climate change scenarios 
(Pac17). International actors like GIZ or IOM seem to 
contribute to closing the knowledge gap, for instance 
through IOM’s displacement tracking metrics in the after-
math of disasters (Pac18).297 
295  Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO), “2016 Post-TC Pam Mini-Census 
Report. Vol.1. Republic of Vanuatu.”
296 Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO).
297  Data has been collected after Tropical Cyclones Pam, Winston, and Gita at the 
request of governments (Pac18).
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Research
HMCCC, as a new scientific and political field, gives space 
for plenty of research gaps. Some scientific insights exist, 
especially from a more general perspective, but specific 
and applicable knowledge is rather rare which hinders 
successful practices (Pac11, Pac14). Several interviewees 
from different regions in the Pacific identified the lack 
of data as a reason for this gap. The lack of data is often 
influenced by missing monitoring and evaluation practices. 
Research gaps that have been identified differ from country 
to country. 
Respondents from Kiribati stressed research gaps in the 
field of internal migration trends (Pac11, Pac12), health 
impacts and food security (Pac13). Kiribati and Vanuatu are 
both interested in the “effectiveness of the different inter-
ventions by the different development partners” (Pac13, 
Pac25). 
Interviewees from Tuvalu identified research gaps in the 
field of psychology and long-term planning. Psychological 
and “scientific, social and economic studies” are required 
(Pac22). Questions were raised that address the long-term 
future of Tuvalu: “How do we create another Tuvalu within 
New Zealand or Australia, for example” (Pac21) and “Also 
our EEZ, if we are to move somewhere else who is to own our 
EEZ.” (Pac21).
A focus on relocation and land issues was noted by inter-
viewees from Vanuatu. Mapping land for relocation (Pac26, 
Pac31, Pac34) and rights, security and employment issues 
(Pac25, Pac32, Pac34) were identified as research gaps. 
Furthermore, interviewees noted that the research should 
include local people (Pac29) and particular vulnerable 
areas (Pac32). Many research gaps in Vanuatu underline 
the importance of inclusiveness through a good resource 
allocation to provincial people (Pac25), mediation between 
sending and receiving parties (Pac26), integration of 
particular exposed regions (Pac32), and disaster manage-
ment (Pac26, Pac34). 
In the Pacific, health impacts of HMCC generally seem 
to be important areas in which more research is needed 
(Pac15). In the case of Fiji, conditions for conducting 
research on changing indicators of health, however, are 
rather challenging. A representative from a Fijian national 
agency talked about a research gap that was detected in 
projects on the effects of climate change within and on the 
health sector. It seems that there is a “lack of historical data 
in terms of indicators of diseases” (Pac01). Referring to the 
Pacific in general, an academic voiced the need to conduct 
more qualitative studies “where the Pacific voices, particu-
larly that of affected communities, are heard, recorded and 
documented” (Pac15). This may also provide insights about 
the overall situation of communities at relocation sites, 
for instance whether they were able to continue with their 
traditional livelihoods or practices (Pac15).
Communication and Coordination between 
Stakeholders on HMCCC
Given the interdisciplinary nature of HMCCC, functioning 
channels of communication as well as effective institu-
tional mechanisms of coordination are critical. Several 
regional key informants addressed the need to improve 
communication and/or coordination mechanism between 
relevant stakeholders in the field (Pac16, Pac18). While 
recognising the work of the NDMOs as “proactive and effec-
tive in their roles despite the limited resources”, one inter-
viewee emphasised that better coordination in projects 
is needed among the relevant stakeholders, also because 
government manpower is limited (Pac18). Referring to the 
cross-cutting aspects of HMCCC, another interviewee said 
that this issue should not be limited to NDMOs or climate 
change departments (Pac16). An academic referring to Fiji 
noted that the “various sectors within government that are 
vital to the process of moving people […] may not be aware 
of the need to be involved to ensure the continuity of the 
relocated communities” (Pac15). The same respondent also 
referred to the very nature of a project-based working envi-
ronment and how this translates into double efforts: 
 –“There is no proper coordination/communication/collab-
oration between relevant stakeholders which results in 
overlap in projects rather than a combined effort. Most 
projects are also driven by funding and may result in 
studies or projects that may have already been conducted 
or may result in work being done independently of other 
relevant stakeholder” (Pac15).
This view was shared by another expert (Pac18). 
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5.6. 
Recommendations for the Pacific
While Pacific policymakers and practitioners are relatively 
new to dealing with climate change and human mobility 
questions, one could say they have faced baptism by fire: 
the displacement and relocation of Pacific islanders is one 
of the most visible and publicly recognised law and policy 
issue related to climate change and human mobility in 
the world today. Based on the results of this study, Pacific 
governments and their partners recognise that their efforts 
to deal with the human dimensions of climate change are 
relatively advanced in some areas, such as the successful 
inclusion of language about loss and damage, planned 
relocations, and cultural identity into relevant regional and 
international forums and agreements. Pacific officials have 
advocated passionately for the voice of the Pacific islands 
with the result that they have a disproportionate weight 
in climate change negotiations relative to their countries’ 
small population sizes. However, national and regional 
actors also recognise their deficiencies in other areas, espe-
cially in the implementation of frameworks to deal with 
movements in the context of gradual environmental and 
climatic changes, as well as monitoring and evaluation.
Compared to the other study areas considered for this 
report, regional discussions specifically focusing on 
HMCCC are relatively advanced and have had recent leaps 
forward. This is largely due to attention to Pacific SIDS in 
the on-going processes in the framework of the UNFCCC – 
including, for example, specific policy recommendations 
discussed at the Suva expert dialogue298 – as well as through 
other notable capacity building projects and workshops 
led by the United Nations,299 the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS),300 and GIZ.301 
298  UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Suva Expert Dialogue,” 2018,  
https://unfccc.int/documents/182364.
299  Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), “Pacific 
Climate Change and Migration Project,” accessed August 14, 2019,  
https://www.unescap.org/subregional-office/pacific/pacific-climate-change- 
and-migration-project.
300  International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and 
Migration Project Launched to Protect, Empower Pacific Communities,” 
International Organization for Migration, March 26, 2019, https://www.
iom.int/news/climate-change-and-migration-project-launched-protect-
empower-pacific-communities.
301  GIZ has been working to develop scenarios for HMCCC with key actors in the 
region. See: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/regional-scenario-workshop- 
human-mobility-and-climate-change-pacific.
This section will not repeat policy advice from the forums 
noted above. Instead, the main goal of this section is to 
offer suggestions for the target countries in operational-
ising the two main relevant policy roadmaps applicable at 
the national and multilateral levels, namely: the work and 
recent recommendations from the Report of the Executive 
Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for 
Loss and Damage, especially the recommendations in para-
graphs 51(q), (s), and (t),302 and the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration, in particular, objectives 2 
and 5.303 Priority areas are expressed at the regional level 
and then for the four countries studied.
Core Recommendations at the Regional Level
Given the current path, solutions for climate change 
and human mobility are highly likely to be pursued at 
the regional level. This is of particular importance in the 
Pacific, where the practical and legal understanding of 
boundaries and community are less linked to national 
citizenship-based identity, as compared to other areas 
considered for this study. The main challenge is therefore 
to ensure integrative and coherent approaches across the 
countries in the region in the implementation of relevant 
frameworks, in particular, in the post-2015 Agenda (espe-
cially the goals agreed in the Paris Agreement, The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030,304 and 
the Sustainable Development Goals). 
The interviews carried out in the Pacific for this study indi-
cate that the barriers to executing plans for improving or 
accelerating financing of technical capacities, and knowl-
edge transfers appear to have captured the attention of 
the actor network on human mobility and climate change. 
This reality has created a non-negligible phenomena which 
could be called “consultation fatigue”. In other words, 
more flexible financing and concrete project with multi-
lateral and bilateral donors would be needed to move from 
discussion to action and to further energise the actor-
stakeholder community. This means funding for projects 
which enable different actions at different levels of govern-
302  UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate 
Change Impacts,” 2018, https://unfccc.int/documents/183233.
303  United Nations General Assembly, “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration” (New York, USA, 2019), paragrpahs 18 and 21.
304  UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “Sendai Framework for Disaster  
Risk Reduction 2015–2030” (Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR, 2015),  
https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291.
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ment, as well as working to promote coordination and 
complementarity between them. In the discussions held 
at COP24 (2018), significant attention was paid to deficien-
cies in developing capacity building, technology transfers, 
and response measures, inter alia. Notably, several coun-
tries remarked concerns over the lack of clarity on the 
interaction and effectiveness of the Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC) and of the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network (CTCN), and called for more attention to 
sustainable funding to its functions as well as to the tech-
nical requests submitted to the CTCN.305 
A successful approach entails addressing the issue from 
all angles while simultaneously reducing donor fatigue, 
enhancing long-term local buy-in, avoiding duplicated or 
contradicting efforts, and facilitating continued coordina-
tion across stakeholders. In order to foster effective govern-
ance of HMCCC in the Pacific, the objective of regional 
coordination must be the integration of strategies, policies 
and actions between ministries or departments, across 
different governance levels. Local communities, who will 
themselves be the source of solutions, should be integrated 
in the processes. In particular, these coordinated, integra-
tive efforts and plan implementation can be facilitated 
though regular exchange on National Adaptation Plans 
(NAPS) as well as through the forums provided by the 
constituted bodies under the UNFCCC regime [i.e. the 
Executive Committee of Warsaw International Mechanism, 
the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), the 
Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)]. 
While this section has focused on two key roadmaps, 
countries in the Pacific should sustain their engage-
ment in forums at the regional and international levels, 
such as those mentioned earlier in this chapter, as well as 
the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement, and the Asia-Pacific 
Migration and Environment Network (APMEN).
National Level 
The reports of the Suva expert dialogue indicate that while 
a fruitful discussion was held, it focused heavily on the 
regional and international processes. More insights, best 
305  Jennifer Allan et al., “Summary of the Katowice Climate Change Conference: 
2–15 December 2018,” Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12, no. 747, COP24 Final 
(December 18, 2018): 1–34.
practices, and concrete ideas for the national level are 
needed. National authorities have the primary or exclusive 
role in a few essential areas:
	§ Developing NAPs
	§ Establishing public-private-partnerships (PPPs) to 
develop insurance products, promote migration skill 
partnerships, and facilitate technology transfers, among 
other support systems to manage climate-related risk;
	§ Establish migration policy, promote bilateral and 
multilateral migration agreements, and develop skills 
partnerships (such as the Global Skills Partnership 
envisaged by the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration).
	§ Share good practices with partners through the forums 
noted above. 
FIJI
Fiji is a regional leader in addressing HMCCC, at least in 
part due to the policy and capacity development around 
the Planned Relocation Guidelines (2018). With that auspi-
cious position comes the responsibility to provide tech-
nical and policy support to its regional partners, share good 
practices, and continue to develop and implement frame-
works and guidelines related to HMCC. 
Some priority areas for Fiji include to:
	§ Share good practices and models at regional and inter-
national levels, such as through the voluntary reviews 
of the implementation of the Global Compact on 
Migration, participation in the International Migration 
Review Forum (IMRF), and regular communications 
with the UN Migration Network (as envisaged in para. 
51(v) of the 2018 report of the Task Force on Displace-
ment). For example, Fijian practitioners and civil society 
members can share experiences in expert briefings to 
the UN Migration Network, at the IMRF, and at meet-
ings of UNFCC bodies. 
	§ Lead by example. The implementation of Fiji’s guide-
lines on planned relocation after developing standard 
operation procedures can provide valuable lessons for 
the country and region. As a next step, Fiji can further 
mainstream migration, displacement, and relocation 
into its National Adaptation Plan (NAP). Building on 
the acknowledgement of these forms of mobility in the 
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current NAP,306 Fiji can further include concrete plans 
to: increase safe pathways for migration, as a posi-
tive option to adapt to climate change; monitor and 
evaluate the migratory dimensions of its NAP; identify 
and communicate specific technical and capacity gaps 
through requests to the CTCN.
	§ Develop adequate monitoring and evaluation systems. 
This will help ensure policies and programmes attain 
their intended effects, and will provide valuable 
learnings to other countries in the region. In order for 
policies addressing HMCCC to be successful, partici-
pation of affected communities from all stages of the 
policy cycle is critical, including in the monitoring 
and evaluating stage. Sharing and reviewing migration 
experiences across the region and communicating them 
to international partners is an important component of 
this, and can also be highlighted through the platforms 
provided by voluntary review mechanisms, UNFCCC 
bodies and expert groups, and the IMRF. 
	§ Improve communications and coordination. Several 
experts interviewed for this study noted a need for 
better inter-ministerial coordination and communica-
tion in Fiji.
A newly-established UN-led climate change and migration 
project could also be a helpful vehicle for policy imple-
mentation, as well as for exchange of good practices with 
Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and others.307 
KIRIBATI
This study demonstrated that climate-mobility linkages 
have been recognised by many policy actors in Kiribati. 
However, attachment to land and the limitations to inter-
national migration are key challenges. Migration inter-
nally – especially to Tarawa and Kiritimati – is increasingly 
risky as population pressures grow.
The government and its partners, and particularly with 
international donors, can work on a few top priority areas:
	§ Develop policies, plans and strategies specifically on 
climate change and human mobility;
306  Government of the Republic of Fiji, “Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: 
A Pathway towards Climate Resilience.”
307  International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and 
Migration Project Launched to Protect, Empower Pacific Communities.”
	§ Clarify and communicate plans for land purchased in 
Vanua Levu in due course, with particular attention to 
the implications on current knowledge and interna-
tional standards related to planned relocations, cultural 
identity, nationality, and livelihoods;
	§ Expand DRR and resilience building efforts in Tarawa; 
	§ Develop and expand – to the extent possible, given 
available labour gaps – planned migration to regional 
neighbours;
	§ Simultaneously, develop and expand programmes that 
help make I-Kiribati migrants more attractive on the 
international labour market, such as targeted skills and 
vocational training (via, for example, analogues to the 
‘Pacific Qualification Framework and Regional Educa-
tion Framework’ as well as via the ‘Global Skills Partner-
ship’ envisaged in the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, 
and Regular Migration);
	§ Ensure specific allocations for development projects 
targeting women, children, people with disabilities, and 
other marginalised or particularly vulnerable groups. 
TUVALU
Tuvaluan policy actors demonstrate an increasing aware-
ness of attention to HMCCC. While international mobility 
has been the focus of much of the interviewees quoted in 
this report, this study also exposes the risk that attention to 
climate-related migration should not come at the expense 
of regular national development and resilience-building 
efforts. Empirical research suggests that the majority of 
current environment-related migration in Tuvalu is rural-
urban labour migration to Funafuti, not to international 
destinations.308 In part as a result of this increased popula-
tion density and organic urban growth, resources available 
in the capital cannot keep pace with the need for water, 
safe housing, and services. The city has also become an area 
at risk, as noted above, in particular because of the poten-
tial impacts of extreme weather and spring tides. 
Disaster risk reduction efforts are a main weakness 
currently in Tuvalu. Such efforts will, by their nature, also 
help to protect people on the move as well as to preserve 
the right to stay. Building on insights from a previous 
308 Milan, Oakes, and Campbell, “Tuvalu,” 66.
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project,309 the newly-established UN-led climate change 
and migration project mentioned above may be a helpful 
vehicle to further explore this question and implement 
ideas related to HMCCC.310 
The government and its partners, and particularly with 
international donors, can work on a few top priority areas:
	§ Develop policies, plans and strategies on climate change 
and human mobility;
	§ Develop livelihood options as well as service provision, 
accessibility, and communications on the outer islands;
	§ Develop employment in alternative urban and peri-
urban areas (called “secondary cities” in other contexts), 
to absorb some of the pressures of migration on 
Funafuti; 
	§ Develop and expand – to the extent possible, given 
available labour gaps – seasonal work programmes to 
regional neighbours, such as those already in place for 
Australia and New Zealand;
	§ Simultaneously, develop and expand programmes that 
help make Tuvaluans more attractive on the inter-
national labour market, such as targeted skills and 
vocational training (via, for example, analogues to the 
‘Pacific Qualification Framework and Regional Educa-
tion Framework’ as well as via the ‘Global Skills Partner-
ship’ envisaged in the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, 
and Regular Migration);
	§ Ensure specific allocations for development projects 
targeted for women, children, people with disabilities, 
and other marginalised or particularly vulnerable 
groups. 
Drawbacks to inter-ministerial communication and coor-
dination were noted as a key deficiency in Tuvalu in this 
study. Moreover, in its work to address the key priority 
areas noted here, Tuvalu and its partners should work to:
	§ Expand CSO participation where possible, as it is critical 
to the effective functioning of government;
309  Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), “Pacific 
Climate Change and Migration Project.”
310  International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Climate Change and 
Migration Project Launched to Protect, Empower Pacific Communities.”
	§ Work together to ensure regular communications 
between governmental departments, including through 
projects to stock-take and expand information and 
technology (ICT) infrastructure;
While Tuvalu is well integrated in international discus-
sions, at the UNFCCC in particular, regional integration 
should also be expanded, in part because solutions to 
climate-related human mobility may come from regional 
cooperation. Tuvalu should therefore continue to be 
engaged in the activities noted in the previous section. In 
particular, Tuvalu should continue to work through the 
NAP process.
VANUATU
Vanuatu is relatively advanced in the region in terms 
of HMCCC governance, due to the recent launch of the 
National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced 
Displacement (2018). A new UN-led project should also 
add to efforts to address the issue.311 In implementing the 
policy and project, the government should continue atten-
tion to:
	§ Develop livelihood options as well as service provision, 
housing, infrastructure, and communications infra-
structure across the country and especially in outer 
islands;
	§ Develop resilience and DRR in Port Villa, Port 
Havannah, and Mele;
	§ Develop and expand – to the extent possible, given 
available labour gaps – seasonal work programmes and 
other forms of planned migration;
	§ Simultaneously, develop and expand targeted skills 
programmes and vocational training
	§ Ensure specific allocations for development projects 
targeted for women, children, people with disabilities, 
and other marginalised or particularly vulnerable 
groups.
311 International Organization for Migration (IOM).
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6.1. 
Introduction: Human Mobility in 
the Philippines
When mapping patterns of human mobility in the 
Philippines, both international and internal move-
ments are important phenomena to look at. Out of a total 
population of approximately 104.9 million, nearly 5.4 % 
of Filipinos live abroad.312 Of those, 2.3 million people in 
2017 were classified in the category of migrant workers 
known as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), representing 
over 2.1 % of the total population of the Philippines.313 Of 
nations with the highest proportion of its citizenry abroad, 
the country ranks in the top ten.314 
Internal – and especially inter-provincial – human 
mobility also constitutes a significant phenomenon in the 
Philippines.
Based on the Census of Population and Household (CPH) 
data from 2010, approximately 2.9 million Filipinos 
changed residence between 2005 and 2010.315 In that 
period, 50.4 % were long distance movers (measured by 
change of province) and 45.4 % were short distance movers 
(measured by change of city), while just 4.2 % had moved 
312  Calculated as 5.7 million out of 104.9 million. Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision.”
313  Approximately 2.3 million out of 104.918 million, or 2.1 %. Philippine Statistics 
Authority (PSA), “Total Number of OFWs Estimated at 2.3 Million (Results 
from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos),” 2019, https://psa.gov.ph/
statistics/survey/labor-and-employment/survey-overseas-filipinos.
314  OECD et al., “2019 International Migration and Displacement Trends and 
Policies Report to the G20” (Paris: OECD, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/
migration/mig/G20-migration-and-displacement-trends-and-policies-
report-2019.pdf.
315  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
“Overview of Internal Migration in Philippines,” 2017, https://bangkok.unesco.
org/sites/default/files/assets/article/Social%20and%20Human%20Sciences/
publications/philippines.pdf.
internationally.316 Rural and agricultural poverty,317 the 
draw of urban areas,318 violent conflict,319 social and kinship 
networks,320 and natural disasters are among the main 
factors contributing to the decision to migrate in the 
Philippines.
Consistent with observed trends in other developing coun-
tries, the rate of women migrants has increased substan-
tially in recent decades, particularly for rural-urban move-
ments and for international labour migration.321 Women 
represent approximately 64.7 % of all Filipinos abroad322 
and over 53.6 % of OFWs.323 The ratio of international 
migrants that are women is significantly higher than the 
global average of 47.9 %.324 For both internal and interna-
tional migrants, women are more often in domestic house-
work or childcare sectors and less often in manual labour 
316  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “2017 Survey on Overseas Filipinos 
(Results from the 2017 Survey on Overseas Filipinos ) | Philippine Statistics 
Authority,” 2018, https://psa.gov.ph/content/2017-survey-overseas-filipinos-
results-2017-survey-overseas-filipinos.
317  International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Country Migration 
Report: The Philippines 2013,” 2013, https://publications.iom.int/books/
country-migration-report-philippines-2013.
318  Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA), “Domestic and International Migrants 
in the Philippines (Results from the 2010 Census) | Philippine Statistics 
Authority,” 2012, https://psa.gov.ph/content/domestic-and-international-
migrants-philippines-results-2010-census; Philippine Statistics Authority 
(PSA), “Urban Barangays in the Philippines (Based on 2010 CPH),” 2013, 
https://psa.gov.ph/content/urban-barangays-philippines-based-2010-cph.
319  IDMC, “Disaster-Induced Internal Displacement in the Philippines. The 
Case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong” (Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre – Norwegian Refugee Council, 2013); IDMC, “The Evolving Picture of 
Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-Based Overview,” 
2014. 
320  Agnes R Quisumbing and Scott Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban 
Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines,” Philippine Journal of 
Development PJD 33 (2006): 43.
321 Quisumbing and Mcniven.
322  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant 
Stock: The 2017 Revision.”
323  Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA), “Domestic and International Migrants 
in the Philippines (Results from the 2010 Census) | Philippine Statistics 
Authority.”
324  Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “International Migrant 
Stock: The 2019 Revision,” 2019, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp.
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or transportation. While women previously represented 
a lower share of rural-urban migrant workers – perhaps 
due to their relative lack of formal education and skills as 
compared to men, as well as to social and cultural norms 
and obligations – women have more recently become 
above half of rural-urban migrants.325 The macro view of 
women and migration was reinforced by the expert inter-
views conducted for this study. 
 –“… [M]igration has already been feminised. Because the 
land is being subdivided [In farming communities], that 
is reducing the land for farming. So if you have five chil-
dren with two or three males, [they] would usually remain 
in the communities while the females would leave and 
find work outside the community. So they will migrate, 
either within or outside the country … [Women are] better 
educated as well. Since the 1970, the number of women 
who finished schooling has increased. We can observe the 
same trend up to now” (Ph04).
325  Quisumbing and Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: 
Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines.”
The latest information from the 2018 National Migration 
Survey (NMS) considers migration in the past five years, 
providing an update on the longer-term trends repre-
sented in the census data. According to the initial findings 
from the NMS, 15 % of Filipinos have migrated between 
2013 – 2018.326 Most moved between and across regions, 
especially to the capital and nearby Calabarzon region; the 
Eastern Visayas; and Davao.
Reflecting the important linkages between education and 
migration highlighted by the key informant cited above, 
education levels appear to be a limiting factor in migrant 
destinations – or, put differently, education enhances the 
opportunities available to prospective migrants. Of recent 
internal migrants in the Philippines, 28 % have some 
college education. In comparison, 50 % of people with 
recent international migration experience and 65 % of 
people with both internal and international mobility expe-
rience have some college education.327 
326  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines 
Population Institute (UPPI), “2018 National Migration Survey: Key Findings” 
(Quezon City, Philippines: PSA and UPPI, 2019).
327  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines 
Population Institute (UPPI).
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BACKGROUND FOR THIS CHAPTER
In the Philippines, climatological, meteorological and 
hydrological disasters already create significant economic 
damage and lead to the suffering of millions of affected 
people.328 It has also been observed that the cumulative, 
erosive effects of multiple disasters over time can aggravate 
structural inequalities and contribute to migration propen-
sities.329 This changing character of drivers of mobility 
in the Philippines creates new challenges for protection, 
assistance, and resilience of Filipino families. As a result 
of climate change, previous ways of addressing human 
mobility have to change to meet these new challenges. Yet, 
the evidence base required for effective government action 
is currently limited, in particular, with regard to slow-onset 
hazards and climate events.
Presently, there are no laws or policies that directly 
address human mobility in the context of climate change. 
However, frameworks and bodies exist for climate change 
and disaster risk, especially those relying on R.A. 9729 and 
R.A. 10121, described in detail below. The country also 
has an extensive and advanced institutional infrastruc-
ture in place to address the needs of people before, during, 
and after displacement. As the evidence gathered for this 
baseline study demonstrates, important stakeholders 
from governmental and non-governmental organisa-
tions acknowledge the importance of addressing climate-
induced human mobility and are positioned to advance the 
issue. However, important actors called for more research 
and evidence to be generated to guide leaders, policy 
actors, and decision makers. 
328  IDMC, “The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon 
Haiyan: An Evidence-Based Overview”; IDMC, “Disaster-Induced Internal 
Displacement in the Philippines. The Case of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong.”
329  IDMC, “Disaster-Induced Internal Displacement in the Philippines. The Case 
of Tropical Storm Washi/Sendong.”
Information Base of the Philippines Chapter
The present chapter of this baseline study is based on the 
existing literature and the expert interviews conducted for 
this study. A total of 27 participants were involved through 
ten individual interviews and two focus groups discus-
sions. The individual interviews (six females, four males) 
included: an expert in agricultural policy and program-
ming, two specialists in human mobility in humanitarian 
contexts, a demographer, an expert on human rights and 
internal displacement, a demographic policy and program-
ming specialist, an expert on coastal resilience, a climate 
change policy and programming specialist, and two climate 
policy researchers. 
OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS  
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Type Interviewee No. Sum
Residents/Focus Group 
Discussion Participants
Phil18 – 27 10
Personnel of Ministries 
and Other Central National 
Bodies
Phil01, Phil06, Phil08, 
Phil11 – 14, Phil16, 
Phil17
9
Researcher/Academic Phil04, Phil09, Phil10 3
Intergovernmental 
Organisation
Phil02, Phil03, Phil05 3
Non-Governmental- 
Organisation
Phil07 1
Personnel of Provincial or 
Municipal Bodies
Phil15 1
Total 27
 
A focus group with seven participants (five females, 
two males) from the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Council (RDRRMC) of Region VI was 
conducted specifically to understand shared responsibili-
ties and goals for disaster response. Finally, ten residents 
(five females, five males) of Sitio Lamsabuy, Barangay 
Tasima, Lake Sebu, South Cotabato were invited for a focus 
group discussion to delve into community-wide changes 
and issues.
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Background: Migration in the Philippines
Historically, migration propensities in the Philippines 
can be attributed to the geographic and the archipelagic 
characteristics of the country. The riverine set up of pre-
colonial Philippine communities facilitated movement to 
search for food, to conduct trade, to intermarry, or to even 
wage war to conquer other lands. Forced or conscripted 
labour,330 settlement of new frontiers,331 overseas work,332 
modernisation333 and urbanisation334 have been important 
triggers of movement in the Philippines.335 These elements 
form part of a more complex tapestry of migration history, 
which has been especially influenced by the country’s long-
standing relationships with colonial powers, but also by 
flows to Mexico, China, and countries in the Middle East.336 
330  Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, A History of the Philippines 
(NYU Press, 1975).
331  Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th ed. (Quezon 
City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), https://www.goodreads.com/work/
best_book/2223636-history-of-the-filipino-people.
332  Allen J. Scott, “The Shoe Industry of Marikina City, Philippines: A 
Developing Country Cluster in Crisis,” Urban/Regional (University Library 
of Munich, Germany, November 7, 2005), https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/
wuwpur/0511003.html.
333  Alfred W. McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines 
(Univ of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
334  Quisumbing and Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: 
Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines.”
335  Luis H. Francia, “History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos,” 
2010, https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/7869640-history-of-the-
philippines; Juan Antonio Perez III, “On the Move: Current Patterns and 
Factors of Internal Migration in the Philippines Filipinos,” 2016,  
https://slideplayer.com/slide/10247958.
336  OECD, “The Philippines’ Migration Landscape,” in Interrelations between  
Public Policies, Migration and Development in the Philippines, by OECD and 
Scalabrini Migration Center (OECD, 2017), 41–65, https://doi.org/10.1787/ 
9789264272286-6-en.
The 2018 NMS referred to above builds knowledge on 
recent internal migration in the country, a topic for which 
there is relatively less evidence as compared to informa-
tion on international migration. Findings from the NMS 
suggest that, of those surveyed, only 2 % of people who 
had moved in the past five years migrated internationally. 
In addition, permanent, intra- and inter-regional migra-
tion – especially rural-to-rural flows (46 % of the total 
surveyed) – are significant and outweigh movements to 
foreign destinations.337 Interestingly, while both internal 
and international migrants report seeking employment 
as the primary motivation for their first move – 46 % and 
89 %, respectively – other motivations gain in importance 
over time for internal migrants, who cite housing, marriage 
and education among their motivations.338 Only 23 % of 
internal migrants cited employment as the main reason for 
their most recent move, as compared to 84 % of interna-
tional migrants.339
Despite available information, studies that explicitly 
explore the relationship between climatic or environ-
mental variabilities and human mobility in the Philippines 
are scarce.340 The primary gap is the lack of research on 
indirect ways in which climate change affects move-
ments, namely, by affecting livelihoods and household 
strategies. In contrast, there are numerous studies related 
to displacement and humanitarian crisis resulting from 
a climate-related extreme event.341 Developing a greater 
understanding of both types of movements, as well as the 
linkages between them, is an important step in designing 
appropriate policy measures and actions. 
337  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines 
Population Institute (UPPI), “NMS Key Findings.”
338  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines 
Population Institute (UPPI).
339  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines 
Population Institute (UPPI).
340  Pratikshya Bohra-Mishra et al., “Climate Variability and Migration in 
the Philippines,” Population and Environment 38, no. 3 (March 1, 2017): 
286–308, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-016-0263-x; F. H. Bordey et 
al., “Linking Climate Change, Rice Yield and Migration: The Philippine 
Experience,” Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) 
Research Report, 2013, http://www.eepsea.net/index.php?option=com_
k2&view=item&id=450:linking-climate-change-rice-yield-and-migration-the-
philippine-experience&Itemid=265.
341  For instance, in a jointly conducted study, more than two hundred assessments 
and reports came out of Typhoon Yolanda in 2014: IDMC, “The Evolving 
Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-Based 
Overview.”
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6.2. 
Climate Change-Related Drivers of 
Human Mobility in the Philippines
This section briefly summarises potential impacts of 
climate change on the Philippines, followed by a discus-
sion of the existing empirical evidence on the links with 
displacement and migration. Climate models suggest a 
robust warming trend for the Philippines. Mean tempera-
tures are expected to rise by between 0.9°C to 1.1°C by 2020 
and 1.8°C to 2.2°C by mid-century. Evidence suggests the 
months of March, April and May, in particular, are getting 
hotter.342 Temperature and rainfall patterns are generally 
expected to be more erratic, more frequent and intense 
extreme weather events are more likely. Importantly, 
heat stress will have critical impacts on rice produc-
tion.343 The human and economic cost of heat, disasters, 
health risks, and other climate impacts will be great. If the 
world continues on a higher-end global emissions path 
(A2 scenario), the Philippines stands to lose 2.2 % of its GDP 
every year by 2100.344 
The Philippines is expected to face many of the threats 
climate change represents to developing, coastal, and 
populous nations of Southeast Asia. In particular, the 
economic and human costs of extreme weather are 
already severe and likely to be exacerbated by climate 
change. Changes to rainfall patterns and distributions, 
a high degree of water scarcity, more intense droughts 
and El Niño episodes, and reductions in grasslands due to 
dryness are among the most severe projected effects. An 
overall decrease in rainfall accompanied by an increase 
in days of crop-damaging heavy downpours is expected 
by between 2020 and 2050 in most parts of the  country.345 
In addition to the expected reduction in nearly 1 million 
hectares of grassland due to extended periods of dryness 
342  Government of the Philippines, “Climate Change in the Philippines” 
Department of Science and Technology Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical 
and Astronomical Services Administration (n. d.), http://bagong.pagasa.dost.
gov.ph/information/climate-change-in-the-philippines
343  R. Wassmann et al., “Climate Change Affecting Rice Production: The 
Physiological and Agronomic Basis for Possible Adaptation Strategies,” in 
Advances in Agronomy, ed. Donald L. Sparks, vol. 101 (Academic Press, 2009), 
59–122, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2113(08)00802-X.
344  IPCC, “Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: 
Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)” (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2.
345  Climate Change Commission, “Executive Brief: The Philipppine National 
Climate Change Action Plan Monitoring and Evaluation Report, 2011 – 2016” 
(Manila: Climate Change Commission, 2019), https://climate.gov.ph/
our-programs/national-climate-change-action-plan-nccap.
and heat, the rice grain yield in the Philippines is expected 
to decline by 10 % for each degree (Celsius) of warming 
in the minimum growing season temperature.346 Coastal 
subsidence and erosion, aquifer and agricultural soil 
contamination, and flooding are also expected to be 
particularly acute in the Philippines, as the observed sea 
level is three times higher than the global average due 
to regional differences in sea-level rise described in the 
previous chapter. About 60 % of Local Government Units 
(LGUs) across 64 coastal provinces will face the effects 
of sea-level rise, leading to an estimated number of 
13.6 million Filipinos that may require relocation.347 
In a highly mobile society such as in the Philippines, the 
negative impacts of climate change have the potential to 
alter existing voluntary and forced migration trends. In 
addition, scholars hypothesise that yet-to-be-witnessed 
severe effects of climatic variability, extreme weather, and 
sea level rise may lead to previously unobserved migration 
patterns.348 While there is a dearth of empirical research 
linking migration, displacement, and climate change in the 
Philippines, there are significant bodies of research inves-
tigating these topics separately.349 International migration 
of Filipinos has been tracked by central bodies and well-
studied by academics for decades. Internal displacement is 
more often tracked by external actors like the UN (Phil05), 
and there is more limited empirical data available on 
internal migration (Phil04).350 These words of one interview 
was echoed by many contacts for this study: “[The govern-
ment] is looking more at relocation and the displaced people, 
but not at migration” (Phil04).
346  Climate Change Commission; Climate Change Commission, “Climate Change 
and the Philippines: Executive Brief” (Manila: Climate Change Commission, 
2018), https://climate.gov.ph/files/CC_Executive-Brief_V32.compressed.pdf.
347  Climate Change Commission, “Climate Change and the Philippines: Executive 
Brief.”
348  Kate Burrows and Patrick L. Kinney, “Exploring the Climate Change, Migration 
and Conflict Nexus,” International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health 13, no. 4 (April 2016), https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13040443.
349  See for example: R. V. O. Cruz et al., “2017 Philippine Climate Change 
Assessment: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation.” (Pasig City, Philippines: 
The Oscar M. Lopez Center for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster 
Risk Management Foundation, Inc. and Climate Change Commission, 2017), 
https://climate.gov.ph/files/PhilCCA-WG2.pdf; Rosa T. Perez, Leoncio A. 
Amadore, and Renato B. Feir, “Climate Change Impacts and Responses in 
the Philippines Coastal Sector,” Climate Research 12, no. 2–3 (August 27, 
1999): 97–107, https://doi.org/10.3354/cr012097; Quisumbing and Mcniven, 
“Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: Evidence from Bukidnon, 
Philippines.”
350  See also: Maruja M. B. Asis, “The Philippines: Beyond Labor Migration, Toward 
Development and (Possibly) Return,” migrationpolicy.org, July 11, 2017, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/philippines-beyond-labor-migration-
toward-development-and-possibly-return.
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In many of the interviews undertaken for this study, 
experts referred to Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as 
Yolanda) when giving examples for lessons learned on 
HMCCC. Typhoon Haiyan, which made landfall on the 
Philippines in November 2013, was one of the most 
powerful tropical cyclones ever recorded. With wind speeds 
reaching more than 300 km/h, as well as storm surges of 
more than four metres, Haiyan caused severe damage.351 
According to the report on Reconstruction Assistance on 
Haiyan by the Government of the Philippines, nearly 6,000 
people were killed, approximately 27,000 were injured, 
and more than four million Filipinos were displaced.352 
Discussing the effects of Haiyan, an interviewee from a 
prominent intergovernmental agency reported that thou-
sands of families are still in need of support for housing 
and livelihoods. There is a want for long-term solutions for 
displaced people in general (Phil03). In addition, a high-
ranking staff from a key climate change office mentioned 
that “[i]n Tacloban again, in areas affected by Yolanda, 
people continue to stay in areas classified as no-build zones. 
They are aware of the risk, but because of livelihoods or 
economic activities, they have difficulty leaving the place” 
(Phil01). 
Consistent with similar findings in other tropical 
developing countries, episodes of extreme events and 
temperature increases have had stimulating effects on 
outmigration, including rural-rural internal migration, 
while rainfall has had a mixed or limited demonstrated 
effect.353 For example, one predominant study demon-
strates that a standard deviation increase in temperature 
in the Philippines corresponds to a 1.16 % increase in 
out-migration, particularly for provinces with the largest 
rural and agriculture-dependent populations.354 Studies 
of other regions with already high baseline tempera-
tures suggest that rising temperatures can increasingly 
have negative effects on crop yields355 and agricultural 
351  The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), “Reconstruction 
Assistance on Yolanda.” (Pasig City, the Philippines, 2013), http://www.
officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2013/12dec/20131216-RAY.pdf.
352  About 1,800 people were still missing (as of December 12 2013), according to 
The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
353  Bohra-Mishra et al., “Climate Variability and Migration in the Philippines”; 
Bordey et al., “Linking Climate Change, Rice Yield and Migration: The 
Philippine Experience.”
354 Bohra-Mishra et al., “Climate Variability and Migration in the Philippines.”
355  Wolfram Schlenker and David B. Lobell, “Robust Negative Impacts of Climate 
Change on African Agriculture,” Environmental Research Letters 5, no. 1 (2010), 
https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/5/1/014010.
exports.356 Agricultural incomes is one of the primary 
channels through which climate change affects migration 
of resource-dependent households. As explained by one 
interviewee, “There are indications [that slow-onset climate 
events lead to rural-urban migration]… They would prefer to 
work in urban areas since they can hardly make both ends 
meet if they rely only in agriculture. They said that agricul-
tural inputs are becoming more expensive, so it is better to 
work [in urban areas] so that you can get your salaries, even 
[if you have to work] on a daily basis” (Phil06). For all the 
climate-related variables it is not known whether there 
are threshold values from which migration patterns would 
change nonlinearly. Current literature on environment 
and migration phenomena from other parts of the world 
indicates that working-age men with capital necessary to 
migrate are often those who migrate in the face of resource 
stress.357 This trend is explained by prevailing migration 
literature suggesting that in the face of risks, households 
take economic decisions jointly.358 To supplement agri-
cultural income, some decide to invest in the migration 
of those members with the highest earning potential and 
relatively lower household obligations.
Many experts approached for this baseline study made 
explicit references to the link between the sensitivity of 
agricultural outputs to climate change and mobility. A 
key informant from the Climate Change Commission, 
for instance, discussed the research about the correlation 
between crop shortfalls and observed increases in human 
mobility presented in the Philippine Climate Change 
Assessment as “direct impacts of climate change” (Phil08). 
Another expert interviewed for this study stressed this 
point further:
356  Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken, “Climate Shocks and Exports,” SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, January 1, 
2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1544761.
357  Richard Black et al., “Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends  
and Their Policy Implications for Migration,” working Paper, 2008,  
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2680629;  
Paul A. Lewin, Monica Fisher, and Bruce Weber, “Do Rainfall Conditions Push 
or Pull Rural Migrants: Evidence from Malawi,” Agricultural Economics 43, 
no. 2 (2012): 191–204, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2011.00576.x; 
Koko Warner et al., Where the Rain Falls: Climate Change, Food and Livelihood 
Security, and Migration (United Nations University Institute for Environment 
and Human Security, 2012), http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:2901.
358  Ian Scoones, “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis,” 1998, 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3390; Oded Stark 
and David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration,” The American 
Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 173–78.
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 –“Once the agriculture – the farms – are damaged, the 
means of livelihood are damaged, temporarily these 
families would have nothing and would have to look for 
alternatives. And what happens, as per our observation, 
is: some of them would migrate to the cities and live with 
their families and look for jobs in the factories, stay in 
slum areas, and then we would find out that after a year 
that they would come back” (Phil03). 
This account was not uncommon. One key informant 
noted “if there is drought and the economy is not moving 
in a particular rural area, migration may come out later 
on, let’s say 6 months, or a year, or 2 years after realisation 
about the effect of climate change” (Phil04).359 Both slow-
onset events and sudden-onset hazards can cause crop 
damage, and the effect of repeated crop failure can lead to 
migration when coping strategies are exhausted. Another 
interviewee stated unequivocally: “Typhoons have pushed 
people out of their communities into the urban areas to look 
for jobs” (Phil06). As the increased intensity and frequency 
of storms is likely to influence internal migration to urban 
areas in particular,360 further evidence in this area could be 
beneficial to enhance concurrent efforts.
The effect of storms on communities is particularly signifi-
cant in coastal and riverine areas, where around 60 % of 
the Filipino population lives.361 While evidence suggests 
that natural hazard-induced disasters often result in 
short-distance internal migration,362 duration of stay varies 
significantly. Depending on other factors present – such as 
conflict and structural inequalities – displacement may be 
short or become protracted. In the Philippines, the impact 
of social networks appears to be strong. Interviewees noted 
that temporarily displaced people tend to return quickly to 
their home communities to assist with the reconstruction, 
359  As demonstrated by Bordey et al., “Linking Climate Change, Rice Yield and 
Migration: The Philippine Experience.”, changes in rice field and gross revenue 
per hectare due to extreme weather changes significantly affected overseas 
migration. The number of total OFWs is observed to increase by 5 persons per 
thousand population for every 1 metric ton decrease in average yield.
360  Michael Beine and Christopher R Parsons, “Climatic Factors as Determinants 
of International Migration: Redux,” CESifo Economic Studies 63, no. 4 (2017): 
368–402, https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifx017.
361  United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Climate 
Risk Profile: Philippines,” Climatelinks, 2017, https://www.climatelinks.org/
resources/climate-change-risk-profile-philippines.
362  Clark L. Gray and Valerie Mueller, “Natural Disasters and Population Mobility 
in Bangladesh,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 
16 (April 17, 2012): 6000–6005, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115944109; 
Xin Lu, Linus Bengtsson, and Petter Holme, “Predictability of Population 
Displacement after the 2010 Haiti Earthquake,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109, no. 29 (2012): 
11576–11581.
or help financially.363 One key informant said that “[f]or 
Filipinos, a social network is important because it could help 
guarantee your security” (Phil04). According to the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Philippines 
was the country with the highest number of people 
displaced by disasters in 2018.364 A whopping 3.8 million 
new disaster displacements were recorded, roughly the 
same number as in China. IDMC’s global disaster displace-
ment risk model estimates that, on average, 718,000 people 
are likely to be displaced by sudden-onset disasters in the 
Philippines each year, with tropical cyclones accounting 
for the large majority of these displacements.365 The effects 
of disasters are having ripples across the society, including 
in diaspora communities, as evidenced by the increased 
remittance flows to the Philippines from international 
migrants in the aftermath of major disaster events.366 
363  D. Yang and H.J. Choi, “Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall 
Shocks in the Philippines,” THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW 21, no. 2 
(2007): 219–248.
364  IDMC, “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019,” 2019,  
http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019.
365  It is stated that the figures for average annual displacement in the model 
“should be considered as an indicator of the potential magnitude of 
displacement, not as an exact value.” See: Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018,” 2018,  
http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018.
366  Yang and Choi, “Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in 
the Philippines.”
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Drought, degradation and untracked migration in the Province of South Cotabato
The natural gifts of the municipality of Lake Sebu are 
impressive: rolling hills, dark soil, and lush greenery. The 
area is as rich in history and culture as it is in natural 
resources, and the municipality has made strides in ensu-
ring that the indigenous way of life and cultural practices 
are recognised, protected and preserved. In 1993, Lake 
Sebu was declared as the ancestral domain of four major 
indigenous groups: T’Bolis, Ubos, Tirurays and Manobos. 
Lake Sebu is home of the famous handwoven tinalak tex-
tile, from which the biggest festival in the province got its 
name. Located inside a watershed forest reserve on Min-
danao, the second-largest island of the Philippines, Lake 
Sebu serves as one of the premier tourism destinations in 
the Province of South Cotabato. In 2015 – 2016, the pro-
vince experienced one of its worst droughts in memory. 
Overall, the El Niño-triggered drought reportedly cost 
PhP 15.2 billion (approximately USD 300,891,300) in agri-
cultural losses.367 Several villagers of Sitio Lamsabuy, a 
small community of Ubos in Lake Sebu with 32 house-
holds, share their stories about the drought, among them 
Mariel, a farmer, James, who works for the church, and 
Perlah, a single mother. All of them have seven children.
367  Agence France Presse, “Oxfam: Expect 2016 Drought 
in Philippines amid ‘super’ El Niño,” ABS-CBN News, 
December 14, 2015, https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/14/15/
oxfam-expect-2016-drought-in-philippines-amid-super-el-nio.
Despite the natural and cultural richness of the area 
surrounding Sitio Lamsabuy, the villagers have always had 
to face difficult livelihood conditions in this rather remote 
community. Changing climatic conditions have put further 
pressures on their livelihoods which primarily rely on rainfed 
agriculture. Corn is people’s staple diet, supplemented by 
bananas and root crops. Farmers have no access to capital 
and, thus, no means to expand production. Furthermore, the 
absence of agricultural facilities, including irrigation, make 
corn production vulnerable to extreme weather events. 
According to respondents, almost 50 % of household heads 
in Lamsabuy temporarily left the community during the El 
Niño-triggered drought in 2015 – 2016 to look for survival 
means elsewhere. Many went to work on sugarcane or cas-
sava plantations for low-wage labour, while others went to 
cities to find work or stay with family members. 
James recalls: “It was really difficult and many of us left our 
community to find work in other areas, like in the town of 
Polomolok. Some remained and endured difficult conditions 
here. We tried planting crops during El Niño, but it was 
useless.[…] Only bananas could withstand the heat. Corn, 
our staple crop, could easily wither away. So we have no 
choice but to consume whatever is available. We ate root 
crops like Palawan (taro)”. Mariel shares how difficult it was 
to feed her seven children: “We would be happy if we could 
find coconuts to eat. We would get the fruits and feed them 
to our children. They would sleep at night with only coconuts 
in their stomach. In fact sometimes, they would just drink 
water and go to sleep. And it was a challenge to look for a 
water source too. Our usual sources dried up, so we have to 
walk longer distances to find spring water just so we can 
have something to drink”. Perlah talks about the effects of 
the drought on education: “[Our children] stopped schooling. 
We can’t send them to school when we have nothing to feed 
them in the first place. They will get hungry in school and 
could collapse on an empty stomach”.
Both Mariel and James eventually left the community to 
support their family. Mariel worked on a cassava plantation 
about 25 km away. She describes the hard physical labour 
on the farm and how some labourers suffered severe health 
problems from the work. She got paid in goods. James 
joined a group of farmers from the village to work in a farm 
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6.3. 
Policies and Actors Addressing 
Climate Migration
While there appears to be a growing recognition by policy 
actors in the Philippines that climate change can trigger 
internal migration – particularly through its effects on the 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather and envi-
ronmental degradation – this phenomenon has yet to 
be recognised in legal and policy frameworks, from the 
national to the local level. Climate change and human 
rights experts in the Philippines approached for this 
study expressed optimism that there is significant room 
for action. This section maps the existing institutional 
infrastructure on issues related to HMCCC. The first part 
discusses stakeholders from the field and their constella-
tion, the second focuses on key policies and instruments 
relevant for managing HMCCC in the Philippines.
Actor Landscape 
A number of major actors in Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management (DRRM) and Climate Change Adaptation 
(CCA) should be highlighted: the CCAM-DRR Cabinet 
Cluster; relevant agencies of the National government; the 
LGUs; civil society; and the affected communities.
THE CCAM-DRR CABINET CLUSTER
In 2011, then President Benigno Aquino III signed 
Executive Order No. 43, creating a cabinet cluster on 
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation (CCAM), to 
facilitate the implementation of climate change-related 
policies, plans and programmes. It was eventually reor-
ganised as the CCAM-DRR cluster in 2016. The cabinet 
cluster intends to effectively pursue the government’s 
“social contract” with citizens and serve as “venue[s] and 
mechanism[s] for coordination, harmonisation, comple-
mentation, and synergy among the Departments and other 
Government instrumentalities”.369 The reorganized cluster, 
thus, primarily intends to function as a mechanism to 
discuss the interrelated challenges of climate change and 
disaster risk management, whereas the cluster’s actions 
shall focus around measures to protect the environ-
369  Office of the President of the Philippines, “Executive Order 43: Pursuing 
Our Social Contract with the Filipino People Through the Reorganization 
of the Cabinet Clusters,” 2011, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/
downloads/2011/05may/20110513-EO-0043-BSA.pdf.
 
Drought, degradation and untracked migration in the Province of South Cotabato in the town of Digos. They were recruited in the village 
and brought to the site in a truck. An advance payment 
allowed him to leave money to his wife before he left. 
Despite the extra income, James’s wife still struggled: 
“It was sad. It was difficult [especially] for my children. 
I would feel terrible when they ask for food or for bread 
and I have nothing to give them. The money that my 
husband would send would sometimes fall short. I had 
to take out credit from the store or from our neighbours. 
I looked for a means to find food myself. I would leave 
my smaller children to their older siblings while I look for 
menial jobs myself.”
This drought episode highlighted the need to improve 
early warning and response mechanisms from the 
government, as well as local uptake of information. The 
Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical 
Services Administration (PAGASA) announced the onset 
of El Niño in the Philippines in March 2015 and issued 
regular advisories three months later. Yet, villagers 
perceived that no formal advisory was provided – 
although some heard information about the drought on 
the radio – and preparedness was consequently low. Des-
pite considerable lead time for preparations, a declara-
tion of a state of emergency and humanitarian relief from 
the provincial and national authorities were delayed.368 
Under future climate change scenarios extreme El Niño 
events may become more common. In terms of remedia-
tion efforts and proactive adaptation solutions, residents 
of  Lamsabuy collectively expressed an interest in diver-
sifying their income sources and in seeking government 
assistance for climate-smart projects. However, they 
acknowledged, available resources are low.
368  The Provincial capital, Kidapawan City, declared a ‘State of Calamity’ 
eight months after the initial advisory. In December 2015 the government 
announced the PhP19 billion allocation to combat El Niño a couple of 
months after it assembled an El Niño Task Force that crafted the Roadmap 
to Address the Impact of El Niño (RAIN). Food, health, energy and safety 
were the major thrusts, but the massive funding and the special body fell 
short in delivering the intended outcome. See; “Roadmap to Address the 
Impact of El Nino Archives,” The National Economic and Development 
Authority (blog), accessed August 14, 2019, http://www.neda.gov.ph/tag/
roadmap-to-address-the-impact-of-el-nino.
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ment and natural resources. The cluster aims, inter alia, 
to increase the climate resilience of rural communities 
“through increased agricultural productivity, water suffi-
ciency, food security, and climate and disaster-risk resilient 
development.”370 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Two national agencies have been created to address climate 
change and disaster risk reduction in the Philippines: 
the Climate Change Commission (CCC) and the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council 
(NDRRMC). Both have inter-agency orientation that strives 
to coordinate, centralise and scale up climate and disaster 
work across levels of government.371 Government agen-
cies can also work together through a convergence strategy 
or through joint circulars to implement complementary 
programmes. 
The Philippine Commission on Population and 
Development (POPCOM) possesses the mandate to manage 
population programmes including internal migration. 
Along with fertility and mortality, it looks at internal 
migration as an essential demographic process, although 
migration is not as well inscribed in population projections 
as the first two. Internal migration is predominantly inter-
preted as a demographic process aligned with urbanisation. 
There are limitations in generating data on internal migra-
tion; thus, POPCOM usually collects data at the local level 
to track movements. POPCOM works with the Philippine 
Statistics Authority (PSA) for statistical concerns and with 
the Department of the Interior and Local Government 
(DILG) to strengthen its anchor with the LGUs. It may need 
to work with CCC or secure a seat in the NDRRMC so that 
population processes and movements are considered in 
CCA-DRR discourses and vice-versa (see Figure 6).
370  Office of the President of the Philippines. For more information about 
the cluster’s stated objectives and its organisational structure refer to the 
official website: Government of the Philippines (GoP), “Cabinet Clusters: 
Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation,” accessed October 2, 2019,  
http://www.pms.gov.ph/index.php/67-linkccam/57-cabinet-clusters.
371  CCC receives technical advice from an interagency body composed of 
14 government departments; two national bodies, National Security Council 
(NSC) and National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW); 
presidents of local government leagues; and representatives from academia, 
the business sector, non-government organizations and the DRRM sector.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGU)
The LGU, based on RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 
the Philippines), aims to provide for wider-scale partici-
pation by fostering the government’s responsiveness and 
flexibility. LGUs in the Philippines are semi-autonomous 
governance units from the sub-national (provincial) down 
to the village (barangay) level. To date, there are 82 provin-
cial, 145 city, and 1,489,489 municipal, and 42,029 village 
governments in the country. LGUs serve to execute state 
administrative policies and to assist in rural development. 
LGUs are mandated to formulate local policies for safety 
and resilience – as defined in RA 9729 (Climate Change Act, 
2009) and RA 10121 (National Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management Act, 2010) – and to anchor their programmes 
in international agreements and national guidelines. Each 
LGU in the country is mandated to organise their own local 
DRRM bodies and craft DRR-CCA plans and programmes, 
including planning counterparts to the National Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) and the 
National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP). 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES
There are clear provisions for civil society participation in 
the DRRM and CCA laws of the country. Representatives 
from non-government organisations help compose the 
advisory board of the CCC while four non-government 
organisations are invited as members of the NDRRMC. 
Local communities serve as the first level of defence in 
times of disaster (Phil13). Key informants in a focus group 
conducted for this study, agreed that local communities are 
crucial players in the implementation of climate action and 
risk reduction (Phil13–17). Focusing on local communities 
not only saves resources, but also ensures participation and 
empowerment (ibid). Community capacities for adapta-
tion and risk reduction thrive in an environment where 
it is being encouraged and promoted. Among others, UN 
departments372 suggest that safety and resilience initia-
tives will only gain traction if these are locally relevant and 
invite people’s participation. 
372  United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), “Living with Risk: 
A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives – UNDRR,” 2004,  
https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/657.
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ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS
Higher education institutions actively partner with the 
government and non-government organisations to 
strengthen research and technical capacity on CCA-DRR 
including HMCCC. Many academic institutions also have 
research and public service mandates that allow them 
to play an active role in safety and resiliency advocacy 
and programme implementation. Furthermore, topical 
experts occasionally move between public and academic 
fields. Interviewees noted that partners in state universi-
ties and colleges were important to “carry out assessment 
and capacity building with LGUs” and “they help in finding 
innovative technologies that could help address farming 
issues and concerns in local communities” (Phil01). One key 
informant from academia underlined the utility of part-
nering for technical knowledge and local capacities:
 –“What we advocate is the community of practice, where 
the LGU will have an academic and CSO partner that 
will help them in terms of gathering the data, [especially] 
if it’s climate change adaptation, climate related. They 
can build the baseline data which they can use to back 
up their local sectoral plans, such as the LCCAP and the 
DRRM Plan, which will eventually be included in their 
CDP. That’s the strategy” (Phil10).
PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS 
A number of privately-owned organisations have 
formally launched their involvement in CCA-DRR in 
the Philippines. One example is the Philippine Disaster 
Resilience Foundation (PRDF), which established itself as 
a leading private sector vehicle for coordinated responses 
to disasters in the country. Last year, the organisation 
drew up a national framework on the role of the private 
sector in DRR, together with the NDRRMC and UNDP. 
Figure 6: Key legal frameworks (orange), resulting bodies, and main actors. In the interest of space, important agencies and bodies 
serving as members or on advisory committees are omitted. POPCOM currently does not sit on either the CCC, the NDRRMC or in the 
CCAM-DRR cluster.
Key Legal Frameworks, Resulting Bodies and Main Actors
RA 9729 (2009)
CCC (No Secretariat)
President  
of the Philippines  
(Chair)
Secretary/Commissioner
Undersecretary
Commissioner
Undersecretary
Commissioner
EO 43 (2011)
EO 24 (2017)
CCAM-DRR 
Cluster CCC (Secretariat)
Department of Environment 
Natural Resources (DENR)  
(Chair)
DND
RA 10121 (2010)
NDRRMC OCD (Secretariat)
Department of  
National Defense (DND)  
(Chair)
DILG – Disaster  
Preparedness
DOST – Disaster  
Prevention and Mitigation
DSWD – Disaster  
Response
NEDA – Disaster 
 Rehabilitation and Recovery
116
Relevant Policies for HMCCC 
In the Philippines, new ground can be broken by finding 
entry points for HMCCC in two national policies on CCA 
(RA 9729) and DRRM (RA 10121). These policies frame 
the country’s engagement in international coordination 
and negotiation mechanisms, such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA), and the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030 (see 
Figure 7). 
THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACT OF 2009
RA 9729 aims to mainstream climate change into govern-
ment policy formulation and to establish national and local 
strategies and programmes for climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. The law asserts the responsibility of the 
state to resolve climate change issues, protect vulnerable 
groups, and engage the above-mentioned stakeholders 
through improved policy formulation, development plan-
ning, poverty reduction programmes and research. The law 
also provided for the creation of the CCC as an oversight 
body to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programmes 
and action plans of the government relating to its UNFCCC 
obligations.373 374 The responsibility to lead climate change-
related initiatives at the local level has been lodged with 
the LGUs, with the close involvement of the barangays.
CCC was initially set up with a funding of PhP50 million 
(approximately USD 989,890). Its subsequent allocations 
were included in the General Appropriations Act. In 2010, 
the CCC published a Framework Strategy and Program on 
Climate Change and the National Climate Change Action 
Plan for 2010 – 2022. 
THE NATIONAL DRRM ACT OF 2010 
RA 10121 intends to strengthen institutional capacities for 
disaster risk reduction and management system, in line 
with current international humanitarian standards, as well 
as to advance the resilience of the population to disas-
ters. The Act contains an explicit recognition of gender, 
indigenous knowledge, and intersectionality with conflict-
affected groups without explicitly acknowledging the need 
to protect the human rights of these people. 
373 See note 345.
374  For a detailed list of powers and responsibilities, see Fourteenth Congress of 
the Philippines, “R.A. 9729,” Pub. L. No. 9729 (2009), https://www.lawphil.net/
statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9729_2009.html.
Timeline for Key Moments  
in Building CCA and DRR/DM 
Policies in the Philippines
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RA 10121 establishes the National Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Council (NDRRMC), with interagency 
composition, chaired by the Department of National 
Defense.375 In 2011, the NDRRMC produced the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP), 
2011 – 2028. The law has explicit provisions for decentrali-
sation down to the village level and for funding.376 
RA 9729 and RA 10121 were perceived as landmark poli-
cies by officials approached for this study, because of their 
endorsement of interagency cooperation. This enables 
the development and recognition of specific agency 
guidelines to reinforce institutional capacities at multiple 
levels, even if local uptake can be improved. For example, 
DILG developed the guidelines for the Rationalized Local 
Planning System to integrate DRR and CCA concerns into 
local development plans and programmes. Both NEDA’s 
Mainstreaming DRR in Subnational Development Land 
Use / Physical Framework Planning in the Philippines 
as well as the Harmonized Gender and Development 
Guidelines for Project Development, Implementation, 
Monitoring and Evaluation reinforce the call for local 
actions considering gender variables. 
Both policies likewise encourage the participation of civil 
society, academia, private sector and community-based 
organisations, an indication of facilitating their empow-
erment as key partners (Phil11–17). Mandatory funding 
provisions assure financial resources needed to pursue 
risk reduction and climate action to accomplish safety and 
resilience objectives. 
375  Fourteenth Congress of the Philippines, “Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Act of 2010 – Republican Act 10121,” Pub. L. No. Philippine 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (RA 10121) (2010), 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/laws/1549.pdf.
376  “Not less than five percent (5 %) of the estimated revenue from regular 
sources shall be set aside as the LDRRMF to support disaster preparedness 
programmes including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, 
supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and for the payment of 
premiums on calamity insurance.” See Section 21, Fourteenth Congress of the 
Philippines.
6.4. 
Mapping Obstacles and Building 
Blocks for HMCCC People-Centred 
Planning 
None of the laws and policies noted above makes explicit 
mention of population movements relating to climate 
change. Experts interviewed for this study confirm there 
are no frameworks that “tackle mobility, migration, or 
displacement in relation to climate change directly” (Phil08, 
emphasis added). Climate is a relatively new policy field. 
Laws and policies related to human mobility more gener-
ally are nascent and have been the target of fluctuating 
political interest at multiple levels of government. While 
RA 9729 and RA 10121 have some areas for improvement, 
they are commonly perceived by interviewees as good 
steps forward. RA 10121, in particular, was described by 
interviewees as “robust” (Phil03), “a big feather on the cap” 
(Phil05), and “the closest policy measure we can probably 
consider as addressing the issue of climate-related migra-
tion” (Phil08). 
Policy Gaps
Key informants expressed the perception that a lack of 
interest in internal migration and of slow-onset drivers of 
vulnerability represent a key gap in current policies, plans, 
and knowledge (Phil02, Phil03, Phil04, Phil06). A number 
of policy and administrative reforms may be necessary 
to formally and fully integrate HMCCC concerns into the 
prevailing policy and governance structure. 
A review of RA 10121 was initiated but was stalled during 
the transition into the new administration.377 Calls to 
review emphasised the need to consider the “new normal” 
(Phil02-03) as well as to integrate lessons learned from 
the large-scale disasters like Typhoon Washi/Sendong in 
2011, Typhoon Bopha/Pablo in 2012 and Typhoon Haiyan/
377  Sofia Tomacruz, “Mandatory Review of Disaster Law Did Not Take 
Place in Congress,” August 24, 2018, https://www.rappler.com/
nation/210255-mandatory-review-republic-act-10121-did-not-take-place.
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Yolanda in 2013.378 An expert shared views on why the 
review is necessary: 
 –“[the policy] lacks substantive provisions [on protec-
tion]. The tendency usually is to declare an emergency or 
advisory to evacuate but [there are] no guidelines on how 
to evacuate, so people get left behind. People are getting 
abused, even during the transit or even during evacua-
tion. […] and I think that’s a big gap” (Phil05).
RA 9729 has no clear provisions on the management of 
climate-induced mobility but considers migration as a 
“system of interest” within the CCC. It may not be a major 
thematic priority in the NCCAP (Phil08), but “population 
displacement and migration as a result of sea level rise or 
other large-scale biophysical, ecological or social disruptions 
[are] linked with security concerns associated with climate 
change” (Phil08). At the time of writing, the NCCAP was in 
the process of being updated379 and the National Security 
Strategy alludes to climate change as a national security 
threat.380 
Policy reforms could be assisted by developing a robust 
evidence base. One issue expert noted the challenge of 
championing climate-mobility linkages: “We recognise the 
two are related but moving forward can be hindered by [a 
dearth of] information” (Phil06). Interviewees noted, never-
theless, anecdotal evidence on the migratory impacts of 
drought and El Niño (Phil01), degraded fisheries and other 
coastal resources (Phil06, Phil08, Phil09–10), rising sea levels 
(Phil01, Phil009–010), ocean acidification (Phil09–010), and 
degradation of agricultural land and natural inputs (Phil06, 
Phil08). A number of interviewees referred to experiences 
of drought in 2016 and in 2019, thought to have triggered 
labour migration of people from rural to urban areas.381 
378  Various proposals for the replacement of RA10121 came out both in the 
House of Representatives and in the Senate. At the time of writing, a proposal 
to combine DRR and CCA – embodied in HB 8165 – into a joint cabinet-level 
level, the Department of Disaster Resilience, awaits approval. Voltaire Tupaz, 
“Gov’t Eyes ‘stronger’ Disaster Management Agency to Replace NDRRMC,” 
Rappler, January 12, 2017, http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/
disasters/158170-government-eyes-stronger-disaster-management-agency-
replace-ndrrmc.
379  “National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2011 – 2028 | ESCAP Policy  
Documents Managment,” accessed August 14, 2019, https://policy.
asiapacificenergy.org/node/928.
380  Office of the President, “National Security Strategy: Security and 
Development For Transformational Change and Well-Being of the 
Filipino People” (Manila, April 2018), http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/
downloads/2018/08aug/20180802-national-security-strategy.pdf.
381  Ariah Cadiogan, “Drought-Affected Philippine Farmers Share Hopes for 
New Government,” news.trust.org, May 31, 2016, http://news.trust.org/
item/20160531034226-4ze2y.
Weak leadership, inter-agency communication, siloed 
outputs and procurement difficulties can detract from the 
positive coordination efforts noted above. Interviewees 
noted a lack of adequate leadership on the part of the 
Office of Civil Defense (OCD), leaving the four vice chairs 
of the RDRRMC to perform tasks as required, creating 
subsequent confusion across multiples clusters (Phil11–17). 
One focus group participant complained: “This is ironic 
since when we talk about [environmental action], RA 10121 
is highly praised, but in reality, there’s a lot of confusion and 
overlap.” (Phil16).
Weak communication mechanisms and coordination 
within inter-agency platforms noted by interviewees have 
contributed to hardening of institution-specific mandates 
and the de-prioritisation of inter-agency goals. Moreover, 
the NDRRMP shaped several institutional initiatives on 
DRRM but many of these initiatives were carried out by 
some institutions with relative independence from the 
national plan.382 Procurement guidelines can be constric-
tive for local governments, especially for agencies like 
the Disaster Risk Management Bureau (DRMB) that does 
considerable work for 5th or 6th class municipalities – 
lower- and lowest-income provinces and cities – encum-
bered by demands to protect their constituencies and 
assets on shoestring budgets. Demand to produce outputs 
consistent with national goals and international norms 
needs to go with governance reforms that could support 
and facilitate local level capacities. 
Gender-Sensitive Approaches
Overall, experts interviewed for this baseline study noted 
that gender is relatively prevalent in efforts to address 
disaster displacement and migration, in part because 
women were already visibly present in migration – as well 
as empirically – in some communities for many decades 
(Phil04). Furthermore, there is a prevalence of women in 
the public sector, in particular in sustainable development 
and humanitarian aid (Phil02-03). Many experts under-
lined that women’s sexual and reproductive health should 
be of particular concern in times of crisis. However, in the 
context of this research, most government officials did not 
address women’s safety in great depth. This may be due to 
382  Sonny N Domingo and Divina C Olaguera, “SERP-P Publication: Have We 
Institutionalized DRRM in the Philippines? Domingo, Sonny N., Olaguera,  
Ma. Divina C. 2017” (Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2017), 
https://serp-p.pids.gov.ph/serp-p/details.php?pid=5813.
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cultural norms, the sensitivity of the issue, or personal reti-
cence to speak about the issue in an anecdotal way.
One notable exception discussed the following incident: 
“During Yolanda, in relocations sites, there were notable 
increases in cases of teenage pregnancy. We tried to deter-
mine the reasons, identified appropriate intervention. That’s 
our observation. If you are displaced and mobile, you are 
more exposed to risk” (Phil06). Concerning migration for 
proactive adaptation and displacement risk reduction, one 
expert noted: “[women] usually do not have a decision-
making power to migrate prior to a disaster” (Phil08).383 
Another explained that the subdivision of land disadvan-
tages women farming communities, adding to the need to 
seek livelihoods elsewhere (Phil04). These expert opinions 
confirm findings from the literature review conducted for 
this study, which indicated urban, educated, and well-
connected women are more likely to benefit from migra-
tion than women from rural areas, although rural-urban 
internal migration of women is increasing (see section 6.2).
While most experts expressed their perception that good 
policies are in place to protect the rights of women, some 
areas for improvement were noted. The importance of 
383  The expert also said that the link between mobility and gender was “also one 
of the more heated discussions on the adaptation forum that we last held in 
the ADB” (Phil08).
empowering women at the local level was highlighted by at 
least one interviewee: 
 –“And the problem really persists in terms of, I think: we 
have to bring more women champions to be more visible 
in leading the communities towards sustainable solu-
tions to climate change. So the women in the communi-
ties have to understand that they can contribute as well 
in terms of long-term solutions to climate change… So, it 
has to be more about providing the women sector with 
the expertise, providing them opportunities to lead in 
their communities, in their sectors of expertise wherever 
they are working – in the schools, in the business sector, 
providing them the tools to also take part in trans-
forming their sector towards resilience” (Phil08).
Several interviewees identified gaps in research and data on 
the gendered impacts of climate change. One interviewee 
mentioned missing research on gendered-based accounts 
of international migration when agricultural productions 
decline, because women can apparently find work abroad 
more easily (Phil08). Sex and age disaggregation of data 
was a priority concern for some (Phil06 and Phil10), which 
are also commitments elaborated in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. However, as long as the avail-
ability of regular, reliable data on migration in general 
is poor in the Philippines (described in the next section), 
experts believe it is unlikely that disaggregation of data will 
be prioritised (Phil06).
Lake Sebu – Philippines (© Jorge S. Ebay)
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Data Gaps
There is a strong perception in the Philippines that poor or 
absent data is a major weakness for understanding human 
mobility and for formulating evidence-based policies on 
mobility in the context of climate change. Poor or absent 
data was the weakness most discussed by key informants, 
covered at least 37 times. By comparison, lack of disaster 
preparedness and lack of targeted policies were the two 
next most frequently discussed issues, appearing 17 and 13 
times in the interviews, respectively.384 
Official reports are not available but experts interviewed 
shared their observations, for example: “I don’t have 
information about communities that move out because of 
the impact of climate change. But I think it’s happening, 
and I’m sure there are many factors involved” (Phil01). One 
interviewee simply stated that “there’s no conscious effort 
to put a priority on data management” (Phil05). Another, 
from a prominent intergovernmental organisation, noted 
that they went to donors outside of the country to apply 
for funding in order to conduct research on mobility, for 
which national interest could not be mustered. Specifically, 
the research would fill gaps in knowledge on communities 
in Mindanao that had been adversely affected by climate 
change and “are moving from one place to another, mostly 
internally, but also abroad and [ultimately] become OFWs” 
(Phil02). 
The need to improve databases on migration was expressed 
throughout the interviews, along with many examples of 
why tracking past or current movements is such a major 
challenge in the Philippines. One interviewee mentioned 
that population projections are sometimes stalled after 
each census, for political reasons, or due to a lack of data 
(Phil04). A key informant described how restructuring 
processes around the establishment of the Philippine 
Statistics Authority (PSA) created institutional confusion 
and impediments to data collection, like the NMS in 2015. 
PSA replaced the National Statistics Office (NSO) in 2013, 
“So all interagency committees, technical working groups, 
were sort of in limbo, and nothing happened. It took some 
time to process all the necessary papers under the new 
agency” (Phil04). More technical personnel in areas from 
census enumeration to statistical analysis would be needed 
to support PSA in its work (Phil04).
384  It is worth noting that some issues explored more extensively in the literature 
were not broached by most interviewees – for example, social tensions or 
conflicts.
Establishing the PSA as a single, centralised authority 
which “shall primarily be responsible for all national 
censuses and surveys, sectoral statistics, consolidation of 
selected administrative recording systems and compilation 
of national accounts”385 is a key effort by the Government 
of the Philippines (GOP) in order to produce better official 
statistics along with: (1) the standardisation of concepts 
and definitions on internal and international migration 
for statistical purposes;386 (2) development of a framework 
to be able to measure internal migrants and to distin-
guish international migrants from overseas Filipinos; and, 
(3) conduct of the National Migration Survey.387 
Government officials approached for this study place a lot 
of weight in the ability of the National Migration Survey 
(NMS) to close existing data gaps. The NMS is expected 
to provide a boost of confidence in knowledge of both 
international and internal migration.388 The aim for NMS 
is to refine data on different migration streams that would 
allow comparison of development initiatives across urban 
and rural conditions. It could also generate information 
of the migration experience, for example, whether one’s 
livelihood or well-being has improved due to transfer of 
residence. Initial results are already telling in terms of the 
magnitude of intra- and inter-regional migration, migra-
tion motivations and intentions, and shifts in migrant 
destinations, both internally and internationally.389 The 
survey includes indicators related to displacement but 
does not specifically intend to include slow-onset climate 
drivers. However, it will shed light on labour mobility more 
broadly, which will capture migrants affected by gradual 
climate changes. Overall, experts felt the NMS is a very 
385  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “About PSA,” n. d., http://www.psa.gov.
ph/about.
386  RA 10625 (the Philippine Statistical Act of 2013) mandates the PSA to 
coordinate with government departments and local government units to 
promote and adopt “statistical standards involving techniques, methodologies, 
concepts and definitions and classifications,” and to ensure the “avoidance of 
duplication in the collection of statistical information.” In response to this call, 
the Interagency Committee on Migration Statistics (IACMS) recommended 
for the approval of official concepts and definitions related to migration for 
statistical purposes.
387  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “Total Number of OFWs Estimated at 2.3 
Million (Results from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos).”
388  Data for NMS has been collected and is currently being processed. While 
a report and the underlying data were not available at the time of writing, 
initial results launched in October 2019 were reviewed: Philippine Statistics 
Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI), 
“NMS Key Findings.”
389  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and University of the Philippines 
Population Institute (UPPI).
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positive development that will improve migration data and 
provide entry points for HMCCC. One interviewee noted 
that “It was a long process advocating for [the NMS],” and 
“we’ve been advocating for [inclusion of migration questions 
in the census] for more than 10 years now” (Phil04). 
To complement the NMS, efforts are being funnelled 
into supporting local capacities for migration tracking. 
POPCOM initiated the Registry of Barangay Inhabitants 
and Migrants (RBIM) programme with DILG, replacing 
the now-defunct Registry of Barangay Inhabitants (RBI) of 
DILG. The RBIM is essentially a migration tracking instru-
ment that a barangay can use to monitor entries and exits. 
Through this, the community can develop its own migra-
tion database to inform local plans and programmes. The 
programme was piloted in Tanay, Rizal and in Malay, Aklan.
Many key informants provided anecdotal evidence about 
human mobility in the context of climate change. Nine of 
ten individual interviewees spoke about the topic. Some 
key informants made note of the limited reliability of such 
evidence (Phil06, Phil09, Phil10). They recommended more 
research to close existing data gaps and to provide a solid 
base on which decision makers can act: “we need empirical 
data for more efficient planning” (Phil06). One difficulty 
raised by a key informant was in regards to future popu-
lation projections that include migration as a key demo-
graphic: “we have almost nil for migration because data are 
always lacking” (Phil04). 
Interestingly, several interviewees drew a connection 
between HMCCC and settlements in unsafe areas. While 
there is currently limited empirical evidence that climate 
change is an important factor driving under-resourced 
migrants and displaced people to unsafe settlements, 
particularly in larger cities, more research on the issue is 
needed. For example:
 –“When we talked about natural disasters, we see that 
most victims are migrants because they are forced to 
settle in hazardous areas. Migrants usually look for 
available lands to settle in regardless of risk… The driver 
of unsafe settlements is internal migration. One of our 
limitations right now is the data. So far that’s what we 
see. We can establish the connection between unsafe 
settlement locations with internal migration because 
there’s literature and a logical connection, but we need 
the database to serve as evidence for this relationship 
and the linkage between human mobility and climate 
change” (Phil06).
The same interviewee also expressed optimism about 
future knowledge management and research opportu-
nities: “…when we were approached [to contribute to the 
HMCCC project in the Philippines], we responded affirma-
tively while thinking about the potential inputs and data 
that it can bring. It can help us in crafting a more realistic 
policy” (Phil06). 
POPCOM is a key actor in data collection and management. 
Part of its mandate is to develop local capacities to track 
internal migration and it, thus, serves as the “lead organi-
zation in population management for well-planned and 
empowered Filipino families and communities”.390 
The need to shed further light on the implications 
of internal migration – rural-urban movements, in 
particular – led POPCOM to conduct a rapid appraisal in 
2014 to explore existing patterns and to identify prevailing 
factors influencing decisions to migrate or stay under more 
or less similar circumstances.391 Using data from the 2010 
census (CPH) as well as qualitative information from key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions, the 
appraisal points to a very dynamic character of internal 
migration in the country.392 
These assessments are crucial inputs for policymakers 
in identifying action points that can create an enabling 
context for local development to improve service and 
quality of life of the rural population. However, inter-
viewees also noted that a more systematic, longitudinal 
database on internal migration and internal displacement 
would be helpful, especially in any attempt to link slow-
onset hazards and migration. 
390  Commission on Population (POPCOM), “Mission Vision Goal,” accessed 
August 14, 2019, http://www.popcom.gov.ph/transparency-seal/agency- 
profile/mission-vision.
391  Perez III, “On the Move: Current Patterns and Factors of Internal Migration in 
the Philippines Filipinos.”
392  Migration experts acknowledged that the decadal CPH does not completely 
capture internal migration. The default question on migration is not currently 
adequate to bridge the gap, as de facto migration can only be discerned if a 
given participant’s residency changed up to five years before the enumeration 
year. This, however, can produce misleading information on migration because 
it fails to capture return movements, short-term movements, and circular or 
seasonal migration. As in other areas, experts indicated that key priority areas – 
in this case, basic migration data through the NMS – would take precedent 
over putting resources into deeper, complex empirical work needed to better 
capture and understand HMCCC phenomena.
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Research 
In part thanks to familiarity with human mobility, many 
tools exist in the Philippines to understand migration 
broadly. For internal migration, mechanisms for moni-
toring movement at the community level, such as through 
the Migration Information Centre (MIC), are growing. 
Pilot data collection activities in places like Tanay, Rizal, 
Malay and Aklan – where a spate of recent increases in 
internal migration has been detected – have been evalu-
ated by the government as promising. Additionally, there 
are efforts to revive the Registry of Barangay Inhabitants 
(RBI) of the Department of Interior and DILG. The RBI 
module may be improved to become the RBIM and lodged 
across all villages in the country. A standard population 
data basing tool is crucial given the failure of other similar 
tools in the past to fully take off (e.g., the Community Based 
Monitoring System or CBMS). It is vital for the tool to be 
friendly, technically accessible, and comprehensible to 
users to ensure compliance. Dialogues with other agencies 
with complementary functions could redound to mutual 
benefits vital in fulfilling respective mandates. 
Current effort to address information gaps on internal 
migration are likely to continue to have positive knock-on 
effects in terms of greater understanding of slow-onset 
climatic and environmental determinants of migra-
tion. Initiatives like the reorganisation of NSO into PSA 
are fundamental in consolidating national accounts and 
information databases.393 Specifically for migration, they 
could refine methodological and analytical parameters in 
migration research, policy, planning and programming and 
boost calls to fill data gaps on migration, both internal and 
international. 
In terms of the link between climate change and displace-
ment, current knowledge and monitoring mechanisms are 
a notable strength in the Philippines. Good practices exist 
and can be replicated. For instance, a week after Typhoon 
Yolanda in 2013, the Migration Outflow Desks (MODs) 
was established by IOM in partnership with DSWD and 
the Philippine National Policies (PNP) in key coordination 
hubs along the typhoon corridor (Tacloban, Cebu, Guiuan, 
Roxas, Ormoc and Manila) to monitor the inflow and 
outflow of people. Outflows triggered mainly by govern-
ment-supported evacuation394 were observed to return to 
pre-typhoon levels in one month.395 MODs built profiles of 
the people moving out, the intention being to track survi-
vors who sought temporary shelter with relatives, espe-
cially in Cebu and Metro Manila, in order to better provide 
them with necessary provisions and support. 
Experts approached for this study noted that a greater 
conceptual clarity between “voluntary” migration and 
displacement as they relate to climate impacts is needed. 
393  Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), “Total Number of OFWs Estimated at 
2.3 Million (Results from the 2018 Survey on Overseas Filipinos).”
394 Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA).
395  IDMC, “The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: 
An Evidence-Based Overview.”
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Movement due to slow-onset events or environmental 
degradation represents a gap in empirical evidence. In the 
case of the Philippines, anecdotal evidence of this has been 
presented (see the “Storytelling” box, page 112).
Current tools for migration data and research in the 
Philippines are not entirely appropriate to unpack the 
complex relationship between human mobility and 
climate change, especially to investigate the internal move-
ments that are the most likely to be observed. Previous 
research396 tracing migration movements relied on primary 
data collection rather than on official government records 
or reports. Existing tracking mechanisms are reserved for 
international labour migrants and are generally not appli-
cable to internal migrants.397 The Migration Information 
Center (MIC) developed by POPCOM in consonance with 
RA 7279 may fill some gaps but requires buy-in from LGUs. 
The dataset generated by the MIC is intended as input to 
policies that would regulate movement and improve popu-
lation management programmes.398 
The state of empirical research specifically on HMCCC in 
the Philippines is limited as compared to other regions of 
the world. Interviews conducted for this study uncovered 
a number of areas of focus for future research identified 
by experts in the field, notably: the influence of weather 
variability and extreme weather on rural out-migration, 
including internal, international, and circular movements 
(Phil02-03, Phil08); gendered impacts of climate change on 
human mobility (Phil04, Phil08); impacts of climate change 
on rural-urban migration to informal settlements, and 
related displacement risks (Phil02-03); the role of migra-
tion as a household strategy to adapt to environmental and 
climatic change (Phil04); the impacts of natural hazard-
induced displacement on subsequent migration (Phil04, 
Phil08); greater tracking of people post-displacement in 
general (Phil04), and; in general, more ethnographic (quali-
tative) studies to elucidate observations made from quanti-
tative research (Phil08).
396  Quisumbing and Mcniven, “Migration and the Rural-Urban Continuum: 
Evidence from Bukidnon, Philippines.”
397  An expert interviewed for this purpose shared that there is a need to 
harmonize data on international migration. There are specific units under the 
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs that work on international migration and they do not have a unified 
data set. The Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) under DOLE 
uses contracts issued in determining the number of migrants. So if a worker 
got two separate contracts in a year, i.e., six months or less per contract, then 
that worker is counted twice. 
398  Perez III, “On the Move: Current Patterns and Factors of Internal Migration in 
the Philippines Filipinos.”
6.5. 
Recommendations for the Philippines
There is currently no law or policy specifically on human 
mobility and climate change in the Philippines. Legal and 
policy frameworks to address human mobility tend to fall 
under two categories: disaster displacement or interna-
tional labour migration. International engagements on 
the part of the government on the climate-mobility nexus 
also reflect the prioritisation of the protection of over-
seas workers as well as of the facilitation of the develop-
ment of benefits of international migration.399 Inside the 
Philippines, the government has more experience tackling 
disaster displacement than addressing the root causes and 
impacts of voluntary migration in the face of longer-term 
climate impacts, particularly in regards to internal migra-
tion, which are likely to be the main type of movement 
resulting from climate change impacts. However, there are 
opportunities to bring a climate lens into existing policy 
frameworks. Based on key insights from expert interviews, 
this section summarises some of these priority areas and 
offers some recommendations. 
SET A STRATEGIC DIRECTION
In recent years, the Philippines has demonstrated many 
of the key strengths needed to set strategic direction 
for human mobility in the context of climate change: 
sustained commitment at national levels of leadership; 
engagement in relevant international dialogues, and in 
cross-country coordination, such as through the Platform 
on Disaster Displacement (PDD) and former Nansen 
Initiative, the MCIC initiative, the Global Compact on Safe, 
Orderly, and Regular Migration (2018), and the separate 
Global Compact on Refugees (2018); building institutional 
structures and capacities for effective implementation of 
policies and programmes, for example, through the work 
of POPCOM and DRMB; and executing monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms, such as the pilot initiative to 
track internal migration through the Registry of Barangay 
Inhabitants (RBI) prescribed by the DILG.
399  For example, by advocating in international fora for: improved remittance 
environments and lowering the costs and barriers to financial remittances; fair 
recruitment practices; strengthening migration pathways and overall economic 
relations with key receiving countries; and facilitating foreign investment.
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An area for continued improvement is ensuring the 
full participation of the affected communities in policy 
development and implementation planning, with due 
consideration to disaggregation of data, and with special 
attention to the specific circumstances and needs of 
vulnerable or marginalised groups. Overall, a main priority 
for the Philippines remains the need to translate interna-
tional- and national- level policies and interests to their 
implementation in local communities. In addition, the 
Philippines is well placed to:
	§ Share best practices and lessons learned in addressing 
displacement due to disasters in international fora, and 
advocate for greater integration of a climate-mobility 
lens in relevant international plans and programmes;
	§ Contribute to a better understanding of the local, 
community-level impacts of climate projections, and 
their subsequent influence on migration trends, which 
may be supported by the development of multi-dimen-
sional models and indices to predict the impacts of 
climate change on migration outcomes. 
FOSTER EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND 
DECISION MAKING
Effective policy implementation on human mobility in the 
context of climate change means mainstreaming of human 
mobility – including migration, displacement, and planned 
relocations at different geographic and temporal scales – 
into overall development planning. The government’s 
strategy should include: capacity building and training of 
key officials at the local and provincial level; further efforts 
to raise awareness about climate-related migration trends; 
and integrating this lens into development planning. A 
development worth noting is the first intra-regional migra-
tion census conducted by PSA in 2018.400 
In addition, it would be important to:
	§ Invite POPCOM into the NDRRMC and CCC, to broaden 
understanding and approaches to internal migration 
while considering its value as a strategy for risk reduc-
tion and adaptation; 
400  Karen Bermejo, “Malay Migration Grows in 5 Years: POPCOM,”  
October 10, 2018, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1050634. Bermejo.
	§ Improve and standardise vulnerability assessment tools 
at the local and regional levels, for instance, participa-
tory mapping at the community level can be a vital 
material for LGU planning and policy implementation;
	§ Establish needs assessments and develop policy 
remedies intended specifically for people moving in the 
context of slow-onset hazards;
	§ Integrate climate and migration lenses to research and 
data instruments including via the NMS, RBIM, and 
the Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS) for 
LGUs, among others;
	§ Fit the Climate and Disaster Risk Assessment (CDRA) 
(the tool currently endorsed by the DILG to build 
climate information database) with questions/parame-
ters that would allow LGUs to track/monitor slow onset 
climate events;
	§ Include a climate and human mobility lens in the 
review of existing policies and plans particularly associ-
ated with RA 9729 and RA 10121;
	§ Support the DILG in advancing a legal and policy 
framework to identify, endorse, fund, and carry out 
planned relocations of whole communities and of 
families in exposed areas, informed by international 
standards.401 
FOSTER PARTICIPATORY, COMMUNITY-BASED 
APPROACHES
Community-based programme implementation and 
integration of vulnerable groups can be improved. Both 
are needed for inclusive and sustainable policy implemen-
tation. The dearth of disaggregated data is a challenge to 
evidence-based policy development as well as to moni-
toring and evaluation of policy effectiveness. In addition, 
measures for community participation in the concep-
tion and implementation of planned relocations should 
be strengthened. While research indicates that Filipinos 
prefer local measures to adapt in situ to the prospect of 
whole community relocations,402 higher-level coordination 
and government support in these strategies will be critical 
401  IOM, Georgetown University, and UNHCR, “A Toolbox: Planning Relocations 
to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change | Environmental 
Migration Portal.”
402  Ma. Laurice Jamero et al., “Small-Island Communities in the Philippines Prefer 
Local Measures to Relocation in Response to Sea-Level Rise,” Nature Climate 
Change 7 (July 24, 2017): 581. Laurice Jamero et al.
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to their success. Moreover, the need for adequate, timely 
responses to relocation requests by families and individuals 
in exposed areas403 is likely to continue. 
	§ Strengthen monitoring of local implementation of poli-
cies and programmes with full participation of affected 
communities and community leaders, considering 
inclusivity principles;
	§ Develop and communicate clear, open mechanisms for 
requesting planned relocation, supporting the DILG’s 
initiatives on local implementation of planned reloca-
tion frameworks;404 
	§ Develop mechanisms for formalisation and transfer of 
tenure in informal settlement areas, including griev-
ance mechanisms.
ANTICIPATORY EFFORTS TO MANAGE MIGRATION AND 
DISPLACEMENT
There should be an overarching system to manage migra-
tion and displacement that includes the establishment 
and maintenance of safe, regular, dignified and prosperous 
migration pathways at all skill levels. Greater sensi-
tivity should be exercised to low- and un-skilled sectors, 
because climate change impacts disproportionately affect 
the poor and marginalised. The previous experience of 
the Philippines and the ‘Global Skills Partnership’ envis-
aged in the Global Compact on Migration can be scaled 
up through private sector partnership to develop targeted 
skills matching programmes for temporary migration for 
all skills categories.405 In addition, to continue the country’s 
sophisticated disaster displacement management outlined 
above, the Philippines and its partners should:
403  Annabel Consuelo Petinglay, “39 Families along Malandog River up for 
Relocation,” 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1066078. Petinglay.
404 See above.
405  For example, article 5(b) of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration, adopted in 2018: ”Develop flexible, rights-based and gender-
responsive labour mobility schemes for migrants, in accordance with local and 
national labour market needs and skills supply at all skills levels, including 
temporary, seasonal, circular and fast-track programmes in areas of labour 
shortages, by providing flexible, convertible and non-discriminatory visa and 
permit options, such as for permanent and temporary work, multiple-entry 
study, business, visit, investment and entrepreneurship.”
	§ Ensure the DRMB is adequately funded and staffed;
	§ Support DILG and DRMB in their work for Geographi-
cally Isolated and Disadvantaged Areas (GIDAS), to 
undercut contributing factors to so-called “distress” 
migration;
	§ Regularly consult with the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of IDPs on the improvement of disaster displace-
ment response as well as the intersection between 
conflict and disaster displacement. 
	§ Actively pursue and support the development of the 
population registrars (through CBMS or RBIM) to 
anticipate movement vital in proactive management of 
internal migration. 
EXECUTE ABATING ACTIONS FOR CLIMATE RISKS
Policies and programmes to undercut the root causes 
of displacement and distress migration, and specifi-
cally targeting people already affected by climate change 
impacts, are also key actions the Philippines could include:
	§ Further developing safety net mechanisms for poor 
families experiencing severe losses and damage in the 
context of extreme weather and disasters, such as cash 
for work programmes, which are currently limited;
	§ Continuing to support and expand the Philippine Crop 
Insurance Corporation and the Cooperative Insurance 
System of the Philippines (CISP), working with the 
private sector;
	§ Evaluate mechanisms to request relocation and reset-
tlement in anticipation of severe hazards and climate 
risks;
	§ Establish empirical and legal thresholds to designate 
areas as unsafe or unfit for human habitation.
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FOSTER AND SUSTAIN A STRONG ACTOR/
STAKEHOLDER NETWORK
There is a need for enhanced communication and coopera-
tion between national-level actors, local level actors, the 
multi-national private sector, and the donor community. 
One of the primary challenges in policy implementation 
and in ensuring the sustainability of capacity building 
efforts has been the reliability of LGUs. While this report 
does not seek to question the autonomy of LGUs, given the 
importance of local buy-in to ensure the sustainability of 
policies and programmes, a number of possible actions are 
proposed for DILG in particular:
	§ Prioritise the establishment of partnerships between 
LGUs and reliable local implementing partners for 
evidence-based policy development and implementa-
tion, in particular, through universities (as independent 
knowledge brokers);
	§ Train LGUs and local implementing partners in migra-
tion data and analysis, as well as in – most critically – 
how to interpret and downscale the findings of climate 
science to local impacts;
	§ Raise awareness about climate change and human 
mobility in the context of climate change among the 
general population;
	§ Enhance coordination and collaboration between and 
among government agencies, donors, and civil society 
organisations to work towards common solutions 
to climate and mobility challenges at the level of the 
communities.
STRENGTHEN CRITICAL COORDINATION AND 
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS
Communications challenges emanating from a complex 
actor landscape along with related fields like resilience 
building and overall development can be mitigated by 
closing the gap between national- and local-level decision 
makers and practitioners:
	§ Enhance cooperation and communication across 
relevant agencies through regular, effective, and results-
oriented meetings of the NDRMC and Climate Change 
Commission, and day-to-day communications of the 
participating agencies;
	§ Charge a data task force and commission of technical 
experts with improving web hosting systems and 
sharing mechanisms (both ICT infrastructure and 
protocols) for data and information;
	§ Invest in communications between DILG and LGUs in 
general, and establish coordination calls on this topic 
specifically; 
	§ Enhance transparency of activities and advance 
proposals to ensure data and information accessibility 
by the public and academia, for example, through 
journalist trainings, hackathons, improving open source 
data, inter alia;
	§ Improve public advocacy and communications about 
the rights of migrants and the rights of IDPs in general, 
with particular attention to humanising mobility and 
recognising the positive potential of migration (both 
internal and international) for development and adap-
tation to climate change impacts.
IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE AND DATA
Collection of basic migration and displacement data is 
important for the implementation, follow-up and review 
of migration or displacement management policy, as well 
as for identifying and assisting groups with special needs 
or vulnerabilities. A more consistent, standard, and good 
quality database that integrates existing data collection 
initiatives and empirical studies will help stakeholders 
to develop a better view of the mobility generally, and 
environment-motivated human mobility specifically. At 
the national level, within existing tools and initiatives, the 
government and its partners could consider:
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	§ Better integration, sharing, and harmonisation of 
existing data on international migration, and targeted 
analysis for potential environment-migration nexus 
trends, including: administrative data on border cross-
ings, work permits and visa processing; the survey of 
overseas Filipinos; the Philippine Overseas Employ-
ment Agency; the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 
the Bureau of Immigration; 
	§ Mapping of existing data on internal migration, and 
targeted analysis for potential environment-migration 
nexus issues, in order to identify trends and data needs 
or gaps, including: population registrars; census data; 
periodic surveys (such as the NMS); Census of Popula-
tion and Housing; National Health and Demographic 
Survey(s); and the Community-Based Monitoring 
System; and RBIM, 
	§ Establish a data task force/working group of relevant 
agencies to meet regularly to coordinate ways that 
improve data harmonisation, sharing, and overall 
knowledge management, which could be coordinated 
through the NDRMC; 
	§ Charge a data task force with improving web hosting 
systems and sharing mechanisms (both ICT infrastruc-
ture and protocols) for data – including by commis-
sioning experts to improve systems for encoding, 
cleaning, protecting, and managing data – and advance 
proposals to enhance information sharing with the 
public;
	§ Advance proposals for inclusion of migration questions 
into existing surveys; 
	§ Invite technical experts – for example, from IOM or the 
migration data task force/working group – to brief the 
NDRMC, Climate Change Commission, and Congress 
on the state of the art on climate-mobility linkages in 
the Philippines and ways to improve data and analysis 
on migration in the context of slow-onset hazards.
STRENGTHEN LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCH AND POLICY
Research institutions and academic institutions have been 
known to work in silos, providing limited opportunities for 
dialogue and knowledge sharing. Research outputs should 
be funnelled back into the channels described above, to 
help ensure evidence-based policymaking. In addition, 
efforts can be made to:
	§ Standardise and consult on terminology, methods, and 
typologies for internal migration, especially operational 
definitions used by LGUs in small-scale surveys;
	§ Scaling-up of the potential of the Community-Based 
Monitoring System for migration tracking;
	§ Encourage universities to strengthen student exchanges 
and host international scholars to present research 
on the environment-migration nexus, to host trainings, 
and mentor students.
The literature on the environment-migration nexus in 
the Philippines is fairly limited but is growing. Existing 
empirical studies conducted in Southeast Asia have tended 
to focus on disaster effects rather than migration related 
to slow-onset hazards.406 Key informants interviewed for 
this research noted a number of areas that merit further 
attention, and which may be commissioned or undertaken 
by technical experts: 
	§ The impacts of climate change on human rights;
	§ The impacts of climate change on livelihood secu-
rity, especially in relation to droughts and saltwater 
intrusion;
	§ Longitudinal studies of people internally displaced by 
disasters;
	§ Longitudinal, tracking studies of internal migration;
	§ The impacts of climate change on red tides, coral 
bleaching, changing patterns of migratory fish, irriga-
tion supply, and [perceived] extreme heat, and subse-
quent effects on migration patterns.
406  F. Laczko and C. Aghazarm, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change: 
Assessing the Evidence,” Migration, Environment and Climate Change: 
Assessing the Evidence, 2009, https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/abstract/ 
20103136708.
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 The research across the Pacific, Eastern Caribbean and the Philippines brought to light that while regional experts are concerned about the growing pressures on livelihoods and their influence on 
human mobility dynamics, there is no sufficient capacity to 
systematically address HMCCC. One challenge is – and this 
is true also outside of the countries under investigation – 
that HMCCC often cannot be directly attributed to one 
ministry, but is a cross-cutting issue, involving immigra-
tion, environment, health, education, labour and disaster 
response ministries. Moreover, in some cases, such as in the 
2017 displacements during the Caribbean cyclone season, 
movements occur across international borders. Therefore, 
the topic requires strong inter-ministerial, and intra-
regional cooperation. Also both financial and personnel 
capacity is needed at different levels of governance. While 
some interview partners established that there are more 
pressing push factors for outmigration, such as poverty, 
there is general agreement that climate impacts are 
increasingly undermining livelihoods and therefore will 
become a more important factor in future migration deci-
sion making. In order for human mobility to become an 
effective adaptation to climate change, policies and instru-
ments to support migrants, receiving and sending commu-
nities need to be designed. To fulfil this objective, both the 
Warsaw Mechanism’s Task Force on Displacement and the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
provide guidance. In the following sections we outline how 
the recommendations from these two instances can be 
operationalised for the three regions. 
7.1. 
Operationalising the 
 Recommendations of the Task Force 
on Displacement
The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with 
Climate Change Impacts submitted draft conclusions of 
the Chairs to the Forty-ninth session of the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in Katowice, 
2 – 8 December 2018, drawing from the report of the 
Executive Committee of the WIM mechanisms (FCCC/
SB/2018/1).407 Countries should work to operationalise 
the recommendations from the Task Force on disaster 
displacement, especially 51(s) and 51(t).408 This means 
addressing disaster risk reduction while striving for 
climate-resilient development.
First and foremost, all countries should “consider devel-
oping policies, plans and strategies, as appropriate, and 
to facilitate coordinated action and the monitoring of 
progress, where applicable, in efforts to avert, minimise and 
address loss and damage”.409 Some countries noted below 
have done so via their NAPs, while most have the opportu-
nity to take part in relevant regional discussions.
Specific objectives related to climate change and human 
mobility are further elaborated by the WIM Executive 
Committee through its five-year rolling work plan. In 
particular, strategic work stream (e) which calls for  
“[e]nhanced cooperation and facilitation in relation to 
action and support, including finance, technology and 
407  UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate 
Change Impacts.”
408 UNFCCC Secretariat.
409 COP Decision of 8 December 2018: FCCC/SB/2018/L.6
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capacity-building, to address loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change”.410
The WIM executive committee underlines the need  
“[t]o support and enhance regional, subregional and trans-
boundary cooperation, in relation to averting, minimizing 
and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts 
of climate change, including for risk and vulnerability 
assessments, mapping, data analysis, preparedness and 
early warning systems”.411
For example within the regions under investigation coun-
tries can work together to:
	§ Consider equity and non-economic considerations – 
such as wealth disparities, cultural identity, and place-
based identity – in disaster risk reduction activities, 
plans, and strategies. These considerations vary by 
410  UNFCCC, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts. 
Addendum,” FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1, 2017, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/
files/resource/docs/2017/sb/eng/01a01e.pdf.
411  UNFCCC Secretariat, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate 
Change Impacts.”
country, household, group, and gender, creating specific 
needs that should be considered. 
	§ Raise awareness of climate change impacts at the local 
level through science-policy communication, made 
accessible to local governments and their constituents.
	§ Invite constituted bodies under the UNFCCC regime 
[e.g. the Executive Committee of Warsaw International 
Mechanism, the Least Developed Countries Expert 
Group (LEG), the Paris Committee on Capacity Building 
(PCCB), the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(CTCN)] to develop guidance – for example, a ‘toolkit’ 
such as those that exist for planned relocations – related 
to risk reduction, related capacity building, and tech-
nology needs that can be adapted and applied at the 
national level. 
	§ Encourage donor governments to support the devel-
opment of such guidance/toolkits and the imple-
mentation of recommendations therein, with a view 
to improving consistency and coherence across the 
regions as well as within countries, to enhance coor-
dination and complementarity of different actions at 
various levels of government.
East Coast Dominica  (© Dr. Horst Vogel / GIZ)
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7.2. 
Operationalising the Objectives  
of the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration
The Global Compact provides a roadmap for addressing 
migration, with a focus on actions within the authority 
of sovereign states, and on the ways in which bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation can enhance national goals. 
With respect to current challenges in the Pacific, Eastern 
Caribbean and the Philippines, two objectives of the 
compact should be of particular interest: Objective 2, mini-
mise the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel 
people to leave their country of origin, and; Objective 5, 
enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular 
migration.
Inter alia, in Objective 2 subsections (b) and (g), states 
commit to drawing from the following actions:
 –“(b) […] eliminating the adverse drivers and structural 
factors that compel people to leave their country of 
origin, […] climate change mitigation and adaptation”,
 –“(g) Account for migrants in national emergency prepar-
edness and response”.
In addition, states commit in Objective 5, inter alia, to draw 
on actions to develop labour mobility schemes [21.(d)], to 
promote effective skills-matching [21.(e)], to 
 –(g) Develop or build on existing national and regional 
practices for admission and stay of appropriate duration 
based on compassionate, humanitarian or other consid-
erations for migrants compelled to leave their countries 
of origin, due to sudden-onset natural disasters and other 
precarious situations […], 
 –“(h) Cooperate to identify, develop and strengthen solu-
tions for migrants compelled to leave their countries of 
origin owing to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse 
effects of climate change […] including by devising 
planned relocation and visa options, in cases where 
adaptation in or return to their country of origin is not 
possible.”
Sovereign nations determine how to domesticate and 
follow-up to the compact, which provides a roadmap for 
states as well as a vehicle for regional and international 
cooperation. Implementing its objectives may inspire an 
enhancement of policies and plans at the national level, 
taking a whole-of-government approach. Successfully 
achieving the goals of the compact is much more likely 
with sustained support of the compact itself, as well as the 
objectives therein. Opportunities for the Philippines and 
Pacific and Caribbean countries, in line with the compact, 
can be found through: bilateral cooperation and engage-
ment, as well as multi-stakeholder partnerships; regular 
exchange with the UN Migration Network; and overall 
support to and engagement in the multilateral system.
Tukuraki – Fiji  (© GIZ)
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9Annex9.1. 
List of Interview Partners
CARIBBEAN
Code Organisation/Position Area of Expertise Country
C01 Ministry or Other Central National Body Social Services Antigua and Barbuda
C02 Intergovernmental Organisation Sustainable Development
C03 Local Politician Tourism Antigua and Barbuda
C04 Ministry or Other Central National Body Environment Anguilla
C05 Ministry or Other Central National Body Environment Anguilla
C06 Provincial or Municipal Body Governance Antigua and Barbuda
C07 Ministry or Other Central National Body Health, Disaster Coordination Anguilla
C08 Academia Gender
C09 Intergovernmental Organisation Climate Change and Migration
C10 Ministry or Other Central National Body Labour Anguilla
C11 Local Politician Agriculture and Fisheries Antigua and Barbuda
C12 Intergovernmental Organisation Disaster Management
C13 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Anguilla
C14 Ministry or Other Central National Body Immigration Antigua and Barbuda
C15 Ministry or Other Central National Body Social Development Anguilla
C16 National Politician Education Antigua and Barbuda
C17 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Antigua and Barbuda
C18 Non-Governmental Organisation Health, Humanitarian Action Dominica
C19 Academia Disaster Risk Reduction
C20 Intergovernmental Organisation Disaster Risk Resilience
C21 Ministry or Other Central National Body Immigration Dominica
C22 Ministry or Other Central National Body Immigration Dominica
C23 Intergovernmental Organisation Sustainability 
C24 Intergovernmental Organisation Disaster Risk Management
C25 Intergovernmental Organisation Health
C26 Intergovernmental Organisation Social Development
C27 Intergovernmental Organisation Social Development
C28 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Saint Lucia
C29 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Saint Lucia
C30 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Dominica
C31 Ministry or Other Central National Body Local Government Affairs, Disaster 
Management
Dominica
C32 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Saint Lucia
C33 Ministry or Other Central National Body Immigration Saint Lucia
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PACIFIC
Code Organisation/Position Area of Expertise Country
Pac01 Intergovernmental Organisation Disaster Displacement
Pac02 Ministry or Other Central National Body Meteorology Fiji
Pac03 Academia Geography, Development Fiji
Pac04 Academia Environment Fiji
Pac05 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Fiji
Pac06 Private Sector Environmental Law Fiji
Pac07 Non-Governmental Organisation Urban Resilience Fiji
Pac08 Ministry or Other Central National Body Multilateralism, Climate Change Fiji
Pac09 National Ministry Agriculture Fiji
Pac10 National Ministry Forestry Fiji
Pac11 Ministry or Other Central National Body Climate Change Policy Kiribati
Pac12 Provincial or Municipal Body Community Development Kiribati
Pac13 Non-Governmental Organisation Climate Action Kiribati
Pac14 Ministry or Other Central National Body Meteorology Kiribati
Pac15 Academia Climate Change Adaptation Fiji
Pac16 Intergovernmental Organisation Climate Change
Pac17 Intergovernmental Organisation Regional Cooperation
Pac18 Intergovernmental Organisation Climate Change and Migration
Pac19 Intergovernmental Organisation Security
Pac20 Non-Governmental Organisation Health Tuvalu
Pac21 Ministry or Other Central National Body Climate Change Policy Tuvalu
Pac22 Ministry or Other Central National Body Project Management Tuvalu
Pac23 National Ministry Biodiversity Tuvalu
Pac24 Non-Governmental Organisation Climate Change and Disaster 
Management
Tuvalu
Pac25 Non-Governmental Organisation Development Vanuatu
Pac26 Private Sector Maritime Ecosystems Vanuatu
Pac27 National Ministry Environmental Law Vanuatu
Pac28 Private Sector Development Vanuatu
Pac29 Non-Governmental Organisation Gender Vanuatu
Pac30 Academia Environmental Law Vanuatu
Pac31 Ministry or Other Central National Body Local Government Affairs, Develop-
ment Planning
Vanuatu
Pac32 Ministry or Other Central National Body Finance Vanuatu
Pac33 Non-Governmental Organisation Climate Action Vanuatu
Pac34 Ministry or Other Central National Body Disaster Management Vanuatu
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PHILIPPINES
Code Organisation/Position Area of Expertise Country
Phil01 Ministry or Other Central National Body Climate Change, Agriculture, 
Fisheries
Philippines
Phil02 Intergovernmental Organisation Migration Philippines
Phil03 Intergovernmental Organisation Disaster Preparedness and Response Philippines
Phil04 Academia Demography Philippines
Phil05 Intergovernmental Organisation Human Rights Philippines
Phil06 Ministry or Other Central National Body Migration Philippines
Phil07 Non-Governmental Organisation Coastal Protection Philippines
Phil08 Ministry or Other Central National Body Climate Change Philippines
Phil09 Academia Climate Change Policy Philippines
Phil10 Academia Sustainable Cities Philippines
Phil11 Ministry or Other Central National Body Local Government Affairs Philippines
Phil12 Ministry or Other Central National Body Civil Defence Philippines
Phil13 Ministry or Other Central National Body Social Welfare Philippines
Phil14 Ministry or Other Central National Body Science and Technology Philippines
Phil15 Provincial or Municipal Body Disaster Risk Reduction Philippines
Phil16 Ministry or Other Central National Body Security Philippines
Phil17 Ministry or Other Central National Body Development Philippines
Phil18-
Phil27
Residents/Focus Group Discussion Participants Various Philippines
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9.2. 
Interview Guide
	§ Introduction of interviewers and project (Human 
Mobility in the Context of Climate Change), state name, 
affiliation and position.
	§ Explanation of project scope: “To improve applied 
knowledge relating to the sustainable management of 
human mobility in the context of climate change in (the 
Philippines/the Pacific region/Caribbean region) as well 
as in international cooperation. “
	§ Goals of the interview: Learning about existing policies 
related to human mobility in the context of climate 
change.
	§ Technical Aspects: Interviews will be audiotaped and 
later on transcribed. 
	§ Informed Consent: Interviewers are required to read the 
informed consent form out loud in the language of the 
interviewee. They ask whether everything was under-
stood by the potential respondent and whether they 
wish to participate in the study. If yes, the respondent 
is asked to sign the form and answer the questions 
regarding audiotaping, use of transcriptions and 
anonymity. If no, the interviewers say that this is fine 
and thank the respondent for their time. 
	§ Questions should be asked in sequence, however, if 
some questions are already answered as part of a reply 
to a previous question, the questions are not repeated. 
Probing and additional questions for understanding 
and elaboration of new insights are possible. 
	§ At the end of each interview the interviewer thanks the 
respondents for their time and participation. 
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9.3. 
Set of Questions
Goal Policy Action Expert interview question
Introduction 1. What is your name?
2. What is your organisation?
3. Note to interviewer: please note gender.
4. Please describe your position/role.
Topical Information 5. How does climate change undermine livelihoods of people? 
Could you give some examples and how this relates to you 
work?
6. Have you witnessed effects on people’s health, also mental 
health such as trauma or depression?
7. What are the main factors that motivate people to migrate?
8. Do you think that climate change is acknowledged as a poten-
tial driver of human mobility among policymakers?
9. Have you experienced the worsening of religious, ethnic or any 
form of social tensions in the aftermath of a climate-related 
natural disaster?
Dimension 1:  
Strategic 
Policy Regime/
Framework
Policy Strategies Governmental 
Policies
10. Are there laws or policies on climate mobility on the national/ 
regional/local level?
11. Who holds the final authority to enact policies related to 
migration, internal displacement, and planned relocation?  
(in general, not necessarily related to climate)
12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s 
current strategies to address migration, displacement and 
planned relocation in the context of climate change?
Regional or inter-
national dialogues 
& cross-country 
coordination
13. What is your/your ministry’s/your entity’s involvement in 
global policy discussions, such as the annual Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework  Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?
Monitoring 
and evaluation 
mechanisms
14. What are the evaluation procedures in place for initiatives 
relating to migration, displacement and panned relocation?
Institutional 
capacities 
15. What capacities are there in the government to address or 
manage migration, displacement and planned relocation?
16. What capacities are needed?
1
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Information on 
participatory, 
community-based 
approaches
Communication 
mechanisms
17. What are the mechanisms for people to obtain assistance in the 
case of climate shocks (e.g. crop failure, flooding, destruction 
of shelter or productive assets)? (e.g. how do citizens contact 
relevant authorities to obtain assistance?)
Citizen 
consultations 
18. Are there mechanisms for communities to request relocation 
from climate change-affected areas? 
19. Do current disaster risk reduction policies and initiatives 
 consider climate change projections?
Livelihoods 
and Economic 
Development
20. Are there any employment or economic development initiatives 
that target climate change-affected communities? (e.g. skill 
training, financial assistance, …)
21. In what geographical areas should assistance be strengthened 
for populations vulnerable to sudden-onset or slow-onset 
events?
22. Which ministries/departments or partners have the final 
authority for the protection of and assistance to people 
 displaced by disasters?
23. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current responses to 
people displaced by natural hazard-induced disasters?
24. Are there any compensation or social protection schemes in 
place for those affected by (slow-onset/rapid-onset) climate 
impacts? For example, government- or internationally- 
supported food safety net programs, crop or livestock 
insurance.
25. If so, what impact do those schemes have on migration?  
(more/less/different destinations …) 
Human rights of 
migrants and dis-
placed people
26. Are you aware of any international or regional human rights 
instruments country X is party to that are applicable to 
migrants, displaced people and relocates in your country? 
27. Please describe any domestic human rights and civil liberties 
instruments (e.g. constitutional amendments, domestic 
application of international human rights law) to migrants, 
displaced people, relocating/relocated people (for example: 
right to migration/free movement, citizenship, mobility of 
voting rights, mobility of social security, etc.) 
28. Are you aware of your government’s involvement in the 
discussions on the Global Compact on Safe, Regular and 
Orderly Migration or the Global Compact on Refugees?  
Please describe any of the government’s priorities therein.
Application of 
women’s rights 
of migrants and 
displaced people
29. Are you aware of women’s rights instruments that are 
 applicable to women and girls who are migrating, displaced or 
being relocated?
Rights & Capacities 
to move
30. What capacities are there in the government to manage migra-
tion, displacement and planned relocation? What capacities are 
needed?
31. Are there any planned relocation programmes related to 
 environmental change? If so, how do these feed into other 
existing settlement schemes?
32. Should people severely affected by climate change in your 
country be entitled to live and work in another country? 
33. Do national asylum regulations and refugee policies consider 
environmental/climate change? If so, in which way?  
Please detail on past experience and/or existing legislation.
1
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Dimension 2: 
Actor/stake-
holder network 
Institutional 
Setting
Stakeholders 34. Which role do regional and international actors play in 
managing or responding to environmentally/climate related 
migration, displacement, and planned relocation on the 
national level? (for example development aid, NGO)
35. Which institutions and/or individual actors do you regard 
crucial to respond to the challenges of climate migration?
36. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
institutional structure to address environment- or climate- 
related displacement, migration and planned relocation?
Coordination 37. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the communication 
between actors working on environment, climate change, and 
displacement, migration, and relocation?
38. On what basis do government actors working in climate change 
adaptation, disaster response, internal displacement, migration, 
and planned relocation coordinate? For example, are there 
inter-ministerial task forces or trainings?
Dimension 3: 
Supportive 
Actions
Knowledge Research 39. Are there any research programmes or projects specific to 
environment- or climate-related migration, displacement and 
planned relocation?
40. How is current knowledge and new research on environment, 
climate change and migration, displacement and planned 
relocation shared within your ministry/organisation? 
41. What type of research on this topic is needed?
Data 42. Describe any data that exists on migration, displacement and 
planned relocation?
43. What are the strengths and weaknesses of current data 
collection and data/knowledge management on migration, 
displacement and planned relocation?
44. Whom else should we interview regarding the topic of climate 
migration?
2
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